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A few days after New Year's in 1857 on a windy, bitter
cold afternoon in Boston, a gaunt somber-faced man named John

Brown appeared at the Bromfield Street offices of the

Massachusetts Kansas Aid Committee.

The gray-haired fifty-

six year old had recently returned from Kansas where for over
a year he had helped lead the violent struggle to prevent the

imposition of slavery on that territory.

Brown believed that

force had to be used to prevent a proslavery takeover in

Kansas and he came east seeking funds to further subsidize

freestate military efforts.

After introducting himself and

presenting his references, the Kansas warrior was greeted by
the committee's newly appointed secretary, young Franklin

Benjamin Sanborn.

Their meeting on that cloudy winter day

the
began a three year relationship in which Sanborn became
Massachusetts
"lynch-pin" of Brown's fund-raising activities in

and New England.

In fact, during the next few years Sanborn

Theodore Parker,
and five other prominent abolitionists,

Gerrit Smith,
Samuel Gridley Howe, Thomas Wentworth Higginson,
help Brown collect
and George Luther Stearns would not only
secret committee to
funds for Kansas but would also form a
March 1858 all six
subsidize his raid on Harpers Ferry. By

provide supplies, arms and
men were engaged in a conspiracy to
thrust at slavery.
money for the old man's insurrectionary
"make a dash" south, stir a
They supported Brown's plan to
slave uprising and then retreat
vast and, if necessary, bloody

into a Virginia mountain fortress where other similar attacks

might be prepared.

By October 1859, the Six had given Brown

4000 dollars to begin the raid as well as 200 Sharpe's rifles

and 200 hand guns.
But in spite of the fact

that, a

record of the conspiracy

can be accurately reconstructed from a number of historical
sources, no full-scale analysis of why the members of the

Secret Committee of Six, either collectively or individually,

decided to support Brown has been undertaken.

This disserta-

tion seeks to begin a discussion of that question and in the

process expand understanding of abolitionist class values,
racial attitudes and notions of justified violence.

Immediately three problems present themselves.

First

violence.
there is the issue of the group's ambivalence toward
that it
Despite their regard for Higher Law and their belief
slavtheoretically justified the use of violent means against

actually subsidize
ery, none of the committeemen were ready to
force

when they met Brown in 1857.

Yet by the spring of 1858

of force.
they made a tentative commitment to the use

This

ambivalence and moved
study examines how they resolved this

beyond Higher Law for

a

justification of violence.

the motives of
The second problem to face in examining
why six men who were so
the Secret Six is how to explain
racialist stereotype of the
thoroughly imbued with a romantic

support black insurrection.
black man found it possible to
committeemen agreed, blacks were
After all, if, as most of the

.

pliant, docile and "little addicted" to revenge, it seems

unlikely Brown could have convinced them that slaves would
make violent efforts for freedom.

The question remains:

how

did the Six come to believe a race without vengeful emotions

would or could fight for freedom?
Finally there is the problem of Brown's relation to the
Six.

Most historians talk about the personal and religious

differences between the warrior and his associates.

They see

the link between him and the others only in terms of their

mutual hatred for slavery.

Whenever any historian ventures

beyond this tie, Brown is portrayed as someone spiritually

separated from his supporters
them as a person.

— almost

incomprehensible to

My research suggests a different conclu-

sion.

Brown's social character, his personality and values

were

quite comprehensible to the members of the Secret Com-

mittee of Six.

Indeed it was on the basis of similar social

values that the relationship between Brown and his committee

associates was founded.

These values have profound implica-

tions for the Six's willingness to commit themselves to vio-

racialist
lence and see the black man in other than romantic
terms
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INTRODUCTION

A few days after New Year's in 1857 on

a windy,

bitter

cold afternoon in Boston, a gaunt somber- faced man named John

Brown appeared at the Bromfield Street offices of the

Massachusetts Kansas Committee.

The gray-haired, fifty-six

year old had recently returned from Kansas where for over a
year he helped lead the violent struggle to prevent the impo-

sition of slavery on that territory. Brown believed that
force had to be used to prevent a proslavery takeover in

Kansas and he came east seeking funds to further subsidize

freestate military efforts.

After introducing himself and

presenting his references, the freedom fighter was greeted
by the committee's newly appointed secretary, young Franklin

Benjamin Sanborn.

Their meeting on that cloudy winter day

began a three year relationship in which Sanborn became the
"lynch-pin" of Brown's fund-raising activities in

Massachusetts and New England.

And during those years,

Sanborn, along with five other prominent abolitionists,

Theodore Parker, Samuel Gridley Howe, Thomas Wentworth
Higginson, Gerr.it Smith, and George Luther Stearns, would not
only help Brown collect funds for Kansas but would also form
Ferry.
a secret committee to subsidize his raid on Harpers
to
By March 185 8 all six men were engaged in a conspiracy

insurrecprovide supplies, arms, and money for the warrior's

tionary thrust at slavery.

They supported Brown's plan to

2

"make a dash" into the South, stir a slave

uprising, and

then retreat to a Virginia mountain fortress where other similar attacks might be prepared.

When Brown's attack aborted in the fall of 1359 and he
was captured in the federal arsenal at Harpers Ferry, all of
the secret committeemen

(except Higginson) burned significant

portions of information which linked them to the scheme.
Still, enough source material remains to suggest a number of

factual conclusions about their conspirational activity on
his behalf.

We know that Brown formally revealed his plan

to the Six in late February and early March of 1858, that he

was able to calm their initial fears and quell their doubts

during the next year and that by October 1859 he had
received almost 4000 dollars from them to finance the raid.
We know, too, that although the raid was originally scheduled

for the late spring of 1858, it had to be postponed when a

disgruntled associate of Brown's named Hugh Forbes threatened to reveal the whole scheme to influential political
leaders in Washington D. C.

It is also true that while all

of the committee members didn't know all of the specific

details of the proposed attack (they were shocked when Brown
Sanborn,
was trapped inside of the arsenal), at least four,

where,
Stearns, Smith and Higginson certainly knew when,

violent work.
how, and why Brown desired to begin his

It is

these facts.
very probable Samuel Gridley Howe also knew
Sanborn, Stearns and
Just ten days before the October assault
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Lewis Hayden, the leader of Boston's black abolitionist community, stayed awake all night outlining the plan to an

erratic

young man named Francis Merriam who was determined

to join Brown's small insurrectionary cadre.

In short,

the

factual record of the conspiracy can be accurately recon-

structed despite the destruction of some documents."'"
But up to now no one has attempted a full-scale analysis
of why the members of the Secret Committee of Six (either

collectively or individually) decided to support Brown's violent aim.

While biographers of Brown and those who supported

him have made some attempt to examine motive, no one has pro-

duced a detailed and

probing

the committee's activities.

examination of the reasons for
It is my belief that in failing

to do so these historians have forfeited an important oppor-

tunity to assess abolitionist class values, racial attitudes
and notions of justified violence.

There seem to be many reasons for this failure.

The

most prominent has to do with what Stanley Elkins called the
"persistent rhythm" of rightness and wrongness which characterizes much historical writing on the issues of slavery and
abolition.

Most examinations of the men who formed the

Secret Committee of Six spend far too much time justifying
or chastising the conspirators for their activity and far too

little time trying to assess and understand that behavior.
C.
Two historians who criticize the Six most severely are J.

Furnas and Allan Nevins.
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Furnas provides the most elaborate and censurious exam-

ination of the collective and individual motives of the
Secret Six.

He believes the conspiracy was nothing more than

a "literary-flavored antic" by men who read too much for

their own good.
tory.

It was the most "bookish" conspiracy in his-

Furnas feels the entire membership of the group was

"stimulated by Scott, Byron and their imitators."

They were

obsessed with romantic tales of "God-minded, zeal-and-steel
militants" who roamed England during the 1600' s.

In the

process of this romantic identification, the Six forgot the
"immoral aspects of disorder, violence, anarchy and murder."

Furnas contends that all of the conspirators had

a

"Victo-

rian zeal for romantic violence" which was both "ill-advised"
and "insincere."

They failed to develop "adult approaches"

to the problem of ending slavery.

2

Furnas is very dismayed by Thomas Wentworth Higginson

who admitted his boldness came as much from a "love of adventure" and "boyish desire" for stirring experience as from

"moral conviction."

The historian censures Samuel Gridley

Howe for the "ailment" of "daring-do-goodery " combined with

"Yankee Scottery."

Howe helped convince the other group mem-

bers that Brown's plan was militarily "feasible," thus allowing the warrior to give enough details to keep the committee

"confused but open-handed."

Howe was "necessarily fasci-

nated" by Brown's "steady glow" of emotion.

Theodore Parker

also backed Brown because he read Scott and had

a

5

"backhanded fascination" with Byron.

In addition, Parker's

statements about Higher Law allowed him to rationalize
Brown's violent "delusions."

Parker was "infatuated" with

Brown and saw him as a "self -elected exponent of Higher Law"

who was determined to act out what the minister had been
"demanding for a generation."
tion and willingness "to tempt

Parker's relish of insurrec.

.

.

thousands of slaves to

go out and get massacred" was "ill-conceived."

Furnas brands

Gerrit Smith a "self-dramatizing" millionaire who was

addicted to causes
ments, and men.

and "guilt assuaging" subsidies of move-

George Luther Stearns' passion for Brown

stemmed from a "puzzling emotional-chemical affinity."

According to the historian, it was Frank Sanborn's "talent
for hero-worship" which attracted him to Brown and such a

talent is "implicit in Byronic Scottery."

When each of the

members romanticism was coupled with Brown's ability to
"snuff up the odor of blood righteously shed by the Choosen

People," the Kansas Warrior gained "personal ascendancy" over
the Six and made "fools of them all."

3

Though hostile to the secret committee, Furnas admits
Brown
that he is somewhat perplexed by the group's support of

and does not feel fully able to explain it.

Allan Nevins is

equally hostile and, seemingly, as equally perplexed.

Nevins

over the
also sees Brown as gaining a "personal ascendancy"

committee memSix when he suggests that the warrior "awed"
bers.

"widespread
Awe, and the group's "deluded visions" of

6

slave insurrections" explains their support for Brown.

Nevins also asserts the group hoped to "provoke war" by sub-

sidizing the raid.

And he chides them for a lack of "manli-

ness" in dealing with Brown by noting that after the Forbes

disclosures they continued to support the warrior but didn't

want to know any mere details of the plan.

Nevins also

scolds the Six for not making "creditable" efforts to save

Brown once he had been captured.

4

Those historians who are more charitable toward the Six
and seek to demonstrate the moral rectitude of their support
for Brown are led by Oswald Garrison Villard.

Yet for all

his belief in the correctness of the group's act, Villard
seems quite as puzzled about motive.

The historian's schol-

thorough
arly biography of Brown provided the first and most

documentation of the extensive nature of the conspiracy.

But

data Villard made
in spite of his painstaking accumulation of
themselves
little attempt to explain why these men attached
to Brown.

were
He does suggest that the committee members

himself" and
tremendously inspired by the warrior's "faith in

quell their doubts.
were swept along by the man's ability to
always recommended a
Brown met their "every criticism" and
'•plausible way out of every difficulty."

Sanborn as being "on fire

Villard speaks of

for the antislavery cause and

bodies." He says
ready to worship any of its militant
Brown's "sagacity."
Stearns was "strongly impressed" with
though unsure the plan
Parker supported Brown "vigorously"

7

would succeed.

By the end of his heavily-documented treatise,

however, Villard still has not added anything substantial to
his first hints about reasons for the committee's support of
Brown.

Indeed, in his conclusion he returns to the theme of

inspiration as his basic explanation of motive.

Brown

"inspired" the Six and it was this "weapon of the spirit"

which compelled them to support insurrection.

The "secret"

of Brown's influence was his spiritual power and the morality

of his cause.

Most biographers of the individual committee members
support both of Villard' s themes

.

They continually assert a

belief in Brown's inspirational nature and imply that to know
an act was morally justified is to know the fullness of moti-

vation.

Ralph Harlow speaks of Gerrit Smith's "continuous

flow of enthusiasm" in the "cause of good works."

Smith

never allowed himself to be content with "normal routines"
and enjoyed life when spiritual "demands came thickly upon
him."

He could hardly resist Brown's extraordinary scheme.

Henry Steele Commager speaks of Theodore Parker's recognition
of Brown as the recognition accorded a "kindred spirit.

„6

But both Commager and Harlow are troubled in their
them.
assessment of Brown and the Six even as they applaud
they, like
Both men believe the group's act was justified but

for their valmany historians who praise the abolitionists
seem unsure about
iant efforts on behalf of the black man,

violence that was inherent
how to precisely assess the actual

8

in Brown's scheme from the beginning.

Commager says Parker

and Brown both understood that slavery must be "settled
by the sword."

.

.

.

Neither man was afraid of "a little blood-

shed" or a slave insurrection.

But Commager does not push

the theme of Parker's belief in the necessity of violence too
far.

Actually, before this historian finishes his biography

he suggests Brown was something more than a "kindred spirit"
to Parker.

Commager separates Parker from a belief in the

necessity of force by invoking a form of Villard's "secret

weapon"

— spiritual

He claims that Parker and the

power.

other committee members were not only inspired by Brown but
And, as if being hypnotized were not

were also "hypnotized."

enough to absolve Parker of responsibility for death at
Harpers Ferry, Commager introduces a second attenuating factor into the relationship of Brown and the Unitarian minisHe attempts to ritualize the conspiracy.

ter.

Theodore

Parker and his friends did not really intend to support
bloody, violent insurrection, they were merely engaged in a
"game."

They "enjoyed

.

secret meetings, the code

the hatching of plots, the

.

.

.

.

.

the purchase of arms,

the

word for
tall talk and the rodomotode, matching Southerners

word."
C.

as
The secret committee's relationship to Brown was,

"conspirVann Woodward has also suggested, simply one big

ational drama."

7

commitRalph Harlow similarly portrays Gerrit Smith's

ment to violence.

of
He admits that after 1354 the idea

.

violence took a "firmer hold" on Smith because the philan-

thropist believed traditional American institutions were
"incapable of fostering men for high and holy works."

Yet

the historian ascribes much of Smith's "acerbity of expres-

sion" about violent means to the "nagging physical pain" of
g
his many physical ailments.

Harold Schwartz's biography of Samuel Gridley Howe also

reflects uncertainty about violence and seeks to portray the
doctor's participation in the conspiracy two ways.

On one

hand, Schwartz says that Howe "never sanctioned illegal

activity" and cannot be blamed for supporting Brown because
he did not "fully realize" what the warrior had in mind.

But

Schwartz readily admits that in May 1858, when Brown's plan
was postponed because of the threats and minor disclosures of

Hugh Forbes, Howe rejected the idea of postponement and
"urged Brown to proceed with his plans."

When Schwartz isn't

denying Howe's participation in the conspiracy he's rationalizing it.
age"

He asks us to believe that Howe's "advancing

(the doctor was in his fifties)

and a failure of judgment.

brought on "debility"

Howe had experienced many "great

and
shocks" in his life, his "little world began to crumble,"

character.
he "lost all perspective" in evaluating Brown's

Howe was "unwilling or unable to realize Brown was

irresponsible

.

.

9

Schwartz also produces another variation on
theme.

.

Howe and the others could not make

a

a

familiar

"clear judgment"

"

"
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of Brown because Brown had an "electric" effect on them.

This electricity prevented them from realizing that Brown was
"a failure," a man of "proven instability," an "incompetant,

and a "megalomaniac.

There is some irony in the ambivalence these historians

obviously feel about their subject's commitment to violence.
For while each historian seems to feel that his subject's

commitment to Higher Law implied both a theoretical and
actual commitment to violence, my research suggests that such
is not the case.
it,

Indeed, though none of the scholars admit

the individuals they have studied were themselves ambiv-

alent about the use of violent means.

While all of the mem-

bers of the Secret Six did (with varying degrees of intensity)

espouse the use of force before Brown sought their assistance,
none (except Higginson) had the practical will to use force
They were ambivalent about the use of force

to end slavery.

when Brown proposed his scheme and for quite awhile afterwards.

No doubt the Six were disillusioned with political

abolitionism.

No doubt they were facile in marshalling argu-

ments to support the theory of justified violence.

But all

found the distance between theory and practice, idea and act
to be very great.

Anthony Burns, a fugitive slave who was

arrested in Boston in the spring of 1854 and returned to
slavery was partially

a

victim of Howe's and Parker's irres-

release.
olution over the issue of supporting his forceful

analysis of
This ambivalence has a profound meaning for any

11

why the secret committeemen eventually decided to support
Brown's effort.

They not only had to be convinced of the

warrior's ability to execute the scheme, his competence, but
they also had to find a rationale that went beyond Higher

Law if they were to justify their practical abolitionism.
The problem with these historian's examination of violence is that it focuses on the origins and justification of

each individual's appeal to violence.
been paid to the nature of that appeal.

Little attention has
For instance, no one

asks whether Parker's repeated pleas for violence were meant
to be taken literally or whether they were the purposeful

rhetorical flourish of a masterful opinion-maker who was

merely trying to jolt slumbering northern moral sensibilities.

These historians do not ask whether the Six envisioned

a purpose for violence beyond its use as a means to achieve

the liberation of blacks from slavery.

Nor, as

I

have previ-

ously suggested, has any careful examination been made of the

distance between the group's theoretical justification of

violent means and its practical will to personally or by subsidy implement such means.

If we too readily accept the

proposition that all committee members were theoretically
dedicated to force and fail to question what that dedication

meant

in practice, we cannot possibly probe the complexity

of their conspirational relationship.

We cannot understand

and
their attachment to a man who sought to both symbolize

actualize the violent overthrow of slavery.

.

Fortunately the two most probing and most sophisticated

examinations of motive among the conspirators, Stephen
Oates

'

B.

biography of Brown, To Purge This Land in Blood and

Tilden Edelstein's work on Thomas Wentworth Higginson entitled

S trange

Enthusiasm

lem of violence.

,

have begun to grapple with the prob-

Oates begins his consideration of why the

Six committed themselves to the use of violent means by sug-

gesting that the six abolitionist committeemen saw violence
as the "only solution" to slavery.

They were imbued with

Higher Law notions, believed all "peaceful alternatives" for
ending slavery had failed and were convinced that black
"revolution" must be attempted.

War upon the South "could

destroy the Slave Power conspiracy, eradicate slavery, and

restore [the] nation to God and the ideals of Jefferson's
Declaration." Oates also suggests that the committeemen

believed that if the raid achieved only temporary success it

would alter white racial conceptions, shock sectional tensions, stimulate slave convulsions and possibly provoke

war

11

Edelstein says that the committee's devotion to black
violence derived as much from the conviction that white attitudes about the slave's nature could be changed as from the

hope that insurrection would totally destroy the institution
in one convulsive episode.

According to Edelstein, Higginson

blacks
wanted Brown to destroy the northern belief that all

were as "submissive as Uncle Tom."

Higginson was as

13

interested in having blacks fight their way out of

a

stereo-

type as he was in having them fight their way off the plantation.

12

But neither historian pursues the notion of an altered

racial image far enough.

My own work suggests that Higginson

and the others were interested in two freedoms for the southern slave:

the freedom from and the freedom to.

The Six

wanted black men and women liberated from the debilitating
environment of slavery and they also wanted that liberation
governed by a prescribed social outlook.

Black violence

would free slaves, kill white slaveholders, encourage

a

change in white racial attitudes and, as important, begin to

inculcate a particular set of values in the Afro-American.
In theory Higginson and his colleagues always believed that

justified violence and the willingness to fight for freedom

were the keystone virtues of Anglo-American political, social,
economic, and cultural life.
to believe

belief)

By October 1859,

they had come

(and were willing to subsidize acts based upon the

that assimilation of these virtues could put black

men well on the road to attaining that superior culture.
Assimilation could unleash the black man's potential for participation in the industrial, democratic, marketplace of the
North.

By October of 1859,

the advocacy of violence by the

and had
six committeemen had fundamental class implications

carried them beyond Higher Law.

14

Oates and Edelstein also begin to confront the whole

issue of Brown's "spiritual" power.

Oates flirts with a

variation of the theme but does not quite

embrace it.

He is

convinced Brown saw himself as an Old Testament Calvinist;

a

missionary who was God's providential instrument to destroy
slavery.

He believes that the six committeemen were

impressed with Brown's "unbending conviction" of that instrumentality.

But Oates does not say they were awed, hypnotized

electrified or in any other way paralyzed by the warrior's
"spiritual power

— only

enthused by his religious conviction."'"

Tilden Edelstein finally pulls the plug on the theory of
Brown's "electric" attraction.

His examination of the one

individual supposedly most electrified by Brown, Frank
Sanborn, fully demonstrates this.

Far from viewing Sanborn

as Brown's "orderly," Edelstein sees the young secretary as

an ambitious, calculating, and cynically manipulative person

whose actions suggest strongly that he used Brown as much as
Brown used him.

As

I

suggest more fully in my own analysis,

Sanborn's support for Brown grew as much out of personal

motives as out of selfless hero-worship.

14

Like Oates, Edelstein also presents a far more balanced

view of Brown than has emerged in previous research.

Brown

is seen as a man who depended as much on slyness as his abil-

ity to inspire and less on people's belief in his "spiritual

power" than on a confidence in his business-like manner.
When John Brown made his first plea for support of the

15

Harpers Ferry scheme in 1858, Edelstein shows how the wise
old man "artfully played-off" his "key supporters" against

each other.

Edelstein does exempt Higginson from such manip-

ulation (Higginson "shrewdly baited" Brown) but, generally
his analysis has great merit and must be examined further if
we are to understand the complexity of Brown's relationship

with the Six."^
Edelstein has done more than cut through redundancy in

historical interpretation by such views.

He has stopped

attempts to force Brown's relationship to the Six into basic

incomprehensibility.

Most scholars have overemphasized

Brown's spiritual attraction, his moral and religious affinities because they have overlooked other fundamental personal

and social values.

This is not to suggest that Brown was not

attractive to the committeemen because of his piety and religiosity.

He was.

But it is to suggest that there are many

levels of attachment among men engaged in a common cause not
all of v/hich need have to do with the essential morality of

that cause.

The morality of the issue need not even be their

primary attachment.

And all of these levels must be plumbed

if we are to have a chance at understanding.

My research indicates that in many ways other than spiritual, moral or religious Brown was very comprehensible to
the committeemen.

Indeed, the virtues he aspired to and val-

secret comues he recommended were the same as those of the

mitteemen.

All of these men had internalized similar values

16

and manifested similar traits.

Their quest for civic repute

and professional achievement was precisely the quest of John
Brown.

Their search for place, security, order, and disci-

pline amidst the chaos and instability of mid-nineteenth century America was as frenetic and anxiety- filled as his own.

Futhermore, Brown knew how to appeal to this value system.

He

consciously displayed what the Six just as consciously
demanded.

The old man's years in the marketplace made him

adept at negotiating business deals even if it didn't

increase his ability to bring these transactions to a suc-

cessful conclusion.

If the group was intrigued with Brown it

was as much the intrigue of Narcissus as that of Faust.
In recent years a number of historians have begun to

define Brown's social personality and character.

Ronald

Story's analysis of this work in his essay "John Brown and
the Injuries of Class" is a particularly insightful examina-

tion of these scholar's findings.

16

Throughout his varied and disastrously unsuccessful
career in the northern marketplace, Brown constantly preached
about the values which should govern

a

man's life.

He coun-

seled his sons, friends, and all who would listen about how
they should act.

He was perpetually concerned with success

and how to achieve it.

Young men should learn "about busi-

ness, about general subjects, and

...

the fear of God."

lookout for
They should be ambitious, frugal, ever on the
funds which could
their "main chance," and careful to husband

17

be put "out on interest."

others,"

Eventually they would "employ

Indeed, a "world of pleasure and success [wasl

sure" if one was "constantly attendant upon early rising ."

Brown's Poor Richard mentality frowned on those who squan-

dered earnings.

Men were not made to "idle away their time

and learn lazy habits."

abstinent behavior.

Brown was full of uplift maxims and

He was obsessed with his own neatness

and cleanliness."^

Above all, John Brown was a family man.
source of his "utmost comfort."

know he had

a

It was the

It made him feel secure to

"warm place in the sympathies, affection, and

confidence of my most familiar acquaintance; my family ."

A

man could "hardly get into difficulties too big to be surmounted" if he had a "firm foothold at home."

It was essen-

tial for Brown to have the social and economic sustenance of
his family as he lurched from one failed business transaction
to anotner.

18

The virtues Brown aspired to and the values he recom-

mended were "self-control, order, cleanliness, industry and
ambition."

Such values produced a "respectable, autonomous,

God-fearing, accumulator with a subordinate nuclear
family.

..."

And while this system may have been "modi-

and
fied" by the "intensity" of his "antislavery sentiment"

after
his "Calvinist piety," it did not change him radically"

Kansas.

According to Story "whatever his [Brown's] immediate

.
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objectives

.

.

.

[his]

ideal person was always comfortably

within the nineteenth century mainstream."
Brown's values and those of his friends on the secret

committee were produced by two dominant trends in northern

ante-bellum society.

The first was the emergence of a market

economy which "rewarded (or seemed to reward) such traits."
The second was the appearance of large groups in society
[who] did not engage directly in the market place and did not

have a similar mode of life."

For Brown and the Six it was

the "marketplace North with its burgeoning assertive middle

class that served as the measure of the rest of society."

The North was "virtually synonomous with its new middle class:
a society of projecting, rootless individuals whose deepest

values were, discipline, achievement, and the nuclear
family
My research suggests that it is only by examining the

relationship of Brown with the Six on the basis of these
assumptions that we can break the persistent rhythm of rightness and wrongness Elkins speaks of.

dimension to that relationship.

In this way we can add

In this way we can begin to

appreciate more fully why the Six believed in Brown's competence and why they felt sure violence could instill the
M
"proper" values in his black insurrectionist followers.
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Finally, there is the important matter of the Six's

attitudes toward the black race.

Recently,

it.

has been

c

and Smith were
rectly suggested that Higginson, Howe, Parker,
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imbued with a "romantic racialist" image of the black man.
They believed blacks were pliant, docile, and "little
addicted" to revenge.

Seemingly the basic difference between

their stereotype and that of the slaveholder was that far

from demanding the institutionalization of a paternalistic
slave system, they believed such a nature was to be rever-

enced for its high degree of Christian virtue.

Man, in the-

ory, could have no greater aim in life than to be docile

before Christ.

My analysis of the Secret Six will deal with

the tortuous trail each conspirator walked in attempting to

square such racial imagery with the subsidy of black violence.

The group's drift from romantic racialism to a bud-

ding conviction in the necessity and ability of slaves to
fight is inextricably tied to their movement toward practical

abolitionism and their belief in the assimilative value of
black violence.
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CHAPTER

I

Deputy marshal Asa Butman paced nervously as he waited

on the sidewalk across the street from Colin Pitt's clothing
store.

Attempting a fugitive slave arrest in Boston was

never easy; trying it during Anniversary Week when hundreds
of delegates were in town for the Anti-Slavery and Women's

Rights conventions compounded the problem.

Butman kept him-

He periodically checked the time and

self well hidden.

glanced down Brattle Street to see if his men were properly
positioned.

It had been a mild May day but now,

as the sun

set and nearby church bells struck five, a chill breeze began
to stir.

Moments after five Colin Pitts and Anthony Burns,

a

black man he had recently hired, stepped out of the store
offices and into the street.

After a brief conversation,

Pitts headed toward the corner of Brattle and Court Streets;

Burns in the opposite direction.

Butman panicked.

Every

day for a week, Burns had accompanied his employer and the

deputy marshal positioned his men accordingly.

Now the sus-

pected fugitive was walking away from the trap set for him.
investigating
It looked as if a day of waiting and week of

had been wasted.

Suddenly, Burns stopped, turned around, and

ran to catch Pitts.

signaled

his

Butman jumped from his hiding place,

men, and hurried across the street with
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stiff-legged strides.

When he reached Burns the deputy mar-

shal identified himself and claimed the black man was wanted
in connection with a robbery investigation.

Before Burns

could protest, Butman's deputies lifted him off his feet,

held him horizontally above the ground in their out-stretched
hands, and rushed to the Court House.

Once inside the build-

ing, the suspected fugitive slave was carried up three

flights of stairs and taken to the Jury Room where he was

bound hand and foot and placed in a

chair.'''

About twenty minutes later, the door to the Jury Room
Butman accompanied Virginia slave owner Charles

opened.

Suttle and his hiring agent William Brent inside.

F.

Obscuring

Burns' view of the others in the room, Suttle faced Burns and

asked him why he had run away.

vessel where

"I fell asleep on board the

worked and before

I

I

woke up she set sail and

carried me off," Burns replied.
"Haven't

I

always treated you well, Tony?"

"You have always given me twelve and

a

half cents once

a year," Burns said.

In the silence that followed this exchange, Butman blurted

out,

"Well that's the man is it?"
"Yes," replied Suttle.

the room.

A moment later he and Brent left

2

After they left, Burns faced Butman and asked why the

marshal had lied about wanting him in connection with
bery.

a

rob-

Butman smiled and replied that he was "afraid of the
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mob."

Burns turned away from his captor.

would be

a

He knew there

hearing to certify his identity and then he would

be shipped back to Virginia.

He anticipated harsh treatment

and realized his ordeal had begun when the taunts of guards

outside his cell prevented him from sleeping.

They kept

reminding him that Thomas Sims, a fugitive slave captured in

Boston two years earlier, had occupied the same cell before
being sent back to slavery.

Ironically, if Burns had even a

slight chance for freedom, it was because of the Sims rendition.

The failure to stop Sims' return had stimulated

Boston's abolitionist community to develop better methods for

dealing with slave arrests.

By early evening the Vigilance

Committee of Boston was aware of Burns' plight and had begun
efforts to prevent his return to Virginia.

3

II

At nine o'clock in the morning on May 25, 1854, Commissioner Edward Loring convened the rendition hearing of

Anthony Burns.

Famed novelist and Vigilance Committee law-

yer Richard Henry Dana, Jr., was at the fugitive's side from
the beginning of the hearing.

He hoped to defend Burns.

But

after a night in jail and further reflection on what awaited

him in Virginia, the captive felt defense counsel was "no
use."

He was certain to "fare worse" if he resisted rendi-

tion.

Seconds after this refusal Dana was joined by two

other committee members, Charles

M.

Ellis and Theodore Parker,
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the well-known Unitarian minister.

Parker immediately con-

ferred with Burns and explained his appointment as minister-

at-large for the Boston Vigilance Committee.

He pressed

Burns to accept counsel but the fugitive refused to reconsider his decision.

Burns said he wanted to go back to

Virginia "as easy as

I

can."

Parker wouldn't yield.

It was

only "fear" which gave Burns such a "sad presentment" of his
fate.

No harm would be done by making a defense.

Still

Burns hesitated as Loring began the proceedings by summoning

William Brent to give testimony.

Then,

just as Brent began

to discuss the conversation which took place between Suttle

and Burns in the Jury Room on the previous day
rupted.

,

Dana inter-

He notified the Commissioner that Burns had accepted

counsel and strenuously objected to Brent's testifying before
a

proper defense could be prepared.

Thomas was enraged.

Suttle

's

attorney, Seth

Thomas was certain that "the only object

of those who sought delay was for public purposes of their

own."

Pandemonium broke loose in the court room and Loring

repeatedly gavelled order.

When calm was restored he asked

the fugitive to approach the bench.

Would he accept a defense?

What was his decision?

Burns glanced over his shoulder

at Suttle and Brent, then at Parker and Dana, finally he

turned to Loring and announced his desire for counsel.

Loring called for order, postponed the hearing until Saturday, May 27, and dismissed the court.

4

Theodore Parker was elated as he left the building and

went home to await the Vigilance Committee meeting scheduled
for two o'clock that afternoon.

He felt great satisfaction

at having convinced Burns to make a defense.

After the

humiliation of the Sims affair Parker repeatedly predicted
Boston would become easy prey to federal authorities if slave
"kidnappings" were not resisted.

Powerful reaction to Burns'

arrest would prove Boston was willing to resist unjust laws;

willing to "fight manfully" for the freedom of slaves.
was the time "to push and be active

bring out men

.

.

.

.

agitate, agitate."

.

.

Now

call meetings,

Parker had been

"waiting a long time for some event to occur which would blow
so loud a horn it should waken the North."

Seth Thomas was

correct, Anthony Burns would serve "public purposes."

If

Bums' defense were handled properly the black man from
Virginia might have his freedom.

But whether Burns was freed

or sent back Parker knew the incident could become a "starting horn" for a new wave of antislavery sentiment.

Parker came late to the antislavery movement.

until the mid-1840

'

s,

5

It wasn't

some fifteen years after Garrison had

launched the crusade, that he began to devote himself to the
cause.

However, once committed, he totally immersed himself

in the work.

The minister studied Roman slave codes, poured

over census statistics, examined the economic indices of
slavery, and read tracts which condemned the institution as

well as those which justified it.

He listened to the stories
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of fugitive slaves living in Boston and consulted with
free

blacks like Lewis Hayden and Fredrick Douglas.

By 1850,

Parker relegated all other efforts to a secondary status.

Abolition became his primary religious duty; absorbing all
his passion and serving as a way to bring morality to an

imperfect but perfectible world. 6
Nor did Parker confine his activity to mere study or the

preaching of sermons.

He was convinced that men and women in

the movement must act, as well as speak, in accordance with

their beliefs.
18 50,

After the new Fugitive Slave Law appeared in

he was instrumental in forming the Boston Vigilance

Committee, an organization dedicated to preventing the return
of slaves who fled to the city.

During October of that year

when William and Ellen Craft, two members of his congregation,
were threatened with "kidnapping," Parker led

a

group of

sixty vigilantes to the hotel where marshals charged with

arresting the Crafts were staying.

Without any physical vio-

lence, the group successfully intimidated the officers, drove

them from the city, and protected the Crafts*

freedom.

7

Then, in April, 1852, Parker took an active part in the

unsuccessful effort to prevent the rendition of Thomas Sims.
He

and

other

committee members

never

did

settle

on

a plan to block the attempt and listened only skeptically as
a young firebrand minister from Worcester, Thomas Wentworth

Higginson, called for an attack on the Court House to free
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Sims.

Because of their indecision they were forced to wit-

ness Sims' return to slavery.

8

Theodore Parker based his abolitionist efforts on a

foundation of Higher Law.

There was an infinite law existing

before all time and stored in the intuitive recesses of man's
soul which justified resistance to the great moral crime of
slavery.

Higher Law negated any and every man-made measure

designed to preserve and perpetuate the institution of slavIt impelled antislavery men to "help fugitives;"

ery.

impelled them to "seek and save what is lost."

But Parker

had problems in attempting to apply this theory.

By late

May of 1854/ the minister still hadn't determined the bounds
or form of his own personal resistance to the "crime" of

fugitive slave renditions.

He was quite uncertain as to

whether forcible means should be used in defense of black
Theoretically men were justified in using such

liberty.

But the distance between theory and practice was

means.

great and it was one which Parker had not fully traversed.

9

In 1850, the minister informed President Filmore that he

was "not a man of violence."

He had tremendous respect for

If he resisted efforts to enforce

the "sacredness" of life.

the Fugitive Slave Law it would be "as gently as

but with such strength as
"head

.

.

.

foot or

.

.

.

I

command."

I

know how

He vowed to serve as

hand to any body of serious and

earnest men who will go with me with no weapons."
blacks in Boston led by Lewis Hayden rescued

a

When free

fugitive slave
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named Shadrach

in

early

1851,

Parker called it the "most

noble deed done in Boston since the destruction of tea
in
1773."

However, he still shied away from personally commit-

ting himself to the use of force.
force to rescue a man with.

He would "not

.

.

use

.

But go unarmed when there is a

chance of success."^
By 1853, Parker's views had shifted slightly.

When he

lectured William Craft on the obligations of a husband,
Parker suggested that if Craft was attacked and there was an

attempt to force him back into slavery, he had "a natural
right to resist the man to death."
to exercise the right for himself,

While Craft might refuse
"his wife was dependent

upon him for protection and it was his duty to protect her."
It was a duty Craft "could not decline."

Even in this admo-

nition the minister was cautious when counseling the use of
force.

He warned against hatred and vengeful emotions

— hat-

ing the man one struck "would not leave action without sin."

This warning, when coupled with future actions, suggests that
by May, 18 54, Parker still had not resolved his personal

debate about participating in forcible resistance to law.

11

Parker was apprehensive as he prepared placards adver-

tising the date and time of the Burns hearing.

Surely forc-

ible resistance would be demanded by some of the membership

when the Vigilance Committee met that afternoon.
he respond?

How would

28

Some 200 members of the Vigilance Committee met in

Faneuil Hall that humid, Thursday afternoon.
commanded their attention.

Soon two plans

About twenty men spoke ardently

for forcible rescue of Burns from the Court House.

But the

vast majority of the committee took a "wait and see" position.

They didn't want to move until Commissioner Loring made his
decision.

Then, if Burns was to be returned, they could jam

the streets, create a melee, and spirit the fugitive away.

Logic supported the majority position.

After all, it would

be very difficult to force entry into a strong stone Court

House which was sure to be filled with armed deputies.

And

even if the attack succeeded Burns might be hidden and not
found during the brief possession of the building.

By eight

o'clock that evening, the majority plan was formally adopted.
In addition, a public meeting was called for Friday night,

May 26, in Faneuil Hall and

Court House.

a

detail of men sent to watch the

If there was any attempt to remove the black

captive these committeemen

would provide

planning and organization would prevent

a

a

warning.

Proper

repetition of the

Sims affair.

After the meeting adjourned the advocates of forcible
rescue, and some of those in doubt such as Parker, remained in

the hall and continued to discuss the feasibility of their

plan.

Parker, Wendell Phillips, Samuel Gridley Howe, Austin

Bearse, and William Kemp eventually formed an executive com-

mittee for the group.

They decided to reconvene on Friday
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afternoon and again debate the plan for forcible rescue.

Though Partker had not committed himself to such means
his

membership on the executive committee indicates his continued
willingness to entertain the idea of force.

His experience

with the Crafts, Sims, and now Burns, coupled with the intensity of his commitment to antislavery reform and the logic of
his Higher Law doctrines demanded that he consider the use of

force as a legitimate form of resistance. 13

Parker's personal debate was also strongly affected by
the militance of his young protege, Thomas Wentworth

Higginson, minister of the Worcester Free Church.

Like

Parker, Higginson came from a family that traced its ancestry

back to the first families of the Massachusetts Bay Colony.
He was the son of Stephen and Louisa Higginson.

Stephen Higginson came from

a

highly successful merchant

family but had experienced personal economic misfortune during the War of 1812 because of bad investments and his own

mismanagement. He eventually took a position as Treasurer of
Harvard College but continued to be plagued by a poor organiza
tional sense and the inability to handle accounts properly.

Stephen Higginson never did regain the affluence of his early
years and died soon after his youngest son, Thomas Wentworth, wa
ten years old. It was up to Thomas' mother, Louisa, to rally
the family fortunes and provide for the children's education.

She did a creditable job.

Eventually, in 1837, her prodding,

30

Thomas' hard work, and family connections paved the way for
his entry into the college.

He was only thirteen. 15

While at Harvard the ambitious young man distinguished
himself.

Thomas Wentworth was elected to Phi Beta Kappa and

graduated near the top of his class.

The grade-conscious

young man seemed destined for great achievements.
only one problem:

There was

Higginson was uncertain about what career

he should apply his intelligence and energy toward.

After

graduation the gangling six-footer spent three years marking
time as an unfulfilled schoolteacher trying to decide in

which direction he should move.

Finally, in 1844, he

enrolled in Harvard Divinity School, prompted less by his own
desire than by the urging of family (particularly his mother)
and friends.

They wanted him to begin satisfying the promise

of his undergraduate days.

Higginson'

s

1

own uncertainty about a career as minister

and the boring, rationalistic Unitarian theology taught at

Harvard combined to totally alienate him from his studies.
He concluded that as a minister he couldn't really be a

"leader of men" and so left school at the end of his first
year.

He soon reconsidered his decision, however, after lis-

tening to Theodore Parker's address to that year's graduating
class.

The young scholar was astounded by the impact

Parker's radical theology made upon his listeners.

theology and the reputation he built as

a

Parker's

minister fused

Higginson 's personal need to be "a leader of men" with
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religious, romantic and reform elements.

He went back to

Harvard Divinity School and distinguished himself by graduating at the top of his class.

Ironically, when Higginson

gave the graduation address in 1847 on "The Clergy and
Reform,

"

Parker sat in the audience and marvelled at the

speaker 17

Despite his commitment to religious life, Higginson'
doubts about a ministerial career continued over the next

nine years in a somewhat abated form.

He continually ques-

tioned whether such a career was "worthwhile" or would give

him "position and influence."

His confidence in his decision

to become a minister was severely challenged by his first

congregation in Newburyport.

Here he pumped for antislavery

reform among men who made their living by trading with cotton
planting slave owners and then added insult to injury by

exchanging pulpits with Theordore Parker, a man shunned by

virtually all established Unitarian ministers in the Boston
area

18

While at Newburyport, Higginson did begin to earn

siderable reputation among Massachusetts reformers.

a con-

He

became very active in the Free-Soil campaign of 184 8 and by
the time he was forced to resign from his pastorate in 18 50,

was well-enough known to do

a

brief tour on the lecture cir-

cult.

Like Parker, Higginson saw the enactment of the Fugitive

Slave Law as contrary to the dictates of Higher Law.

He

1

.
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suggested that men and women of Massachusetts "disobey
it"
and show their "good citizenship" by "taking the legal
conse-

quences."

His address "The Crisis Now Coming," written dur-

ing the attempt to arrest William and Ellen Craft, advanced
a

more militant position than that of his mentor.

Though he

claimed to "abhor bloodshed," Higginson found it difficult to
"say when a man must stop in defending his inalienable

rights."

To Higginson, the Shadrach rescue was not merely

"a noble deed."

involved.

The "issue of manliness" was too keenly

There wasn't anyone "of any real manliness" who

did not in his "secret soul respect these colored men of
*.
«
Boston

..20

Higginson put greater distance between himself and
Parker on the issue of forcible resistance during the Sims
affair.

In a Vigilance Committee meeting he held the audi-

ence "spellbound" with an eloquent plea for active resistance
to the law.

Wendell Phillips was convinced Higginson had

brought the group to the "eve of Revolution."
realized the intensity of Higginson'

s

And Parker

convictions when the

young minister planned with Austin Bearse to rescue Sims from
the frigate Acorn

.

The two men wanted to try a pirate- like

attack on the boat which was taking Sims back to Virginia.
Nor did Parker miss the impact Higginson was making on many

antislavery leaders by advocating such tactics.

2

Thomas Sims' rendition upset Higginson greatly.

He was

bitter about the committee's failure to develop and execute
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a

rescue plan.

Higginson was angered by "disorderly" meet-

ings where each man advanced his "own theory."

a fugitive

slave arrest was an occasion which "required the utmost

promptness and decision."

It also required men to scrap

"fixed rules" and "strive to do what seems best without ref-

erence to others."

If commitment to Higher Law meant commit-

ment to "bloodshed," Thomas Wentworth Higginson was ready to
take the step. 22

Just a month before the Sims rendition, in March 1052,

Higginson began work as minister of the Worcester Free Church.
The Free Church was a congregation organized on principles

similar to those which governed Parker's religious society.
In fact, Parker had argued for Higginson to take the position.

At first, Higginson was reticent but he finally decided to
accept the post and soon enjoyed a warm relationship with the

men and women of his congregation.

On Thursday, May 25, 1854

while preparing his sermon for that week, Higginson was notified of Burns' capture and the Vigilance Committee meeting

scheduled for Friday evening.

By early Friday morning he was

on a train headed for Boston.

As he rode to Boston,

Higginson reflected on the Sims arrest two years earlier.

He

wondered if the committee would still be plagued by "great

want of preparation" for their "revolutionary work."

He won-

dered if the men of the committee could ever disobey law.
Like himself, they had been brought up to respect law.

It

had taken the "whole experience" of the Sims case to educate

,

his mind "in the attitude of revolution."

others had been affected by the episode.

He wondered how

For Higginson it

had been "strange to find oneself outside established institutions, to be obliged to lower one's voice and conceal one's

purposes, to see

wrong side."

lav;

and order, police and military on the

Had Parker, Phillips, Howe and the others been

affected the same way?
sity of force?

Did they really understand the neces-

Were they as ready as he to prevent Burns

return by any means?

He wondered.

23

The Worcester activist arrived in Boston just before

noon and soon learned of the executive committee meeting
called the previous evening.

He attended the meeting, asked

that Martin Stowell's name be added to its membership, and

hinted that Stowell was bringing men from Worcester to
attempt a forcible rescue.

Because Higginson couldn't give

any details about the plan before consulting with Stowell and

because the executive committee had not developed any plan of
its own, the meeting was adjourned.

again in the anteroom of Faneuil Hall
the eight o'clock assembly.

could be discussed then.

They decided to meet
a few

minutes before

If Stowell did have a plan,

it

24

Around six o'clock Higginson went to the train station.
There he met Stowell and

Worcester.

a few

men he brought with him from

Stowell immediately outlined his rescue plan.

He

wanted an attack launched on the Court House in two stages.
First Higginson, he, and his men would storm the doors of the
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Court House.

They would be reinforced after the initial

charge by the large crowd slated to attend the evening
meeting at Faneuil Hall.

A great deal depended on the speakers

who were addressing the assembly.

it was up to one of them

to incite the crowd and send them rushing to the Court
House.

Stowell realized the precariousness of the plan.

He realized

how important it was for Higginson and himself to coordinate
their efforts with the speakers.
delicate.

He realized timing would be

It was absolutely necessary that the Faneuil Hall

crowd arrive moments after the first stage of the attack
began.

But Stowell was sure it could be done.

Higginson

thought so too. 25
The two men hurried to meet with the executive committee

members and outline their proposal.

When they unveiled the

scheme Austin Bearse immediately rejected it.

William Kemp

liked it but claimed he couldn't help because he wasn't

scheduled to speak.

Phillips was scheduled to address the

assembly but couldn't be found because he was busy with last

minute preparations for the gathering.

Only Parker and Howe,

both of whom were to speak, could assist.

These two men lis-

tened incredulously as Stowell and Higginson discussed the

planned rescue effort.

Howe and Parker weren't sure of the

scheme's chances and seem to have been
their own role in it.

a

bit confused about

But neither vetoed the plan.

As a

result, Higginson and Stowell left the anteroom meeting

believing they could depend on one of the two (most likely
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Parker) to send the crowd rushing to Court Square.

Higginson

and Stowell were also heartened by Lewis Hayden's promise
to
send ten blacks to assist the first stage of the attack.

Minutes after they left the hall, the two Worcester activists
strolled around Court Square checking to see that everything
was ready for the assault.

As they did, Samuel Sewall intro-

duced George Russell to the large assemblage at Faneuil
Hall.
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After Russell welcomed the audience, Samuel Gridley Howe
stood up to read the resolves of the meeting.

Howe was well-

known to Massachusetts citizenry as the founder of Perkins
School for the Blind.

He was a close friend of Parker's and

helped found the Vigilance Committee.

Whenever a fugitive

slave arrest was attempted, Howe stood right along side his
friend Parker in efforts to prevent it.

He smiled warmly and

acknowledged the applause which greeted him as he stepped to
the rostrum.

Actually, Howe was quite tense as he prepared

to introduce the resolutions.

He was beginning to realize

the implications of his meeting with Higginson and Stowell

moments earlier.

Yes, he believed in Higher Law and knew

that unjust laws must be resisted but like Parker he had
always stopped short of personally participating in acts of

violent resistance.
Stowell plan?

Why had he assented to the Higginson-

It could mean bloodshed.

Only half -concentrating on the resolves, Howe's mind was

flooded with memories of past fugitive slave rescue efforts
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and he vainly wrestled with the question of forcible
resistance.

His thoughts drifted as he mechanically called out

the resolutions.

"Resistance to tyrants is obedience to God

..."

Eight years before, Howe stood in Faneuil Hall and

addressed a gathering of abolitionists on the necessity of

preventing the rendition of fugitive slaves.

At the begin-

ning of his speech he assured the audience that he did not

propose to "move the public mind to any expression of indignation

— much

less acts of violence."

Yet during the speech

he could not contain his anger and suggested law would "not

prevent" the "outrage" of kidnapped slaves.
anger Howe did not take the final step.

Despite such

He veered away from

outright suggestions of violent resistance in his conclusion
by claiming that renditions could be prevented if citizens

fixed their "eyes upon him [the slave hunter]" and didn't
take them off until "he leaves our borders without his

prey
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Throughout the early 1850' s Howe continued to struggle

with the notion of violent resistance.
law could do great harm to men.

He began to believe

When Horace Mann asked him

what he thought of legislation prohibiting corporations from
employing people for more than ten hours

a day,

heatedly that he was against the proposal.
men.

Howe replied

Law emasculated

It prevented them from protecting themselves and inured

them to their own responsibilities.

But this distrust of law

.

38

and his recurring contention that nothing could
truly become
law that could not "answer the eternal principles
of right"

didn't help the doctor resolve the debate inherent in
his
first speech against the Fugitive Slave Law.

For all his

conviction about the transcendence of Higher Law, the evil of
the Slave Power, and justice in protecting escaped slaves, he

still could not accept shedding blood in the resistance to

unjust laws.

He could not bring himself to participate in

actual violence

28

As he pronounced the words of the last resolution and

sat down, Howe knew his approval of the Higginson-Stowell

plan meant very little.

incite the crowd.

He personally would do nothing to

No matter what his theories, he could not

abet violent resistance.

He was horrified by the thought of

what might happen in Court Square at any moment.
The next speaker was Wendell Phillips.
to the rostrum,

He rose, stepped

and was greeted by an enormous ovation.

Phillips knew nothing of the rescue plan and spoke temperately.

He suggested only that people turn out on Saturday

morning at nine o'clock to show that Anthony Burns had "no
master but his God."
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At Court Square, Thomas Wentworth Higginson heard the
roar go up from Faneuil Hall.

He realized the ovation must

be for Phillips since he was scheduled as the first major

speaker.

Higginson also reasoned that it would be best to

delay the attack until it was Parker's turn to speak.
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Phillips had not been informed of the plan and there
was no

way to be certain that Howe or Parker had approached him
before he gave his speech.

would cue their attack.

The ovation that greeted Parker

Higginson and Stowell drew the men

together, passed out a dozen hand axes, readied the huge

wooden beam they were going to use as a battering ram against
the Court House doors, and waited patiently.

Lewis Hayden appeared with ten blacks.
as scheduled.

At that moment

Everything was going

It was all up to Parker.

He must trigger the

emotions of the crowd and send them to the Court House.

Higginson was confident.

If anyone knew how to arouse an

assembly it was Theodore Parker. 30
After Phillips* speech Parker stepped nervously to the
rostrum.

Higginson 's revelations a few minutes earlier had

been startling and

a

bit confusing but Parker was fully aware

of the scene about to be acted out in Court Square.

What is

more, he knew the importance of his role in the scheme.

He

was the only major speaker with prior knowledge of the

planned attack.

It was up to him to incite the crowd and

send them rushing toward the square.

When Higginson first

revealed the plan Parker was certain he could assist.

Now,

that certainty faded as his persistant doubts about using

forcible means returned.

Parker began his speech auspiciously and with a taunt,

addressing the assembly as his "fellow subjects of Virginia."
Shouts of

"No'."

"No!" greeted his words.

After these
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inflamatory remarks, Parker referred to the Sims capture
and

claimed that "if Boston had spoken then, we should not have
been here tonight."

Yes, the people of Boston were "vassals"

of Virginia and federal authorities were so confident of
this

that they hadn't even bothered to chain the Court House.

They had no fear of Burns being rescued.

Boston's submissive

behavior would allow the police to carry Burns off "in
cab."
it!"

Again,

the crowd roared back.

"Let's see them try!"

control of the assembly.

"No I"

a

"They can't do

Parker exhibited a masterful

Actually, this was the only kind of

violence he really understood.

It was a vicarious form,

purely rhetorical, rising out of the mix of his own incendiary words and the crowd's emotions.

First, he built the

crowd's confidence by involking "higher law."
advised them of the power of public opinion.
there was only one law--"slave law"

— and

Then, he
He claimed

it was everywhere.

Next, he spoke to them of "another law," one that was in

their "hands and arms."

whenever they saw fit.

They could put such law into effect

Parker challenged the crowd and

shoved them toward violence.

He was a "peace man" but real-

ized "there is a means and there is an end, liberty is the
end,

sometimes peace is not the means toward it."

With these

words Parker seemed to be condoning violence, seemed to be

resolving his own personal debate over participating in forcible resistance.

As he spoke, he fed and was fed by the
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rampaging emotions of the crowd.

They were ready to charge

the Court House and he was ready to send them. 31

But in the very next moment his power, control, and com-

mitment drained away like fine sand from a tightly clenched
fist.

It began when he asked the crowd what they planned to

do about Burns.

"Shoot:"

Parker was stunned.

"Shoot!" a voice cried out.

Words caught in his throat.

In an

instant he realized his desire for action was far less
intense than his fear of bloodshed.
crowd to Court Square.

He couldn't send the

He must restrain them.

"There are

ways of managing this without shooting anybody," he yelled.
"These men who have kidnapped a man in Boston are cowards
.

.

.

if we stand up there resolutely and declare that this

man shall not go out of the city of Boston without shooting
a gun ,

then he won't go back."

In his next sentence he for-

feited any chance of forcible rescue that evening.

"Now

I

am

going to propose that when you adjourn, it be to meet in

Court Square at nine o'clock."
and Higginson.

He took refuge in the majority plan of the

But before he could carry his own motion, cries

committee.

rang out.

Parker had abandoned Stowell

"Let's go tonight!"

slave-catchers at Revere House."

"Let's pay a visit to the

Desperately trying to pre-

vent an exodus to Court Square, Parker seized upon the last

suggestion and tried to send the crowd to the Revere House.
"Do you suppose to go to Revere House tonight?"

your hands."

"Then show

After counting those who supported the measure,
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Parker claimed it was "not a vote."

Again, Parker suggested

meeting in Court Square at nine in the morning.

motion was met by screams of "Tonight!"

Again his

"Tonight:"

Parker

paused for a moment then hesitantly called for a vote.

Half

the assembly wanted to go to the Court House that evening.

What could he do now?

around the hall.

Shouts of "To the Court House

I

"

echoed

Parker was at the mercy of the crowd he had

totally dominated only moments before.

Sensing Parker's plight, Wendell Phillips leaped to the

rostrum and yelled out, "If
tonight

I

would go first.

I

I

thought it could be done

am ready to trample any statute

or any man under my foot to do it.

daytime

....

But wait until

It is in your power to lock up every avenue

so the man cannot be carried off."

Moments after he uttered

these words and the crowd seemed to settle down, a man burst

into the hall.
the Court House.

the hall.

He screamed incoherently about an attack on

Everyone shoved and pushed for the doors of
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When Higginson heard the ovation that greeted Parker and
the clamor caused by his introductory remarks, he felt sure
the crowd would soon be on its way to Court Square.
the time to attack.

On Higginson'

s

Now was

signal several men extin-

guished street lamps and darkened the square.

Then, with

Higginson headmanning a large battering ram, the small cadre

moved toward the center entry of the west side of the Court
House.

Burns was in a room two floors above this entry.

As
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the minister moved through the square and up
the steps toward
the doors he recalled words he'd spoken that
afternoon.

attempt to rescue Burns had to be made.

Some

If it wasn't,

"future cases would occur with less traces of manly
feeling."

Once up to the door, Higginson and the black man who stood

opposite him guided the thrusts of the battering ram.

Stand-

ing behind those who were manning the beam, other members of
the group shouted and hurled rocks through the windows of the

building.

A few of the attackers slashed away at the doors

with hand axes.

In the midst of this furor Higginson glanced

furtively into the square.

He wondered what was keeping the

crowd from Faneuil Hall. 34

Fifty "special" guards recruited by United States Marshal Freeman pressed against the inside of the Court House

doors hoping to prevent them from giving way.

But repeated

thrusts of the battering ram buckled the door paneling.

A

few of these "specials" stepped back from the door, drew

sabres and firearms, and prepared to repel any attacker who

managed to get inside the building.

Higginson and his black

cohort were the first to squeeze through the small passageway in the paneling.

Once into the building, they began
In the melee,

grappling with some of the deputies.

shots

rang out, deputy James Batchelder was mortally wounded, and

flashing cutlass dug into Higginson*

s

chin.

At the same

time, Higginson realized that only he and his black friend

were fighting, the rest of the attackers had already

a
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retreated.

He drew back and shouted at his fleeing comrades,

"You cowards, will you desert us now."

He was bleeding pro-

fusely and moved slowly down the steps.

At that moment, the

crowd from Faneuil Hall arrived only to see the battered

Court House doors slammed shut.

Amid the confusion of mill-

ing people, Higginson haltingly staggered away from the

square.

Within hours he was on

Worcester.

a

train headed back to
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At first, Higginson was deeply disheartened by the
attack's apparent failure.
of the effort.

But he soon revised his opinion

Public excitement in Worcester stimulated by

the attempt thoroughly amazed him.

He heard the "wildest

things" proposed by men who formerly had little or no anti-

slavery sentiment.

Even they wanted Burns freed.

The min-

ister began to understand the potential power of the con-

certed popular feeling illicited by his act.

What to do with

this power, however, was as new and mystifying as the exhil-

aration he felt in breaking down the Court House doors.

But

in any case, he was now "thankful for what had been done" and

considered the whole effort the "greatest step in antislavery
Conveniently forgetting

which Massachusetts had ever taken."

the successful Shadrach rescue by Boston blacks, the leader
of this "greatest" of all acts was "ready to do my share
•

again.

„36

Samuel May, Jr., wrote a letter

dampened his enthusiasm.

a

few days later which

May notified the young minister
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that a warrant had been sworn for his arrest.

But what upset

Kigginson more, was May's suggestion about Parker's conduct
during the episode.

According to May "Friday night had a

chance of success but the Court Square movement right in the
face and eyes of Faneuil Hall advice was ill-advised and so

failed when with perfect harmony it might have succeeded."
As more information filtered in to Worcester about Parker's

speech, Higginson began to understand why the crowd arrived
so late.

He was tremendously disappointed with Parker.
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Ill

It has been argued that Theodore Parker was one of anti-

slavery's most renouned "moral agitators."

Indeed, he was.

Parker was always ready to "nullify the laws of slavery

because they stultified the Higher Law."

But more than one

account of Parker's fugitive slave activity also implies that
he not only theorized the overthrow of slavery by violent

means but

v/as

ready to personally implement those theories.

A careful examination of the Burns affair and Parker's role
in it suggests another conclusion:

Parker had not committed

himself to anything more than the theory of forcible means.
His fugitive slave efforts had not radicalized him to the

point of practical commitment to the use of force.

A tre-

mendous tension existed within him between theory and practice both before and after the Anthony Burns episode.

He

.

46

would not begin to resolve this tension for another three
years 38

Samuel Gridley Howe faced a problem similar to Parker's.
He shared responsibility with Parker for failing to send the

crowd to aid Higginson and guiltily watched the rendition

proceedings unfold.
cue attempt.

First, there were rumors of another res-

Then, Dana's plea for postponement was followed

by an attempt to purchase Burns' freedom.

Finally, with sol-

diers stationed at all windows, crowds milling in Court
Square, and women abolitionists led by Lydia Parker standing

vigil outside the Court House, the hearings began on Monday,
May 29, at nine in the morning.

Dana conducted a brilliant

defense but his efforts were futile.

Suttle, Brent, and

Thomas certified Anthony Burns' identity and proved ownership.

Commissioner Edward Loring defined his responsibility

in the case as "ministerial" and not "judicial."

He claimed

he was not empowered to preside over a jury trial aimed at

testing the validity of the Fugitive Slave Law.

As long as

proof of identity and ownership had been established, Loring
said he had no choice but to turn Burns over to Suttle for
.

.

shipment back to Virginia.
On June

2,
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thousands of men, women, and children

thronged the streets of Boston to watch Anthony Burns march
from the Court House to the wharf for transportation to
Virginia.

The march was scheduled to begin at eleven o'clock

but was delayed three hours as hundreds of soldiers attempted

to clear streets and prevent any further
effort to free the

slave.

Cavalry patrols drove citizens back on to sidewalks.

Police suggested businessmen close their stores for
the day.

Militiamen locked arms and held back the crowd.

Once these

"path-clearing" efforts had succeeded, Burns was surrounded
by a column of 125 special deputies and 140 United States

troops and marched to the wharf. 40
Standing at the edge of the crowd on one of the streets
en route

,

Samuel Gridley Howe watched the troops pass by with

Burns in their midst.

hanging everywhere.

He saw black-edged flags, unions down,

A coffin with the words "Funeral of Lib-

erty" inscribed on it hung from a window opposite the Old

State House.

Howe was overwhelmed with anger and self-

recrimination, disturbed at having glibly theorized about the

necessity of using forcible means and then personally failing
to execute such theories.

Howe remembered a suggestion he

made to Sumner only a few weeks earlier.

At that time, he

claimed that force might be "the only means
perishing."
was clear:

Now,

...

to save the

the full implication of his failure to act

Burns was being shipped back to slavery.

"wept for sorrow, shame and indignation."

Howe
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Again and again the physician asked himself why he and
so many others had failed to resist the rendition.

Howe

tried to convince himself that if it had not been for "citizen soldiery and armed citizen police, the pe ople would have

routed the United States troops and rescued poor Burns."
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Ultimately he concluded that it was "the fetish
of law which
disarmed and emasculated" both himself and Boston's
citi-

zenry.

Higginson was correct.

It was difficult to find one-

self on the wrong side of established institutions
when one

had been raised to respect those institutions.

been radicalized by the Sims affair.

Howe had not

Unlike Higginson he was

not ready to "burst down a door." 42
In his self-anger, Howe was struck by a vivid image

which eventually had much to do with his personal ability to
break through the crippling "fetish" for law.

The image was

that of "a comely colored girl of eighteen" who happened to
be standing near him as Anthony Burns passed.

watching the column with "clenched fists

.

.

She stood
.

flashing eyes

and tears streaming down her cheeks, the picture of indignant

despair."

When he noticed how emotionally upset the girl

was, Samuel Gridley tried to comfort her.
cry.

Burns wouldn't be hurt.

Immediately, the black girl

turned to him and screamed, "Hurt,
not kill himself.

He told her not to

I

cry for shame he will

Oh why is he not man enough to kill him-

self."

Howe was stunned by the vehemence and power of her

words.

In future days, he

again.

By 1858,

thought of the incident again and

the issue of black manhood and the necessity

of black violence would allow Samuel Gridley Howe briefly to

resolve the paralyzing tension between the theory and practice of legitimate force.

beyond Higher Law.
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It would carry him and others
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The Burns rendition is a significant episode in the

chronicle of the antislavery movement.

It is especially

important in understanding the attitudes of Howe, Parker and
Higginson toward the use of force, and it provides
for their future activities in the movement.

a

context

Higginson moved

rapidly down the road of practical abolition as a result of
his participation in the assault.

The failures of Howe and

Parker accentuated their personal struggle to resolve the

discrepancy between the theory and practice of forcible
resistance
But for all his commitment to violent means, Higginson

was still a novice when it came to using the public sentiment
his attack produced.

In this respect, he learned much from

Howe and Parker who were sophisticated practitioneers at the

art of manipulating public opinion.

Neither Howe nor Parker

could bring themselves to use forcible means but both knew
how to milk the emotion stirred by the Burns affair.

When it

came to exploiting the "martyrdom" of Anthony Burns or pro-

moting a crisis mentality in the populace, each man was an
expert; quite as unscrupulous in the name of Higher Law as

slaveholders were in defense of their institution.

Both men

knew how to win converts to the antislavery faith and their
activities in the aftermath of rendition are as important for

understanding their future abolitionist efforts as is their
failure to forcibly resist the Fugitive Slave Law.
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IV

Parker used his Sunday sermons as a device to relieve

himself of responsibility for the Burns failure and to whip
up popular anger about the rendition.

In his May

28

dis-

course, given only two days after Higginson's attack, he

spoke of such attempts as "wholly without use."

Then, he

deftly side-stepped blame for the crowd's failure to reinforce Higginson by praising Wendell Phillips.

According to

Parker, it was Phillips whose words "hardly restrained the

multitude from going and by violence storming the Court
House."

Parker didn't mention that Phillips was only trying

to do what he himself could not.
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The Sunday after Burns had been returned Parker was less

restrained with his remarks.

He incited his audience by

speaking with disdain about Massachusetts' failure to act.
"We deserve all we have suffered.

tempt of the South.
slaves.

We are the scorn and con-

They are our masters and treat us like

It is ourselves who made the yoke."

aloud if men would always come to

a

Parker wondered

rendition "with only the

arms God gave," then claimed to want "no rashness," only calm

considerate action.
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While Sunday sermons had their effect, other techniques

were also necessary to maintain aroused antislavery sentiment.

Soon after the rescue attempt Howe had written to

Parker saying "I have long made up my mind not to avoid

a

struggle with this law
[I

— perhaps

have avoided the struggle].

attempted."

my children are the reason
.

.

.

Something must be

No new rescue effort was made.

But soon after

rendition Howe was again writing to Parker with a suggestion.

Confessing his feelings of "disgrace," Howe thought one way
to redeem the honor of the "degraded community" of Boston and

at the same time feed antislavery emotion, was to remove Com-

missioner Edward Loring from his position as Judge of Probate.

Parker received the idea with glee.

He had already

begun the process of discrediting Loring by suggesting that
it was the Commissioner who was responsible for deputy James

Batchelder's death.

Nothing could be done about Loring'

federal appointment but his position as Judge of Probate was

subject to state recall proceedings.

Such an issue would

certainly sustain antislavery sentiment while at the same
time shifting attention from antislavery violence and the

failure to prevent rendition.

Such a tactic personalized the

institution of slavery in negative terms as Burns had personalized it in positive ones.

Commissioner Loring became the

institution of slavery; his removal the symbolic triumph of
antislavery men over the institution.
be another lesson in antislavery

'

win the public mind of the North.

s

Loring'

s

ordeal would

continuing struggle to

Undoubtedly Parker

recalled the words he spoke in the aftermath of the Sims rendition.

Seeking to locate responsibility for Sims' return,

the minister wished "it was some single man

.

.

.

some
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official of the City

...

so we could make him a scapegoat

of public indignation." 46

The effort to make Loring a "scapegoat" began on July

at an abolitionist picnic in Framingham.

culated calling for Loring'

s

4

A petition was cir-

removal as Judge of Probate.

early February, 1955, the effort began to succeed.

By

Indica-

tive of the hostility generated against Loring was the defeat
of his appointment as permanent lecturer at Harvard Law

School.

Then, in late February, the House of Representatives

began hearings on the removal petition.

Loring was accused

of conducting the examination of Burns unfairly, hurrying the

proceedings, and not maintaining free access to Court for the

prisoner's counsel.

Loring defended himself by protesting

that he had handled the proceedings impartially and by

reminding the legislative committee that his duties as Com-

missioner were not incompatible with those he rendered as
Judge of Probate.

If they were, why hadn't objections been

raised when he was appointed Commissioner?
forceful plea, Loring

's

Despite his

position was in jeopardy when the

hearings were recessed in late March.
.

-

But he was soon

receiving support from an unexpected source.

47

Richard Henry Dana, Jr., was profoundly disturbed by the

effort to remove Loring.
sode was behind him.

He had hoped the whole Burns epi-

It had been a painful experience.

Now

he was forced to rekindle unpleasant memories because he had

decided to testify in Loring 's behalf.

While Dana condemned
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the Commissioner's decision as morally wrong,
he defended

Loring's actions on the basis of the legal principles
involved.

Dana argued convincingly for the independence of

the judiciary.

if Loring were removed judicial independence

would receive a severe blow.

Dana believed Loring was not

guilty of official misconduct.

In fact, he had encouraged

Burns to make a defense and had postponed the hearings long

enough for counsel to make adequate preparation.

The Commis-

sioner had demanded Phillips and others be allowed free
access to court.

Loring had even cooperated with efforts to

purchase Burns' freedom.
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Dana's defense of Loring seems to have been effective.

Although the legislature voted for removal, Governor Gardener
vetoed the measure.

It would be three more years before abo-

litionists succeeded with their campaign to remove Loring.

Theodore Parker was furious with Dana.
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He was certain

the lawyer's influence had destroyed the removal effort.

This, coupled with Dana's condemnation of Higginson's Court

House attack,

led the minister to claim he had long "despised"

Dana's scruples against violence and was "disgusted [when]
Dana withdrew fr[om] the Vig[ilance] Committee because of

contempt for the use of force."

Considering his own role in

the affair, Parker's criticism was tainted.

mence is also suggestive.

But his vehe-

It implies the importance he

placed on the removal tactic and the intensity of his own

personal debate about the use of violent means.
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Higginson'

s

lack of sophistication in exploiting the

Burns' incident is indicated in his first Sunday sermon
on
the subject.

"Massachusetts in Mourning" is more

a

projec-

tion of his own new level of consciousness than a propaganda
device.

Delivered just two days after Burns had been extra-

dieted, the sermon was primarily devoted to the truths he

personally hoped to live by in the future.

It was his first

formal declaration that slavery could only be ended by

resorting to "physical force."

Slave laws would not be

repealed by politicians, only by "ourselves."

Higginson

claimed to have "lost the dream that our land is
peace and order."

To "always

.

.

.

obey

"virtue must relax much of her vigor."

.

.

.

a land of

laws" meant

In a land where slav-

ery was "national," law and order "must constantly be on the

wrong side."

He wasn't discouraging "peaceful ins trumental-

ities"--politics should be used if they could be made "worth
using."

But Higginson was suggesting that as far as he was

concerned the Burns episode
revolution,"

a

the beginning of "a

signaled

period of vast upheaval when appeal would have

to be made to violent means if the complex institutional

interaction which perpetuated slavery was to be destroyed.
Perhaps the most personally revealing segment of his sermon
was his vision of the result of such

a

revolution.

believed the forthcoming crisis would remedy

a

Higginson

"deeper

disease" in American society than even the institution of
slavery.

Mid-nineteenth century society had grown "selfish
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and timid."

Men tried to save themselves by "law and
order"

and Higginson considered such efforts "idle."

perfected by "talk of liberty."

Men were not

They were not made virtuous

if they never had to risk physical injury to
achieve liberty.

Without "physical habits" minds would grow sharp
and hearts" were left "untrained."

but "bodies

Mid-nineteenth century

Americans had lost the strength and conviction of their forefathers, their society declined because they were "taught

they owe the world nothing and the world owes them a living."
This was the "deeper disease" in his society.

This was the

source of slavery and every other impediment to progress and

perfection.

In a short time Higginson would ride the plains

of Kansas and marvel at the way war disciplined men and women

and made them unselfish.

He would become more convinced of

the necessity of "revolution." 51

Higginson wasn't very active in the Loring removal
effort.

For the most part, he just watched and learned.

Besides, more immediate personal concerns demanded his attention.

He was stung by the adverse reaction to the rescue

attempt voiced by

a

number of antislavery proponents.

too, his pending trial demanded time and energy.

Then

But any

feelings of anxiety about imprisonment were soon dissipated

when he realized what a fragmentary case had been constructed
by the state.

Only one person could identify him as a par-

ticipant in the attack and that individual was unsure of his
.

.

.

testimony
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Eventually a growing confidence in the certainty of his
own acquittal and new insight into the techniques of manipulating popular opinion convinced him that this trial might

serve the same tactical purpose as the Loring removal.

It

could be an "additional stimulus" to antislavery sentiment.

Realizing the others arrested in connection with the attempt

were "obscure men," Higginson hoped his new found reputation

would make his indictment a lesson.
arrest.

He began to relish

He even considered the possibility of pleading

guilty and asking acquittal on moral grounds.

But he dropped

such notions once he received expert legal advice and started

listening to Wendell Phillips whose theories on popular opinion governed even Howe and Parker.

Phillips was still smart-

ing from the Faneuil Hall episode when he wrote to Higginson
a few weeks later.

a chance to help

.

He was upset that he had not been "given
.

.

instead of making a fool of myself."

Phillips advised Higginson (in rather cynical terms given
Burns' rendition)

that he must plead not guilty because "the

opportunity of preaching to that jury is one of the things
you fought for perhaps the most important object."
view was restated by Albert Browne

Phillips"

youth who had been

a

arrested, questioned, and released in connection with the
He told Higginson that "agitation on the

rescue attempt.

subject is good for the cause.
rendition]

.

.

.

Keep this inequity [Burns'

before the public (and) it cannot fail of

producing a good effect.

God knows

I

feel for Burns but

I

am

sure it is a thousand times better for our cause
that he

was sent back."

In the future Higginson would make excellent
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use of these "lessons."

By the end of the summer of 1854, the state seemed

unable to gather enough evidence to bring most of those

arrested in connection with the attack to trial.

Stowell seemed in any serious trouble.
a number of postponements,

Only Martin

But in November after

new names were added to the list

of those to be indicted—including Parker and Phillips.

When

this occurred the slight strains already existing in the

relationship of Higginson and Parker were increased.

Parker

wanted to make a stout defense but by late fall, almost six
months after his own indictment was handed down, Higginson
was impatient to conclude the episode.

He had been threat-

ened with trial too long and was in no mood to carry the
farce any further by arguing the constitutionality of the

Fugitive Slave Law.

The main legal fight should be "on the

evidence" and Higginson outlined his position to Parker in

concise terms slightly tinged with antagonism.
"go for victory" if he plead not guilty.

Yet,

He wanted to

"there must be

nothing unfair and no compromise in my opinions."

He wanted

"to combine a successful defense with an honorable one."

Higginson jabbed subtly at the colleague who had abandoned

him that humid evening in May.

The next time they quarreled

over broken commitments Higginson v/ould be less delicate.
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Parker was dismayed when in April, 1855, charges were

dropped against all people indicted in connection with the
Burns rescue effort.

Parker claimed he "should have liked

the occasion for a speech."

Never one to lose an opportunity

to agitate the antislavery cause, he eventually published an

elaborate defense of his role in the affair although avoiding
any careful analysis of his speech before the Faneuil Hall

crowd

V
Regardless of the personal animosities or philosophical
tensions that arose over the Burns "kidnapping," W.

H.

Channing was pleased with the results of the incident.

wrote Higginson about his feelings.

He

According to Channing,

events like the Burns arrest would "raise higher the growing

desire to break our yoke by awakening the consciousness of
the power to do it ."

Channing was certain the fullness of

this sense of "power" could be managed in a "single season."

Given the right events and the proper use of those events by
abolitionists, men could be awakened from "their drunken
dreams of gain and ease."

Higginson must have been impressed

for Channing also seemed to recognize that the abolition

movement could be used to deal with an even "deeper disease"
in American society than the institution of slavery:

it could

be used to discipline the chaos and flux of mid-nineteenth

century America.

Traditional values could be returned.

And
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Charming had another idea in case men weren't
"awakened" by
events like the Burns episode.
He advised Higginson that
"the next thing to do is guerrilla war at
every chance.

They

shall not sleep whether they pull down their
caps or not."
News from Kansas must have pleased Charming greatly. 55
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CHAPTER

II

On May 30, 1854, in the midst of the Burns hearings,

President Pierce signed the Kansas-Nebraska Act into law.
News of the signing prompted Theodore Parker to suggest that
the Burns episode was merely a diversionary tactic contrived

by the Slave Power for the purpose of turning Boston's atten-

tion away from efforts to institute slavery north of the

Missouri Compromise line.

Parker, like so many other anti-

slavery men, opposed the Stephen Douglas-sponsored measure
from the first day it was introduced in the Senate.

He felt

it was a fraudulent use of the popular sovereignty issue to

expand slavery into the territories.

1

In the next two years, Kansas and the attendant problems

of proslavery Missouri "border ruffianism," inept federal

territorial office appointments, and ballot-stuffed election
victories, stimulated a new wave of antislavery protest and

became the keynote of northern political activity.

Harriet

Beecher Stowe organized 3,050 New England preachers to sign

petition condemning the Kansas-Nebraska measure.

a

William

Lloyd Garrison denounced the act at an Independence Day picnic and then torched copies of the Fugitive Slave Law, Burns
decision, and United States Constitution.

At least partially

aided by reaction to the Kansas-Nebraska Act, Know-Nothingism

swept into office in Massachusetts.

Popular indignation also

assisted antislavery men in their efforts to
enact personal
liberty laws designed to protect fugitive
slaves.
Sermons

were preached and protest meetings organized in
an attempt to
stop Kansas from becoming the newest bastion of
2
slavery.

But by March 1855, antislavery men and women began
to
see it would take more than angry words or political
protest
to prevent a proslavery takeover in Kansas.

They began to

see the necessity of subsidizing freestate settlement of the

territory.

A number of relief committees were set up

throughout the North (particularly in Massachusetts) for the
purpose of collecting funds and supplies to assist people who

were emigrating to the territory.

The committees were non-

profit models of Eli Thayer's Massachusetts Emigrant Aid
Society.

Their purpose was to provide freestate Kansas emi-

grants with enough food, clothing, homes teading supplies, and

money to insure successful settlement.

Antislavery reformers

hoped to prevent slavery in Kansas by subsidizing the growth
of a population willing to vote the institution down when it
came time to prepare a constitution for statehood.

3

One individual who became quite active with the

Middlesex County Kansas Committee in the late fall of 1855
was Franklin Benjamin Sanborn, a recent Harvard graduate, and
son of Aaron Sanborn, town clerk of Hampton Falls, New

Hampshire.

Aaron Sanborn understood the value of proper

religious and educational training for his children.

He

made sure they were thoroughly familiar with the Bible and
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received as much public schooling as Hampton Falls had to
offer.

Because young Frank excelled in his studies, Aaron

Sanborn was even persuaded to pay
for college.

J.

G.

Hoyt to prepare him

Hoyt, a Dartmouth graduate and an "ardent anti-

slavery man," began tutoring Frank in 1850 and within

a

year

was sufficiently impressed to suggest further studies at
Phillips Exeter Academy where young Sanborn could receive
rigorous training in the classics.

At Phillips Exeter,

Sanborn continued to excel, passed Harvard's stiff classics

admission examination and by July, 1852, entered the College
as a member of the sophomore class.

4

During his tutelage by Hoyt, Sanborn was tremendously

impressed by the Dartmouth graduate's commitment to antislavery.

After a few months at Cambridge where he regularly read

the National Era and New York Tribune and frequently attended

abolitionist lectures, the young college student proudly proclaimed his own engagement to the movement.

He was certain

"slavery was wrong" and convinced that "some of the North

were governed by a minority small in numbers but powerful in

wealth and influence."

This minority was composed of "slave-

holders and their commercial allies at the North and West."
Slavery must be destroyed in order for the "mass of people"
to be free from this "dominating aristocracy.

••5

Despite such strong views about the Slave Power, regular

attendance at antislavery lectures, and routine abolitionist
reading, young Sanborn had relatively little time to devote
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to the movement while at college:

things to do.

there were too many other

Daring his years at Harvard, Sanborn began

attending Unitarian services, took long walks out to Concord
in hopes of meeting Emerson or Thoreau, and constantly wor-

ried about what career he would pursue once he had graduated.
In early July, 1853, he and his friend Edwin Morton sat

enthralled as Emerson addressed himself to a question of
vital importance to each of them.

They wondered "whether

literature in America could be a young man's occupation and

bread winner?"

Sanborn also worked very hard at his studies,

earned excellent grades, and became editor of the school
paper.

He even won an election bid to Phi Beta Kappa but

declined the offer because he felt the society to be an
"unjustifiable intellectual aristocracy."
While at Harvard, Sanborn also became

Theodore Parker.

a

disciple of

He first heard Parker when the minister

gave his famous Fast-day sermon on April 19, 1852, after
Sanborn was amazed

Thomas Sims had been returned to slavery.

by Parker's political wisdom, religious fervor, and intense

abolitionism.

Eventually the young scholar was granted per-

mission to exchange Sunday services in the college chapel for
Parker's preaching at the Music Hall.

As a senior, Sanborn

presented a series of lectures on Parker's writings before
fellow members of the Hasty Pudding Club.

7

More than anything else, though, Frank Sanborn's college
beautiful
days were dominated by his relationship with the
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and frail Ariana Walker.

He first met Ariana in 1850 while

visiting a cousin and was charmed by her grace.

After a few

more meetings, Sanborn was certain of his love for Ariana.

For her part, Ariana liked Frank because he thought "more

wholly for himself" than anyone she had ever met, but she

wasn't really attracted to the dark-haired young man.

She

liked him for his "intellectual and spiritual nature" but
"not himself

,

"

and claimed she was "never interested in one

where feeling was so little personal."

o

Sanborn could hardly be as dispassionate.

He hoped to

nurture their friendship and win the love of the woman whose
feelings were "so little personal."

The young man cast their

relationship in typically nineteenth century terms.

He

believed Ariana could be a guiding force in his life; an
infallible source of advice and comfort.

Surprisingly, there

does seem to be some justification for his view.

Ariana was

two years older than Sanborn, exceptionally intelligent, and

possessed an uncanny ability to analyze the people around
her.

She often amused herself by predicting people's actions.

In addition, Ariana does seem to have been quite helpful to

Frank during moments of indecision.

He repeatedly unburdened

himself to her and she calmed him with wise counsel.

She

always claimed his success was "sure" as long as he bent his
"whole energies" to whatever he hoped to achieve.

It was

Ariana who encouraged Sanborn to attend Harvard and devote
his college years to "severe study."

When Sanborn wondered
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aloud what he could do with his Harvard education it was

Ariana who suggested that while he was at college it was the
discipline of education he wanted and "not to be fitted for
any particular profession." 9
In time, Ariana began to love the friend she so often

counseled, and during the early spring of 1854, as Frank fin-

ished his junior year, they announced their engagement.

The

relationship had grown from one in which Ariana had "no per sonal feelings" into something much deeper.

Frail Ariana

Walker became fascinated with the handsome young man who was
like a "kind of book in which

I

like well to read."

When

she turned to her journal to "review" the "book," a loving,

perceptive, and highly revealing character analysis poured
10
4-1,
*
forth.

Ariana knew of Frank's weaknesses, knew that he worried

about everyone "overrating" him.

She knew that the young

scholar viewed himself as "quick" but "confused," and totally
lacking in "strictness and steadiness."
the paradoxes of his character.

She also understood

Frank valued highly his

"independence" and thought of himself as "capable of living

alone and

.

.

.

apart from all others," yet in his "inner-

most soul" looked for "some authority upon which to lean" and
opinion
was "influenced more than he is aware by those whose
he reflects."

Sanborn was a man of many "noble aspirations,

yet unsatistified."

He was constantly "seeking, seeking,

grasping in the dark."

The young man wanted a

"

defin ite end
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for which to strive heartily" and he believed
that if he had

such an end "success would be sure."

Ariana had confidence

in Frank because he had "much executive power," though
she

also realized he often "executed better than he planned."

Ariana Walker loved Frank Sanborn because he had "great
pride/' was "gentle" in spite of a certain coldness, and had
"strong passions."

She loved Frank because he was a man

whose nature would not allow him to find rest,

a

man who

regarded "struggle" as a "native element," and who "must
work" and "must have a great motive for which to strive." 11
In the summer of 1854, Ariana Walker became seriously
ill.

She had battled recurring, short-lived, "nervous

attacks" almost every year since 1846 when she first con-

tracted "a painful lameness" which kept her from walking
But previously she had always recovered her health.

freely.

Now, in the humid weeks of June and July, her condition con-

tinued to deteriorate and her periods of debilitation lengthened.

Shattered and disconsolate, Sanborn turned to Parker

for comfort.

marks of

...

He told the minister that Ariana had "the
a settled consumption" and that "unless some

change for the better" took place, she could "not survive

another year."

He found it difficult to accept that only "a

few months" before it seemed he and Ariana

"

should live

together the life to which we have long looked foward."

Ariana meant so much to him, was "so woven in my being," that
he couldn't "think of life without her."

He wondered what
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would become of himself in "so great

a

desolation."

dered what work he could put his hand to, "what study
could pursue, what pleasure

I

He wonI

could feel in anything." 12

In spite of her illness Frank and Ariana decided to

marry.

Eight days later, on August 28, 1854, the sickly

young woman died.

Sanborn was devastated.

In the midst of

his grief he again turned to Theordore Parker.

asked that a short note be read in Ariana'

s

Sanborn

memory before

the minister's congregation and went on to say that he felt

sure "God had some great work" for him to do or "he never

would have given me such a wealth of love."

In the near

future, Sanborn would meet a powerful authoritarian person-

ality who had a "definite end" in mind and a belief that he
also had been given a "great work" to do by God.

1 "^

Sanborn was too emotionally upset to continue his studies during the fall semester.

But by December of 1854, he

had recovered sufficiently to return to Cambridge and begin
The somber young

the last year of work for his degree.

scholar applied himself diligently throughout the spring and
summer of 1855 and completed his courses by late August.

He

was certain his success that year could be attributed to
"less worldly ambition than before

ity to work."

.

.

.

and a greater abil-

After all, it was the "work of two" he was

finishing
The Harvard senior was given an added incentive to com-

plete his studies by Emerson and other Concord residents.
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The transcendental sage had been so impressed with Sanborn
in previous encounters that he offered the young man a
posi-

tion as schoolteacher in Concord.

The idea appealed to

Sanborn, so in the early spring of 1855 he and his older sister, Sarah, moved to Concord and began developing an educa-

tional program for the coming school year.

The young New

Hampshire native made acquaintances rapidly and in the process was induced to join the Middlesex County Kansas Committee.

Membership on the committee proved to be an important
step in Sanborn's abolitionist career.

Within a year he

gradually turned away from teaching and began spending more
and more time on Kansas aid work.

He was soon appointed

secretary and put in charge of directing committee affairs.
The ambitious young man, looking for a "great work" to do,

became an extremely effective organizer.
he had "much executive power."

As Ariana suggested,

Sanborn scheduled lectures,

managed fund raising campaigns, and searched desperately for
"recent news from Kansas" so he could keep fellow committee

members well informed.

It was an ideal position for young

Sanborn, providing him with a meaningful purpose in life,

a

new circle of fascinating friends and some influential associations.

He was beginning to understand Ariana' s advice

that he not worry about

a

career.

He was thankful for her

suggestion that he concern himself with the "discipline of
education."

No Harvard course work could ever have prepared

him for the effort in which he was now engaged.

it was "dis-

cipline" and "organization" that made for
successful management of committee business.
The beating of Charles Sumner in late May of
1856, fol-

lowed in rapid succession by a Missouri "border ruffian"

attack on the frees tate town of Lawrence, and the killing
of
five antislavery men on Pottawatomie Creek, increased

Sanborn's desire to "do something" for Kansas.

The young

secretary became so intoxicated with the thought of Kansas
as a battleground of freedom that he even debated giving up

his organizational activity and going to the territory to
fight.

"Armed settlers" were desperately needed and Sanborn

seriously believed he should be one of them.

disabuse himself of such notions.
In August,

1856,

1

He would soon

7

Sanborn was asked to visit the terri-

tory for the Middlesex County Kansas Committee and find out

whether funds and supplies collected by the committee were
arriving at their proper destination.

He was also to inves-

tigate how the material was being used and what settlers

would need in the future.

It was the perfect opportunity to

test his enthusiasm for "armed settlement."

But once out

west, Sanborn realized the substantial difference between
the organization of settlement and the actuality of living

and fighting in Kansas.

Like Howe and Parker during the

Burns episode, Sanborn began to understand the distance

between theory and practice in the abolitionist campaign
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against slavery.

The young secretary scrupulously
avoided

entering the strife-torn area and, with a
twinge of defensiveness in his words, claimed to his sister

that his trip

was "only to inspect the emigrant route
through Iowa in order
that it might be kept open for men, arms, and
ammunition."

When offered a revolver for protection by Samuel
Gridley Howe
who was on a similar inspection tour for the newly formed

Massachusetts Kansas Committee, Sanborn took the gun reluctantly.

He claimed he did "not expect to run any risk."

Though he felt strongly he should "go into Kansas" and use
the weapon, he realized his own inability to do so and hoped

it was "for the best" that he didn't "go in."

Sanborn was

awed by the romance of "Western Life," awed by the courage
and heroism of armed settlers, and he wished that he pos-

sessed the leadership qualities of men like James Lane,
Charles Robinson and John Brown.

him a lesson:
settlement.

But the trip had taught

his forte was "executive power" not "armed

1,18

Upon his return to Massachusetts Sanborn spoke of Kansas
as the "most practical form in which the struggle for free-

dom has ever presented itself."
tion."

It would "justify any exer-

Even if he couldn't bear arms there was much to

accomplish in the way of organization.

More and more the

"struggle for freedom" in Kansas and his urge "to do semething" merged.

His own "success" and feelings of accompli.sh-

me nt became synomomous with his participation in the Kansas
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aid movement.
"career."

Providing aid for the territory became
his

By early fall of 1856, Sanborn
entrusted his

Concord school to Sarah and committed himself
to committee
work on a full-time basis. 19
His rationale for this decision was contained
in two

letters to Theodore Parker.

Both provide

glimpse at his motivation and values.

a

revealing

Sanborn claimed that

he was concerned because the aid movement had suffered
from
"the want of men

.

.

.

devoted wholly to it."

The movement

depended too much on "transient excitement and activity."
Someone must give it "system and perpetual order."

Sanborn

felt even his "inexperienced labors" were "great" when com-

pared to those of many others who professed interest in the
movement.

Kansas

(and by implication abolitionism) needed

men who would make it "their study and business."

Until that

happened antislavery men had "no right to hope for any good."
When Parker mildly objected to Sanborn's decision, the former
school master reaffirmed his contention and replied,

"I see

in almost every person traces of indecision which is fatal to

any good settlement of the difficulty.
and facing the real evil we are all

some personal reason.

"

.

Instead of coming out
.

.

held back

Sanborn was "determined

through all these meshes and do thoroughly what
so long talking about."

.

...
I

.

for

.

to cut

have been

It was a telling rebuttal from one

who knew nothing of Parker's hesitation during the Burns rescue attempt.

Frank Sanborn saw himself as an "example,"

a
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person who would convince friends to
leave "business and
pleasure" and work "wholly for the
cause."

His efforts would

cause men to "attach more importance
to the movement."
He
realized he couldn't expect such a commitment
from others
unless he was willing to make it "as soon
as any.He was
"really ready to give up everything." 20
Such assertions were highly idealistic if
not wholly

accurate.

Certainly Sanborn believed in the moral necessity

of ending slavery but he also had personal needs
to fulfill

that were entirely apart from such a goal.

By the fall of

1856, the young man saw that his committee activity could
be
an important vehicle by which to obtain a "place" in
Boston

society.

Indeed, it was a bit dishonest for him to condemn

men for being held back from work for the "cause" because of
"personal reasons."

hold him back.

He really had no "personal reasons" to

All his instincts told him that his own self-

interest would best be served by joining the movement on
full-time basis.

a

His need to free Kansas and secure a posi-

tion became the same thing.

It was rather easy for Frank

Sanborn to advocate leaving "business and pleasure" and working "wholly for the cause."

His own self-interest and the

freestate triumph in Kansas had been completely harmonized.
He didn't need to be altruistic.

As he said to Parker at the

end of his second letter, it was not a violent step to leave
teaching for a few months because there was always

a

his "place" might prove to be "an important one."

If his

chance
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efforts didn't work out he could
always "abandon" them and
"take some other place— if I can get
21
it."

The position Sanborn referred to in
his letter to Parker
was secretary of the Massachusetts Kansas
Committee. The job
had been offered to him in late September
by George Luther
Stearns, a Medford businessman who was
serving as chairman of
the committee.
Stearns was overwhelmed with Sanborn's enthusiasm for the aid movement, impressed by the
young man's

effective fund-raising efforts and eager for his
first-hand

knowledge of the Kansas situation.

Most important, Stearns

was tremendously pleased by Sanborn's awareness of the
need
for "system" and "order" in committee business.

Since both

men also believed that substantial portions of all funds
gathered for Kansas should be used to purchase firearms for
settlers, it was agreed that Sanborn should join Stearns,
Howe, P. T. Jackson and George Russell as a full-time commit-

tee member.

22

On June

3,

1856 a public meeting of Massachusetts abo-

litionists voted "to raise funds for the Free State settlers
of Kansas."

The men selected to lead the state-wide effort

were originally called the Faneuil Hall Committee.

The com-

mittee was chaired by Samuel Gridley Howe (who was available
for "any plan to beat down the Slave Power") and it sought to

combat the "systematic and extensive conspiracy "against
freestaters in Kansas.

By June 25,

1856 the group was

renamed the Massachusetts Kansas Committee, had acquired

a
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new chairman, Stearns, and proceeded
to raise money with the
avowed intention of "going beyond"
what had already been done
for settlers by way of supplies
and funds.
The committee

membership was convinced that guns were as
important in saving Kansas as clothing and farm tools.
And Stearns wasted
no time in looking to fill this need.
In the first
four

months of his tenure, he gave numerous speeches
about the
necessity of supplying Kansas settlers, he communicated
what
the settlers needed and raised 10,000 dollars worth
of sup-

plies.
tive.

Stearns was business-like, organized, and very effecHe never hesitated to use his influence throughout
the

state.

Tinmen, plumbers, and other craftsmen who purchased

goods from his lead-pipe factory were employed as a kind of

agency by which to raise funds.

Between August and December

of 1856, Stearns and his "agents" gathered 48,000 dollars

worth of equipment for the territory. 23
Stearns and Sanborn worked well together.

shared very similar views and backgrounds.

The two men

Each came from a

family which traced its ancestry back to the first days of
the Massachusetts Bay Colony.

modest economic resources.
energy to fashion
ety.

a

Each came from a family with

Each man had to exert great

place for himself in Massachusetts soci-

This was particularly true of Stearns.

George's

father, Luther Stearns, graduated from Harvard in 1791 and

"quickly obtained a good reputation as an obstetrician."

George never got to know his father well because in 1820
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Luther Stearns died and left the
responsibility of caring for
the eleven year old boy, his brother
Henry and sister
Elizabeth, to Mary Hall Stearns, his wife
of twenty-one
years. Mary Hall Stearns undertook the task
with great
strength.
She was an inspiring woman who not only
saw to the
needs of her family but became a "power in
the community."
The large, broad-shouldered woman walked with
a cane, had the

disposition of a justice of the peace, and faced the
family's
financial difficulties with courage.

She was a staunch

no-nonsense Calvinist who refused to accept "optimistic theories" of religion and probably would have preferred to
see

her children dead "rather than grown up in idle vicious

courses."

George saw such discipline as "severe and unrea-

sonable" but his mother saw it as a necessity if she was to

hold the family together.

She was probably correct.

Con-

tinual financial problems, sickness, and Elizabeth's death
in 1828 strained the family bonds but never broke them.

When George was sixteen his mother sent him to
Brattleboro, Vermont, where he trained for
ness at his uncle's country store.

a

career in busi-

Three and a half years

later in 1828, he returned to Boston and spent the next few

years working as a ship's chandler, salesman, and bookkeeper.
Then, in 1835, Stearns saw an opportunity to start his own

business manufacturing linseed oil, an article used extensively in shipbuilding.

After borrowing money from rela-

tives, mortgaging the family home (Mary Hall Stearns backed

.
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her son completely), and obtaining a loan
of 10,000 dollars
from Medford businessman Deacon Train, he
invested his funds
in the necessary equipment.

Stearns soon prospered.

Because of careful management,

in the first five years of produc-

tion the company's assets grew substantially and
George

Luther repaid all the debts incurred when he began
the enter25

prise

Shortly after repaying the last of his debts and rewarding himself with a vacation at some hot sulphur springs in

Virginia, Stearns experienced personal tragedy.

His wife of

five years, Mary Train Stearns, died of a heart condition.

For the next three years the grief-stricken young business-

man occupied himself with various community efforts while
working almost obsessively to improve his linseed oil business.

Then, in the spring of 184 3, he met the charming and

headstrong Mary Preston, daughter of a Maine circuit court
judge and cousin of the prominent abolitionist, Lydia Maria
Child.

They were married that fall.

Mary Preston Stearns had very set ideas about her family's life style.

From the beginning of the marriage fric-

tion developed between her and George Luther's mother.

Their

clashing personalities proved such an emotional drain for
Stearns that by 1345, he was building his palatial Medford

home on the south side of town in order to "look after his

mother without having his wife see too much of her."
Preston Stearns was disturbed about more than

a

Mary

mother's
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influence over her son.

husband worked.

She also disliked the long
hours he r

Nor was she completely satisfied
with th e

kind of business George Luther conducted.

By 1845, Stea rns

had pooled capital from his linseed oil
business and financed
a venture in lead-pipe manufacture.
To Mary's mind "the

lead-pipe manufacture" was "not a fine sounding
profession."
She often criticized her husband for refusing
to adopt a more
"stylish appearance." Socially ambitious, Mary
was particularly annoyed at what she considered her husband's
failure
to "advance his own interests."

stung by such criticism.

Steams seems

to have been

Unlike his wife, he had endured

economic hardships as a young man, knew the economic distance
he had traveled, and was proud of his efforts.

He attempted

to blunt his wife's outbursts by defensively suggesting that

"considering all things" had had "done very well."

People

trusted him because he had "no interests of my own to further."

But Mary was not to be deterred.

She was determined

to achieve a name for her family in Massachusetts society or

know the reason why not. 27

Whether because of Mary's incessant promptings to
"advance his interests" or because of his own personal desire
to continue "doing well," George Luther Stearns began to take
a more active role in Massachusetts politics after remarry-

ing.

As early as 1840 he had voted for the Liberty Party and

it was even rumored that he had been read out of

will because of his antislavery views.

a

cousin's

But up until 1848
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when he attended the Conscience Whig
Convention in Worcester
and "gave liberally" to the campaign,
he was a political
novice.

In 1850, he continued these
political efforts by

promoting Charles Sumner's candidacy for
the United States
28
Senate.
Stearns' campaign activity was paralleled
by a seemingly
compulsive philanthropy.
in 1848, he gave large sums of

money to Irish famine relief funds and rescued
his father-inlaw from bankruptcy- when he was duped out of his
judgeship.

About the same time he was working for Sumner, Stearns
loaned

money for rebuilding the homes of Medford shipbuilders and
mechanics which had been destroyed by fire.

George Luther

and the ever-prodding Mary were also part of a group of prom-

inent Bostonians who hosted Louis Kossuth on his American
tour.

Stearns purchased a number of Kossuth's ten-dollar

"freedom certificates" and raised

a

considerable sum in sub-

scription for the Hungarian leader's entourage of exiles.

Among this group was a young pianist named Zerahelyi.

The

young man's career had been destroyed by shattered nerves
resulting from a six-month jail term he had served for being
a

member of Kossuth's army.

Mary was captivated his

"pathetic expression" and her empathy translated into her

husband's largesse.

Several months after Kossuth left Boston

the young ex-pianist was still residing at the Stearns man-

sion in Medford.

At Mary's prompting, George Luther also

raised a subscription for Kossuth's sister when she was
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deserted by

her husband and left to care for
three children.
In 1858, Stearns gave one of her sons,
Casimir,
a job in his

factory's counting room only to find a
short while later that
the youth was stealing company funds.
Such a discovery was

upsetting but of minor significance.

For by 1858, Stearns

was too busy with another "philanthropic
enterprise" which
consumed all of his attention.
It was a venture he vaguely

referred to as "the wool business" and it was being
promoted
by a failed businessman who captivated Mary Preston
Stearns

every bit as much as the "pathetic" Zerahelyi.
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Ironically, Steams' intensified social and political

activity, facilitated at least partially by his sense of

economic security, was followed in 1853 by a personal economic disaster that nearly ruined him.

During that year

Stearns tried to corner the New England lead market.

The

attempt was ill-conceived, badly managed, and cost the

Medford businessman nearly all his capital.

Desperate,

Stearns made a last-ditch effort to save himself by borrowing
from Peter Butler of Boston and Benjamin Collins of New York.
Luckily, both men had confidence in Stearns and were willing
to cover his debts.

In the next three years,

the would-be-

lead-pipe-magnate worked strenuously, regained his financial
fortunes, and repaid his benefactors. 30
The trauma of economic misfortune, coupled with two

incidents which occurred during his struggle to regain

a

firm

financial footing, intensified Stearns' desire to continue
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Philanthropic activity and focused that
activity in the antislavery movement. Shortly after the
passage of the Fugitive
Slave Act in 1850, Stearns purchased a
revolver and vowed
that "no fugitive would be taken from
his premises."

But up

until 1853, the Medford businessman took
no part in the
resistance to the law. Then, in the fall of
1853, he was
asked to shelter the runaway slave, William.
Talbot.
For six
days Talbot was hidden in the basement of Stearns'
Medford

mansion.

When it was safe for the fugitive to leave, Stearns

paid for his journey to Montreal.

Conversations with Talbot

deepened the manufacturer's awareness of the brutality of
slavery and began his movement into antislavery reform activity.
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The incident that confirmed Stearns' intention to devote

himself to the antislavery cause was Charles Sumner's beating
by Preston Brooks.

The Medford businessman reacted angrily

to news of the assault.

He was sure it would "make a million

abolitionists" and vowed "to do what one man can and devote

my life and fortune to the cause."
lightly.

He did not take the vow

In two weeks he had joined the Massachusetts Kansas

Committee and by the end of June,

18 56,

was directing the

committee's affairs. 32
Stearns came to the antislavery movement with some

definite theories about the nature and tactics of reform.

He

fully understood the necessity of carefully cultivating

favorable popular opinion.

Saddened by Sumner's beating, he

81

was also well aware that it could
"make
ists" if properly exploited.

a

million abolition-

As a businessman his success

had depended upon the ability to market
his wares effectively
and he correctly assumed the same held
true for abolitionism.
Stearns was also convinced that the "idea
of abolishing
slav-

ery in America by moral suasion" was a
"delusion."

He hoped

the institution could be dismantled by political
compromise

but was willing to experiment with other methods.

He never

hesitated to use funds raised by the Massachusetts
Kansas
Committee for purchasing arms when other means of ending
slavery seemed destined to fail.

Stearns also had a keen

sense of the disillusion that often plagued reformers.

No

reform "could be made with the unanimous consent of the community."

Anyone "who stepped forward must be ready to meet

the fate of a reformer"
the public.

— must

be ready to be disappointed by
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The Medford businessman- turned-antislavery-activist fre-

quently discussed his theories with the man he replaced as
chairman of the Massachusetts Kansas Committee, Samuel
Gridley Howe.

The two men first met in 184 8 at the Con-

science Whig Convention.

Later they worked together for

Sumner and cooperated with each other in Kossuth's behalf.
Stearns was deeply impressed by Howe's intense commitment to

Kossuth and his willingness to "cheerfully make any sacrifices" to aid the Hungarian leader.

When Charles Sumner

asked Howe whether the famous Hungarian exile was demanding
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more money than "reasonable,"
Howe replied he was not at
all
moved by any suggestion that Kossuth's
desire to war for
Hungary's freedom would cost too much.
If a cause was
"right," it could never cost too much.
Howe agreed that wars
were "bad" but also suggested that
"when the lower propensities are so active in a race they must
occasionally be beaten
down by muskets." Stearns marvelled that
Howe was never
disturbed by Kossuth's exaggerated claims.
The physician
contended that Kossuth "like all enthusiasts"
overdid his
claims and attempted "more than is possible
to perform."

But

Howe felt it was necessary to indulge such
exaggeration.

Kossuth could "do much" for the cause of freedom and
needed
"a chance to try a struggle."

If collecting funds or endur-

ing overstatement was a way of "keeping" a great man like

Kossuth, Howe was all for it. 34
Howe and Stearns also shared a similar theory of education, one which would have a profound effect on their future

antislavery activity.

Early in his career, Howe had pushed

for the institutionalization of persons suffering from vari-

ous mental or physical handicaps.

As the director of Perkins

School for the Blind he worked diligently to establish an

institution which would prove the validity of that theory.
His reputation in the Boston community owed much to the seem-

ing success of these efforts.

By the late 1840 's, however,

the physician began to have doubts about the effectiveness of
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institutional rehabilitation.

Experience had "lessened the

enthusiasm" he once felt about "such establishments." 35
Howe now began to believe that the "leading principle"
in treating those afflicted with a mental or physical handi-

cap should be

"

separation and not congregation ."

this his "theory of diffusion."

He called

It was based on the assump-

tion that while handicapped people did need special training
at places like Perkins School, prolonged exposure to simi-

larly handicapped persons could be detrimental to an individual' s growth and improvement.

Isolation with similarly dis-

abled peers led to a deteriorating condition.

Instead of

such practice, Howe now pushed for increased exposure to
"normal" persons.

The blind, for example, should not stay

at Perkins all the time.

They should "go among normal per-

sons, adjust to a normal world, and not develop a separate

class feeling."

Howe favored boarding Perkins students out

in the community, using the school only for the purpose of

teaching compensatory educational skills.

The ideal to

strive for was "normal existence among normal people."

should learn by doing as other "normal" people did.
Stearns

1

3

One

6

work for the Medford Sunday School Association

led him to a somewhat similar conclusion.

As secretary of

the association, he was concerned with the seeming failure of

religious instruction:

it didn't seem to be making much of

an impact on the children.

He and other members of the group

engaged in long debates over which form of instruction would
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best promote true "Christian living"
by the youngsters.
His
own conclusion was that religious
instruction depended "too
much on teaching theology, Scripture, History,
etc."

if

Medford parents expected their children to
learn what they
themselves had only "imperfectly mastered," then

it was time

for Sunday-school teachers to start depending
"more on them-

selves" and less on their "immediate preparation."

A teacher

could only legitimately enforce the portions of
christian

truth he had realized in his own life.
speak from "soul to soul."

Only then could he

Stearns was looking for those

people who applied the truths of Scripture to "everyday
life."

The "proper christian teacher" had to be the "proper

Christian disciple."

The teacher had to be someone who would

"enforce precept by example."

The Medford businessman wanted

to conduct religious education on Sunday as Howe conducted

remedial education at Perkins.

Stearns wanted to expose

children to "normal persons," to "living Christians." 37
In 1858, both Howe and Stearns would be asked to subsidize

the effort of a "living-Christian" who hoped to lead a group

of black men and women out of the oppressive and debilitating

institution of slavery.

This "living-Christian" would prem-

ise his own work on the assumption that any "normal" person

had a right and duty to strike a violent blow for freedom

and that black insurrection was the first step in breaking

down "class feeling" and inculcating "normal" values.
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Besides sharing similar reform theories, Howe
and

Stearns seem to have had

a

genuine affection for each other.

It was partially on the basis of their firm
friendship that

Stearns had been willing to take over the reins of
the

Massachusetts Kansas Committee when Howe's poor physical and

mental health prevented him from conducting the committee's
affairs.

Howe claimed to be "fairly broken down" in attempt-

ing to "pull the laboring oar" of the organization.

He was

tremendously relieved when Stearns offered to shoulder the
burden.

Howe was also beset by other problems that spring.

He

frequently argued with Julia over family finances and her
desire for a literary career.

He was shocked by Sumner's

beating and deeply disturbed by his good friend's failure to
properly respond to medical treatment.

And, as always, the

tremendous tension of such problems made an impact on his

physical health and led him to entertain notions of impending
death.

More important than all these problems, however, was

the fact that in the spring of 1856, Samuel Gridley Howe was

undergoing a crisis of character.

engulfed him.
doing.

Doubts,

fears, and guilts

He wasn't sure of who he was or v/hat he was

In a confidential letter

to his close friend, Horace

Mann, Howe revealed the agony of this crisis.

be a "mistake; an abortion."
to him was "a humbug."

He claimed to

The character people attributed

His reputation as a philanthropist

was undeserved, because he had nothing more than "average
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benevolence."

The latter years of his life showed "a great

selfishness" and "loss of the adventuresome spirit."

He

longed for a return to his youth when he had been governed
by principle and ignorant of "what course would have been

profitable."

Howe was worried about his manhood, worried

about having no more than "ordinary courage."

He admitted to

Mann that he was even afraid to board trolley cars.

He was

forever worried about "getting into danger; though able to

appear decently cool."

The doctor felt there was only one

way out of his agony; only one way to recover confidence in
himself.

He needed one more chance to prove himself, one

more chance to recapture the happiness of early life when
"health, a good course and clean consicence" were all that

mattered.

He was looking for an escape to a time when he was

"unconscious of any purpose

.

.

.

called selfish."

for a simpler more certain existence

— one

He longed

that wasn't filled

with marital problems, financial concerns, and too many professional responsibilities.

The same society that caused the

"deeper disease" Higginson so loathed, had placed too many

exhorbitant demands on Sameul Gridley Howe.

He longed for

the days of his imaginary past when he didn't care about what

he ate or what he wore or "whether anybody knew about me."
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As his depression deepened in the summer of 1856, Howe

looked to Kansas for a reprieve.

He believed a trip there

could help him recapture his lost confidence and purpose.
Howe hoped to use

a

Kansas reconnaisance mission for the
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committee to re-experience his "adventuresome
spirit."

First-hand knowledge of the "great ground swell" of
"freedom"
was just what he needed.

After sending Julia and the family

to Newport, Howe started west in mid- July.

He melodramatic-

ally viewed the experience as the "most dangerous" he had

undertaken but claimed he felt "bound to go."

The "Kansas

mission" seemed "a duty, the last of my life that

ever be called to fulfill."

I

should

Faced with the problem of alle-

viating a profound personal crisis, Howe (like Sanborn) proceeded to fuse his quest for relief with the claim of assisting the freestate cause.

In the name of seeing himself as

something more than a "mistake" and "an abortion," he made
Kansas into a fountain of youth, a fountain where he might

recapture the "unselfish" ways of the past and shed the concerns of his urban, professional existence.
fused.

Howe was con-

He grasped for an ordering experience; something that

could return a sense of himself to himself.

In the end,

Fr £
trip
only served to deepen his guilts and fears.

Incredibly, Howe never did enter Kansas.

experience the happiness of

a

"good course."

the
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He never did

At Mount Tabor,

Iowa, he learned of the critical condition of the freestate

forces.

Missouri border ruffians had driven into northern

Kansas and left only two ways to enter the territory.

Howe

could go into Kansas with a body of armed settlers, or he
could go in alone on horseback.

He claimed to have neither

time for the first nor energy for the second.

But whatever

"
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his reasons, Howe's failure to enter
Kansas only added to his
romantic view of the territory and those
men and women who
were settling there. Howe imagined Kansas
to be a reenactment of the English Civil War. He saw
"southerners" as "all
bad" and northerners as "good, God-fearing,
temperate, and
honest." Like Sanborn, however, Howe resigned
himself to

organizing the "God-fearing," instead of joining
them.

He

still had a deep-seated fear of personally engaging
in physical violence. 41
The doctor spoke with as many settlers as he could,

telling them what their "friends in the East" expected.

They

should maintain their "constitutional right to bear arms" and
never lay those arms down while they had "strength to bear
them."

But Howe was a bit uncertain about just what settlers

should do with the arms they weren't supposed to lay down.

When they found themselves "opposed by U.S. troops," the
Boston physician suggested they "stand still and insist on
Free State

,

still bearing arms."

a

It was also important that

they preserve their image as law-abiding citizens, and he

suggested they "ought not oppose the civil process in the

uncertainty and disunion of counsel."

If they did resist

"the civil process," he was sure "mischief" would arise.

Then, whether they were beaten or victorious they would

"stand wrong before the country.

42

Howe was most upset with the actions of one of Kansas'

foremost military leaders, James Lane,

a lean and sinewy man
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of careless dress, and raspy voice.

Lane was a combinati<
Lon

of "principle and opportunism" who had come
to Kansas looking
for the "main chance." He had organized a
freestate militia
and cooperated with Iowans in establishing the
Lane Trail

through which settlers could move into Kansas and
circumvent
the Missouri blockade.

Howe wasn't impressed by these cre-

dentials and felt the man was guilty of "extreme indiscretion"

when he visited Mount Tabor.

Lane failed to remain "incog-

nito," and, thus, gave federal marshals in the area the idea

that the emigrant train leaving Tabor was a filibustering

expedition

— not

a body of legitimate settlers.

Lane's departure from camp
funds and supplies.

a

Howe made

condition for granting committee
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Soon after that departure in early August, Howe began
his trip back to Boston.

Once home, he found that word of

his visit to Kansas had spread quickly.

During late August

and early September he was deluged with requests for funds by

groups heading west.

The fact that he had been able to open

a channel of communication between the Massachusetts Kansas

Committee and freestate settlers consoled him.

He was also

pleased at having been able to "hamstring the adventuresome
Lane."

Generally, however, his "mission," his quest to

recapture his own "adventuresome spirit" had "not turned out
the way proposed."

The doctor realized he had given in to

his "fear of danger" by not going into Kansas and in the process forfeited any chance to regain the happiness of
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dedication to a "good cause."

it simply wasn't enough to do

organizational work for freestate settlers.

He was still

ill, still filled with nagging doubts
about his own character,

still feeling like an "abortion."

bated Howe's self -recrimination

.

The trip merely exascerIt again forced him to face

the discrepancy between his theori zations about
heroic, selfless behavior and the reality of his own practical
capabilities.

He could advise people to maintain their constitu-

tional right to bear arms but couldn't quite bring himself to

pick up a gun.

He was lost, confused, and still looking for

something "dangerous" to which he could commit himself.

Nor

had the trip done anything to alleviate the difficulties

between himself and Julia.

They continued to argue about

family finances and her career.

Howe's relationship with

Sumner was actually strained further by his travel out west.
One of the reasons Howe had not journeyed to Washington to

visit Sumner after his beating was because of the pending
Kansas trip.

When he returned to Boston, Howe feebly

attempted to defend his behavior and tried to excuse his
failure to stay by a friend's side in time of need.

Sumner saying

now learn my presence might have been pleas-

"I

ant and useful to you.

would have gone

He wrote

I

I

cannot reproach myself, for when

could not and when

I

could, it did not seem

to us here that it was well for you to have any visitors."

But Howe did reproach himself.

I

He continued to look for a

"good course," continued to look for something beyond his

normal philanthropic interests.

In four months, he would

find that "course" in the form of a
Kossuth-like hero named
44
Brown.

II

In October,

1855,

just before major hostilities had

developed between freestate and proslavery forces in
Kansas
and just seven months after the state of Massachusetts had

finally dropped prosecution in the Burns case, Thomas

Wentworth Higginson decided to take a vacation.

His reform

activities, lectures, and Burns activities had exhausted him.
The Worcester Free Church also became a burden.

gation had flourished under his tutelage but as

demanded much of his time and energy.

The congrea

result

Another thing that put

stress on Higginson was his wife's poor physical condition.

Mary Channing Higginson had always been subject to chronic
ill-health.

Then, in January of 1853 she suffered from an

attack of "violent rheumatisim.

"

Whether this illness was

a

severe form of arthritis or even an early symptom of muscular
dis trophy is unclear, but throughout that spring she could

hardly walk.

Though Higginson was upset he did not restrict

his reform activities.

Indeed, he sought relief by avoiding

the issue of his wife's health and spending long periods of

time on the lecture circuit.

strained.

Their relationship became quite

Mary needed more and more attention but showed

none of the "reverance" for her husband that he admittedly
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craved.

Added to this was Mary's "undisguised
repugnance for
children and her husband's solicitousness "
Finally, by
.

October of 1855, Higginson, in obvious discomfort
about his
marital situation and exhausted by the reform work

that had

helped him escape it, planned a trip to the
semi-tropical
island of Fayal in the Azores.
(a

After requesting David Wasson

friend of George Luther Stearns) to take over the
respon-

sibilities of the Free Church, Higginson and his wife set
sail from Boston harbor at the end of the month. 45

A warm climate and relaxed daily routine refreshed the
Massachusetts couple considerably.

By the spring of 1856,

Higginson became impatient to return to his reform work.
Before the Burns episode he claimed to be "just waking up to
Kansas

-

Nebraska" and ready to preach a sermon on it.

Now

as news trickled into the isolated island about the increased

hostilities raging in Kansas, the Worcester activist wanted
to do more than preach a sermon.

4^

Immediately upon his return from Fayal in June,

Higginson began efforts in Worcester to organize and supply
people who wanted to settle Kansas as a free state.

These

efforts earned him an agency with the Massachusetts Kansas
Committee.

Then, when a group of forty-seven Worcester men

led by Calvin Cutter rejected instructions to enter Kansas by
the land route through Iowa and were "summarily disarmed" by
a few Missourians,

incident.

Higginson was asked to investigate the

He jumped at the chance and headed west in early

July.

After all, Higginson felt he was living in a
"great

historic period" and he was sure "the future" would
"leave no
true man unhonored." As he traveled west, Higginson
hoped
people would begin to understand the "eminent need" to
sup-

port freestate settlers and indulged himself by exaggerating
his own efforts.

To that end, he was convinced that if he

hadn't begun organizing the aid movement in Massachusetts
"nothing would have been done."

The Worcester activist still

found it necessary to be first among equals. 47
In September, 1856, he had a second chance to experience

first-hand, the conditions in Kansas.

He contracted to write

a series of articles for the New York Tribune but traveled

west fearing his mission would not be a very "manlike one."
Unlike Howe, Higginson had "only a sense of general danger"
about entering Kansas and wasn't really certain it would be
enough of a test of his "manlike virtue."

When he reached

Chicago, Higginson was further disheartened to find that his

itinerary called for him to be "employed more out of Kansas
than in Kansas."

Higginson felt little consolation in the

fact that people he met in the city who had been out west

were "very glad" to see him and to know he was promoting the
freestate cause.
Like Howe, Higginson was immensely impressed with those

men and women who were settling Kansas.
larger than life.
portions.

Indeed, they were

They were romantic figures of heroic pro-

Ever since the rendition of Burns, Higginson

"
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claimed that he had been "looking for men."
in Kansas."

He "found them

They proved the "virtue of courage" had
"not

died out in the Anglo-American race."

Like Howe and Stearns

who understood and theorized about the influence
of environment, Higginson began to realize that all the
Anglo-American

man needed to prove his manliness was the proper "circumstances."

One day in Kansas made the "American Revolution

more intelligible."

If one could change "circumstances," one

could change character— black or white.

If men would fight

for the right they could recapture character. 49

Higginson vehemently disagreed with Howe's view of James
Lane, probably because the frees tate leader went out of his

way to patronize the minister.

Lane appointed Higginson

brigadier general of Kansas freestate forces "because of his
past courage and ability," and even arranged for Higginson to
join a group of twenty settlers who were traveling to Topeka.

The journey wasn't all that Higginson expected.

Some danger

did exist but the trip proved to be "discouragingly safe."
He claimed the group began "to fear marching in without a

decent excuse for firing at anything or anybody."

He was

intrigued with the "wild manly looking riders around him,
and a bit disillusioned by the "dirty" life he was leading.
"Death" for freedom was "all very fine" but when it came to

"dirt for freedom" the sacrifice became "unexpectadly hard."

Higginson didn't know how to romanticize dirt.

50
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One of the members of the group
Higginson traveled with
was James Repath, a frenetic young
journalist-adventurer who
was also covering the Kansas struggle
for Greely's Tribune.

Higginson and Repath got along very well.
lar views on the moral evil of slavery,

They shared simi-

the necessity of arm-

ing freestate settlers, Lane's staunch defense
of freedom,

and the right to use violent means to preserve
freedom.

Repath had been in Kansas
Higginson'

s

a

number of months and stimulated

curiousity about the place with

a

detailed exam-

ination of the politics and leadership of the freestate
cause.
He seemed to know all about men like Lane, Charles
Robinson,

and the mysterious John Brown who was quickly becoming a

minor legend in the territory.

Higginson was also impressed

with Repath *s exceptional boldness.

When both men were

arrested and interrogated by John Geary, the newly appointed
territorial governor, about the intentions of the settlers
they were riding with, Repath refused to be cowed and,

instead, lashed out at Geary for attempting to conquer "the

Free State cause

by arresting Free State leaders."

Higginson himself fully believed Geary intended to maintain
peace in Kansas "at the price of obedience to a false legislature."
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Soon after his arrest and interrogation, Higginson was

released and started back to Worcester.

He was certain the

brief pause in hostilities that settled upon Kansas after
Geary's arrival was "only the prelude to

a

severer struggle."
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Both sides made preparations for renewed
fighting and neither
desired peace. Such a state of affairs
further convinced
Higginson of the correctness of his theories
about the
effects of war on men.
"War" he claimed "always educates men
to itself, disciplines them, teaches them
to bear its fatigue,

anxiety and danger and actually enjoy them."

War made men.

Just as his own attack on the Court House had
crystalized his
own commitment to "practical abolition"; just as
it had dis-

pelled his own personal confusion about life goals and
the
means to achieve them, so too would violent confrontation
discipline the men of Kansas.

It would strip away their

uncertainties about the immorality of slavery.

it would cure

the "deeper disease" inflicted on men by American society.

Righteous violence purified men.
ness and Anglo-American virtue.

It returned them to manli-

Yes, war made men and men

never stopped fighting until they achieved their goals.
Since Kansas was not yet free, Higginson knew hostilities

must continue.
Upon his return to Worcester the minister confessed that
he really enjoyed himself while in the territory.
of the near state of seige that existed there

In spite

(perhaps

because of it) Higginson claimed that things and people were
"very real there."

What was that reality?

To Higginson, it

was like "waking up some morning and stepping out on the

Battle of Bunker Hill."

Kansas was the reincarnation of

eighteenth century revolutionary America.

It was a place of
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morality, courage, and freedom- loving
simplicity.

it was

tradition and idealism freed from a
"mainchance mentality."
It was a place where discipline had
replaced the chaotic
uncertainty of his own society. Kansas was a
place where
people were dedicated to fighting for freedom
and need not
concern themselves with the anxiety of selecting
a proper
career.

The people of Kansas weren't only fighting to
pre-

vent the imposition of slavery.

They were also rejecting a

mentality—a mentality that not only enslaved four million
black men and women but also destroyed the "virtue" and "manliness" of revolutionary America.

Kansas was more than a battleground of freedom for

Higginson and Howe.

It was a refuge, a vacuum apart from their

own society, and, at the same time a model for their society. In
that imaginary vacuum Higginson fared better than his Kansas

committee colleague, Samuel Gridley Howe. While out on the
plains of Kansas Higginson experienced
,

a

tremendous sense of

uplift. He enjoyed "sitting in a hotel and hearing men talk

about me

.

.

.

while

I

know

I

have incurred the penality of

death for treason under the U.S. Laws and for arming fugitives
to Kansas."

Yes, these men and women who were settling Kansas

were indeed "fugitives."

They were men and women seeking

release from a "diseased" society.

Once home, Higginson

despaired of ever having left Kansas and its "fugitives."
When he finally discharged his revolvers and put them away in
his trunk there occurred "a curious reaction from the feeling
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with which

I

first loaded
ue a it.
it

.

.

.

n came hQme tQ
lt efully

^

that all the tonic of life
was ended and thence
forward if
any danger impended the
proper thing would be to look
meekly
about for a policemen, it
seems as if all the vigor
had suddenly gone out of me and a
despicable effeminancy had set
in." Kansas illicited a rugged
individualist "vigor," while
Worcester could only summon
"despicable effeminacy." 53

Higginson soon met
of Kansas.

a

person who symbolized the "vigor"

He was one who believed that
white America could

recapture the values of revolutionary
days only when it saw
the black man as man, one who embodied
all the values

Higginson longed to have restored to
American society.
ironically, Higginson failed to realize
that the values he reverenced were the same values that drove
the expansionism and
development of the so-called "diseased" society
he despised.
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CHAPTER

III

Frank Sanborn prefaced his autobiography
with the creed
he believed had governed his life's work.
He set himself
against the "mainchance " psychology of the
nineteenth century
by claiming never to have yearned for "great
wealth"
nor

sought "leadership or high place in the world."

Sanborn

maintained that whatever leadership he had acquired
owed to
"character and not ambition."

He was always filled with

"contentment in station" though firmly resolved not to be
"domineered over by others, either individuals or classes."
But Sanborn's activities as secretary of the Massachusetts
Kansas Committee belie such assertions; they indicate he

vainly sought for recognition among the intellectuals and
reformers of Boston society.

Indeed, Frank Sanborn was a

very ambitious administrator who continually tried to widen
the scope of his authority and leadership.

Like Stearns, he

was displeased with the haphazard organization of Kansas aid

efforts and tried to remedy the situation.

He changed the

committee's voucher system, demanded that many accounts be
"explained," asked for careful itemization of all expenses,
and constantly prodded agents to fulfill their obligations
in these fiscal matters.''"

During his tenure as secretary of the Middlesex County
Committee, Sanborn learned that the amount of responsibility
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he acquired rose in direct proportion to
the time he put into
his committee work:
to gain power in the bureaucracy one
had
to become an indispensable bureaucrat.
And, as secretary of
the Massachusetts Kansas Committee this was his
first rule of

operation.

Within a few weeks after joining the committee

his exertions earned him recognition and respect from
fellow

-committee members,

As a result, his opinions were more fre-

quently solicited and receptively considered.

This, in turn,

lead to Sanborn's increased self-confidence and assertiveness.

In late December, he composed an article for the

Middlesex Journal and boldly requested the Massachusetts Legislature to appropriate 50,000 to 100,000 dollars for "relief
of our brethren" in Kansas.

The state should place the sum

"in the hands of a committee of good men" who would spend it

only with "reliable information" about Kansas needs.

A

large appropriation would "encourage emigration, promote

investment of capital," and prevent
the territory.

a

proslavery takeover in

2

More than anything else, though, Sanborn's importance to
the aid movement and to Massachusetts abolitionism was estab-

lished by his three year relationship with the gray-haired,
steely-eyed, fifty-six year old Kansas freedom fighter who,

shortly after New Year's Day in 1857, walked into the commi ttee offices on Bromfield Street in Boston.

John Brown

ca lmly introduced himself tc Sanborn and then presented the

young committeeman with reference letters from New York
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philanthropist, Gerrit Smith, Kansas freestate
leader,
Charles Robinson, and abolitionist politician,
Salmon Chase.
In measured and controlled tones, Brown
told the secretary

that he had recently returned from the territory
after spending fifteen months fighting for the freestate
cause.
During

that period he and his sons had skirmished with
proslavery

settlers in the so-called "Wakarussa War," played a major
role in defeating Henry Clay Pate and his Missouri border

ruffians at the Battle of Black Jack, and fought along side
James Lane at Ossawatomie.

Brown also remarked that his

experiences had confirmed his belief in both the moral evil
of slavery and the injunctions of retributive justice found

in the Old Testament.

Force was the only language proslavery

men understood.
Brown came to Boston physically and mentally exhausted.
He was out of money and harried by his family's desperate

financial state

— they

were scraping

a

living out of a small,

soil-poor farm in North Elba, New York.

He was looking for

supplies to continue his freestate efforts and, most important, gently testing Massachusetts abolitionist attitudes on

the use of violent means to overthrow the institution of

slavery.

He told Sanborn that Gerrit Smith believed his

chances of getting materials from the Massachusetts Kansas

Committee were "middling good."

Brown also informed Sanborn

that just before coming to Boston he stopped at Springfield,
Massachusetts, where he had spoken to George Walker, Ariana's
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brother.

Walker suggested Brown go straight to
Sanborn for
any information about obtaining frees
tate supplies. 3
As Brown spoke, Sanborn carefully read the
letters of

introduction and was quite satisfied.

Actually the young

secretary didn't need testimony about Brown's
heroism.

He

had been reading about the Kansas warrior's exploits
for over
a year.

Abolitionist newspapers were filled with articles

heralding the actions of this Bible-quoting freedom fighter.
While in Kansas, Sanborn himself listened to the settlers'

speculations about the self-sacrificing colonist.

Such sto-

ries about Brown reaffirmed Sanborn's own notions of the

singularly courageous spirit of Kansas emigrants.

When he

finished reading the letters, Sanborn was immediately struck
by the recollection of a note he had recently written to

Thomas Wentworth Higginson.

In it, Sanborn replied to

Higginson's call for the formation of an independent northern
_mili.tia to assist Kansas freestaters.

The committee secre-

tary assured Higginson that Kansas fighting and James

Buchanan's election that fall had convinced him of the need
to do "something different."

Submission to the Slave Power

for another four years was "out of the question."

fully supported the idea of an independent militia.

Sanborn
But up

until his meeting with Brown, Sanborn was unsure what "something different" was, in spite of his advocacy of that militia.

Nov/,

as the intense, imposing,

freedom fighter stood in

front of him waiting for a response, the young secretary's
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instinct told him that John Brown was
that "something differ4
ent" in a manly form.
As soon as the two men began discussing
Kansas, Sanborn
knew his instincts were correct. Brown
was a man who

impressed you with his "seriousness of mood."

Often empha-

sizing his ideas with Biblical quotations,
one also sensed
his unwavering Calvinism.
Brown seemed hardened

by his expe-

riences in the "wild regions" of Kansas and the
young aboli-

tionist admired the qualities of leadership these
experiences
seemed to illicit.

Brown knew what needed to be done to stop

slavery in Kansas and he knew how to do it.

He was a man

used to "directing other men" and not being "guided or

trained by them."

Sanborn, whose desire for his own family

had been tragically disrupted by Ariana's death also per-

ceived Brown's tremendous reverence for family.

Brown spoke

sorrowfully about his son Frederick's death in Kansas, his

other sons' imprisonment, and the hardship Mary had to endure

because her men were off fighting for freedom.

It was obvi-

ous to Sanborn that with such an acute sense of family, Brown

thoroughly understood the debilitating effects of slavery.
In fact, after listening to Brown during this first discussion, Sanborn claimed he was certain "History" would give the

man a "proud place on her pages" and "posterity would pay

homage to his heroism."

Ironically, in the future, Sanborn

made a career out of seeing to it that "history" performed
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the task.

In later years, promoting Brown's
image and legend

would also be "something to do." 5
For the next few days Brown and his young
admirer discussed the Kansas struggle. Scrupulously avoiding
any men-

tion of his role in the Potawatomie Massacre, the
warrior

outlined his plans for defense of the freestate cause.

He

spoke of organizing "every able bodied free-state man"
into

military companies and gathering the necessary materials to
supply these cadres.
.

.

.

A cooperative effort could "inspire

confidence and courage" in men who would ordinarily be

only "dead weight" on the hands of those who possessed "more

fortitude and presence of mind.

"

The leaders of these compa-

nies had to be men of "impeachable moral character

ardent devotion to

.

.

.

liberty, gentlemenly

.

.

great practical industry and energy of character."

hardly needed to press such views on

a

.

.

.

.

demeanor,

Brown

young man whose ambi-

tion and industry had earned him a place with the

Massachusetts Kansas Committee and who believed it was "character" that made for distinguished leadership.

Sanborn also

heartily agreed with Brown's Higginson-like notions about the

beneficial effects that military discipline had on weak men.
Sanborn was overwhelmed by Brown's unselfishness, dedication, and organizational sense.

All the man wanted was

enough money to arm settlers and "the means for defraying"
his "ordinary expenses."

The request seemed quite reasonable

to one who had advocated a huge legislative grant for Kansas
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and its defenders.

In addition,

the young secretary was

impressed with Brown's desire for a regularized
payment
schedule and a "fair and full account" of all
expenditures.
Brown's attitudes toward the necessity of proper
fiscal

organization were precisely in line with what the
efficiencyminded secretary had tried to implement as basic
committee
procedure.

Like so many of Brown's past business associates,

Sanborn was led to believe that the Kansas warrior
understood
the value of "system and perpetual order" in any financial

aid program.

Sanborn wrote to Higginson, explained that

Brown needed 30,000 dollars, and asked the Worcester activist
to come and meet the man.

The secretary also sent notes to

Garrison, Howe, Phillips, and other well-known Boston aboli-

tionists suggesting they meet Brown on January

5

at an infor-

mal reception to be held in Theodore Parker's home. 7
For his part, John Brown was equally impressed with

Frank Sanborn.

Sanborn was not only enthusiastic and orga-

nized, but was also in an ideal position to help Brown make

vital financial connections.

The young committeeman really

understood the economic elements involved in resisting Slave
Power encroachments.

Sanborn also understood that men had

to be willing to make antislavery activity their "business

and study.

"

While Sanborn had very limited knowledge of what

slavery was like, he was angered by the institution's debilitating effects, seemed ready to fight for a state appropriation to assist Kansas, and was more than willing to commit
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Kansas Committee funds to Brown's use.

Besides, afte::r a

lifetime of experiences trying to get
men to invest in his
own ill-fated economic ventures, Brown
quickly recognized
young Sanborn's ambition and strong
desire to succeed in his
work.
This intensity, when joined with the
young man's obvious inexperience and deferential attitude
toward anyone willing to actually fight for freedom, made him
more easily manageable than other committee members might be.
In the ensuing weeks and months, Brown tried to exploit that
manageability.

Like Ariana Walker, he realized that in spite of

Sanborn's perfunctory protestations about the need for independence, the young man was quite ready to be led.

And, as

Sanborn himself had suggested, Brown was "used to leading."
John Brown looked forward to the meeting scheduled for

Parker's home.

While living in Springfield some years ear-

lier, he had often traveled to the Music Hall to hear the

fiery abolitionist minister.

Though Brown disagreed with

Parker's Unitarian theology, he claimed to be "wonderfully
taken up" with the minister's "discourse."

And Brown's

appreciation for Parker's violent rhetorical flourishes
against slavery "constantly increased."

The difference

between Brown's Old Testament Calvinism and Parker's Unitarianism was partially reflected in the controlled but heated
debate which erupted between Garrison and the Kansas warrior
during the meeting.

Garrison's dry rationalistic doctrines,

New Testament pacifism, and hopes of ending slavery by moral
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suasion were anathema to Brown who based
his religious convictions on the Old Testament. Brown
literally interpreted
the Bible's many injunctions and believed
there was a wrathful God in Heaven who took an active part
in human affairs
through Divine Providence. Some men were even
called to be
God's instruments on earth and to mete out the
severe and

sometimes violent punishment of sinners.

8

Parker listened attentively to this religious debate.
Of course he was doctrinally sympathetic with Garrison,
yet,

his brand of Unitarianism sought to incorporate the emotion

Brown conveyed.

Throughout his ministry, Parker hoped to

demonstrate rational Unitarianism with intuitive and emotional proofs.

Intellectually he agreed with Garrison but

his sentiment lay with Brown.

Religion existed long before

the Bible, Christ, or Christianity.

The natural laws of

religion had existed from creation.

They were infinite and

self-evident.

The Bible merely reflected such laws.

Still,

Parker knew that to believe in laws one had to know them in

more than a cold intellectual way

— they

also had to be felt.

The Emerson-Norton debate of the late 1830's had left this

matter clear for him. 9
But regardless of religious differences or similarities,

Parker liked Brown-

The warrior believed slavery to be a

crime against, humanity and understood the necessity of meeting force with force.

While Brown was careful not to press

^
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his views on violence, Parker was glad
he accepted its

necessity.

Parker noticed many of the same qualities in
Brown that
Sanborn had. Brown was a good family man, seemed
to be very

careful about his physical appearance, and spoke in
measured
tones.

Undoubtedly, Brown's talk of the value of family

inspired the minister.

He and Lydia had never been able to

have children and both revered those people who understood
their worth.

Like Sanborn, Parker recognized Brown's disci-

pline and self-control as he presented his case for the for-

mation of military cadres in Kansas.
More than any of these considerations, however, was the

kinship of class which Parker felt for Brown.

Unlike Brown,

Parker had had the advantage of a Harvard education, was

financially secure, and had earned an outstanding reputation

throughout New England.

But the minister still felt an

affinity of origins with Brown.

Like Brown, Parker was well-

born but poor; he was decended from a distinguished ancestry

but had no funds to pay his way.

As the minister looked at

Brown and sensed his bone-weary exhaustion, he knew it was a

product of more than the man's sacrifices in Kansas.

Parker

was reminded of his own exhaustion after hours and hours of

reading scholarly tracts and discourses.

It was an exhaus-

tion acquired in the name of selfless learning but Parker

never forgot that his place in society also depended on such
efforts.

Brown's exhaustion also seemed to be born of the
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struggle for survival in nineteenth
century America. Parker
was flooded with memories of poor
youths who were trampled by
the exclusionary class system they
encountered while attending Harvard. Like these young men,
Brown had to sacrifice
"pleasure, comfort ... eye sight and
health" to achieve his
goals. Without the proper cultural
background these youths
were forced to learn "ail by
soul." They,
.

.

like Brown,

.

needed "iron" bodies as well as "iron" intellects
in order to
overcome their backgrounds. They needed stamina
or they

would "die in that experiment of the Cross."

And like these

well-born poor boys at Harvard, Brown had "attained
rior culture" at the expense of

a

crippled body.

a

supe-

In a sense,

Parker was familiar with Brown before he even entered his
home.

Both men had struggled with the handicaps of similar

origins.

One man had "succeeded;" the other had "failed"

until entering Kansas one year earlier. 11
Three days after the meeting at Parker's, Brown met with
Sanborn, Stearns and Howe.

He had just returned from a visit

with wealthy industrialist Amos

A.

Lawrence who was serving

as director of the New England Emigrant Aid Society.

When

Howe heard this he was prompted to share some remarks he had
recently made to Lawrence with the warrior.

Howe wanted the

Massachusetts Kansas Committee to suspend operations.

In

its place the doctor suggested the state of Massachusetts

should "come out and take the high ground" by making an

appropriation for Kansas.

The legislature should "break
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through

...

the miserable trammels of statecraft"
and do

"what we would have a brave and generous
man do in his own
capacity." Such an appropriation would
stimulate "fear" in

slaveholders.

Howe was still ambivalent about the use
of

force and did not specifically advocate direct
attacks on

slaveholders but he did believe that if the
slaveholders'
"fear" could be increased they would be brought
to "terror."

Kansas must be kept free from the "curse of slavery."

slav-

ery had always "beaten freedom" and it was about
time anti-

slavery men acted as if "sons of our mothers and children of
our wives were among the four million bondmen."

Brown com-

pletely agreed and could scarcely contain his excitement.

If

Howe seriously believed what he said about "terror," Brown

knew how to induce it.

In a year, he would ask Howe's assis-

tance to implement a scheme for "practical abolition." 12

For all Howe's talk of legislative action, by early
1857, he was deeply disenchanted with politics.

No doubt he

lectured Brown about his belief that the Republican Party
was "falling far short of its high mission."

Men solely con-

cerned with the acquisition of political office ran the
party.

They were "disreputable" and used "disgraceful" meth-

ods to get elected.
in politics.

Even Henry Wilson wasn't above trading

He had become the supreme political opportunist,

talking with his mouth and "not his eyes."
.

.

.

the heroic element."

He was "without

Howe wondered why men of charac-

ter were constantly being displaced in party ranks.

13

Brown fully agreed with Howe's
observations.

He could

cite numerous examples of political
ineptitude hindering the
freestate cause. The Kansas warrior
acknowledged the need
for a state appropriation but was not
optimistic that it

would be approved.

As Howe listened to Brown's response
and

watched him discuss Kansas affairs, he was
impressed with the
man's "capacity." Indeed, Brown "spoke with
his eyes" and

possessed "the heroic element."

Howe saw Brown as the pro-

duct of a frontier life that could bury talents,
sacrifice
taste, and throw away human accomplishment but, at
the same
time,

could illicit by its "courseness and hardness" all that

was noble and righteous in the human spirit.

Occasionally

Brown's version of his role in the Kansas struggle seemed

overstated and aroused Howe's skepticism.

But in the end,

Howe considered such exaggerations as insignificant.

After

all, as the doctor himself suggested some time before:

"Enthusiasts were prone to exaggerate what they had or could

accomplish."

The important thing to remember was that a

great leader could be "used" and therefore should be
•'kept."

14

Howe saw a number of reasons why this potential leader
of the Kansas freestate cause should be "kept."

During the

debate over the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, he called upon Sumner
to "send a blast through the land."

There was a need to

"seize an opportunity" while public sentiment wasn't yet
formed.

Now in the wake of Buchanan's election and continued
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Kansas fighting, public sentiment
was again ready for shaping.
Howe clearly understood there was a
need for a "steam

prophet to awaken mankind."

And Brown seemed like just such

a prophet.

With his penchant for quoting the Bible
and his
erect, puritanical disposition, he might
be just the man to
"awaken" a slumbering North. Then too, the
prospects of

Kansas being lost to slavery looked very real
to Howe in the
first weeks of January 1857 and he was "willing
to aid anyone
who would fight for freedom." 15
Perhaps the most intimate personal reason for the
physician's support of Brown lay in the sad conclusion he
brought

home from his Kansas trip.

Howe realized he was no longer

able to actively fight for freedom.

The best he could hope

to do was to participate in the struggle by organizing and

subsidizing someone else's efforts.

Soon after the meeting

adjourned, Howe wrote to Lawrence asking him to push hard for
the state appropriation.

1^

Throughout the entire meeting, George Luther Stearns
remained silent, carefully watching and listening to the

interaction between Sanborn, Howe, and Brown.
impressed his

tv/o

He saw how

colleagues were with the man but also knew

that as chairman of the Massachusetts Kansas Committee he

bore the ultimate responsibility for dispensing funds.

It

was absolutely necessary that he determine for himself the

reliability of the men dealing with the committee.
had to be certain his confidence was not misplaced.

Stearns

Having
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been raised by a staunch Calvinist who
had rejected "optimistic theories" of religion he was quite
familiar with
the

tenor of Brown's religious convictions.

What interested him

even more, however, was whether or not
Brown understood the
demands of careful organization. Could he
make a businesslike analysis of his material needs? Did
he understand that

waste and inefficiency jeopardized the whole aid
movement?
By the end of the meeting Stearns had his
answer.

He

was sure Brown was thoroughly convinced of the need for

proper management, regularized payment schedules, and
"full
and fair" accounting of funds.

Stearns

felt Brown could be

trusted and suggested the freedom fighter take possession of
200 Sharpe*

s

rifles recently purchased with committee funds

and turned over to the National Kansas Committee.

following day (January

9)

Stearns led the committee in voting

Brown 500 dollars for "necessary expenses."
made a committee agent.

On the

Brown was also

At the end of this second meeting,

Stearns invited Brown to dinner at his Medford home.

Two

days later on January 11, John Brown rode out to the Stearns

mansion.

17

Stearns hoped the informal dinner would allow him to
test the validity of his favorable first impressions, obtain

more information about other "prominent Kansas men," and help
convince Mary that in his own way he did look out for the

interests of his family.

Indeed, Mary Stearns was pleased

that her husband had invited the celebrated Kansas freedom
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fighter to their home.

By the end of the evening she
sat

enthralled as Brown entertained her young
sons with
description of the Battle of Black Jack.

a

She was so con-

vinced of the righteousness of Brown's
conduct that she
proved to be one of the Kansas warrior's
closest allies in
Boston.
For his part, Stearns continued in
his favorable

assessment of Brown's character.

The Medford businessman was

particularly impressed by Brown's "very clear
ideas in regard
to Lane,

Robinson and others."

Stearns now felt much better

about the men who would take possession of funds and
supplies
sent to Kansas by the committee.

Though Brown probably

didn't discuss his numerous business ventures with the
Stearns, it is unquestionable that the committee chairman

sensed his guest's experience in the business world.

Only a

man who understood the importance of dealing with trustworthy
and competent associates could have constructed such an

insightful analysis of the personalities directing freestate
affairs.

John Brown spoke like a true professional. 18

Quite as important to Stearns, as Brown's analysis of

Kansas leaders, was his painful understanding of what Kansas

work did to family life.
on this point.

Stearns was particularly sensitive

He spent long hours away from home because of

his Kansas efforts and his absence had become a further

source of friction with Mary.

But here was a man of heroic

stature advocating the necessity of family sacrifices for the
cause of freedom in Kansas.

Brown's theories made a deep
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impression on Mary and George Luther.

He convinced Mary that

she should be more tolerant of the
demands on her husband's
time.
Brown also stimulated Stearns' feeling
that his boys

were being over-indulged and spoiled.

After listening to

Brown's rather romantic assessment of how
Kansas had

strengthened his own sons' manhood,

Stearns was con-

vinced that his boys, Frank and Henry, "should
be sent away
from home for a year or two to prevent them from
becoming
soft and effeminate." 19
The most touching moment of Brown's visit came just

before he left.

Young Henry Stearns boldly stepped up to

Brown and offered his savings for Kansas.
contribution.

Brown took the

Then, when Henry asked him to write and tell

"what sort of a boy you were," he promised to send a brief

autobiographical letter.

Of)

Brown left the Stearns home confident the chairman would
"hold up his hands" with committee funds.

He also believed

the wealthy businessman might be willing to personally sub-

sidize his future abolitionist activity.

The Stearns visit

had been rewarding and in pleasant contrast to the meeting he
had with Thomas Wentworth Higginson two days earlier.

Higginson arrived in Boston on January
mittee had voted funds to Brown.

9,

just after the com-

Sanborn had requested the

appearance, feeling that if Higginson had confidence in Brown
he might serve as a conduit to the substantial sums of money

reputedly held by the Worcester County Kansas Committee.
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Sanborn had good reason to believe Higginson
and Brown would
take to each other.
Only a few months earlier at a West
Indian Emancipation Day speech, Higginson had
hailed "the
glory intrinsic to the white man fighting with
arms to end
slavery." And Brown was certainly willing to fight.

Higginson had also suggested that in

a

war against slavery

"the northern white man's present selfishness and
money grub-

bing would be replaced by disinterestedness and selfdevotion."
ties.

Brown seemed the perfect example of those quali-

To Sanborn, Brown's disposition and personality per-

fectly reflected Higginson'

s

contention that the "most

favored race" found its "highest priviledge" in aiding the
"weakest," "most ignorant race." 21

But while Higginson did hold notions which suggested

that he would be immediately interested in aiding Brown,

a

number of conditions unknown to Sanborn prevented the

Worcester activist from committing himself to the warrior.
In November, 1856, Higginson recommended to Gerrit Smith that

an "independent militia" be raised to fight in Kansas.

How-

ever, Sanborn did not know that Higginson had already rejec-

ted a plan to organize such a militia group while touring
Kansas.

Higginson had not been confident of the group's

leadership.

And, as the Worcester activist would suggest in

the near future, those who knew him best realized that under

"apparent rashness,

I

have a great deal of caution."

22

There were other reasons for Higginson's
coolness toward
Brown. While in Kansas, Higginson had spent
much time with
the roving journalist James Repath.

two men discussed Brown.

It is quite possible the

If Repath even hinted of Brown's

role at Pottawatomie, Higginson might have been wary
of

future "rash acts" by the Kansas warrior.

Then too, Sanborn

had exaggerated Higginson's access to Worcester County funds.
In fact, Higginson was under pressure not to request any more

funds until accusations of Calvin Cutter had been cleared up.

Cutter blamed the Worcester committee for loosely handling
contributions.

Hoping to account for funds the committee

dispersed, Higginson wrote Martin Stowell in Kansas asking

him to itemize expenditures of some 2000 dollars sent from
Worcester.

When Higginson received an accounting in the late

fall of 1856, he found Stowell had lost 100 dollars because

he accepted a personal check from John Brown which was even-

tually returned "uncashed because of a closed account."

Higginson wasn't about to make further grants to an individual who regarded his financial obligations so casually. 23

Higginson was also held back from support of Brown by
his deep involvement in the disunion movement.

After he left

Kansas in the fall of 1856, Higginson seriously believed that
if the cause of freedom were crushed there, the United States

would separate into "two nations of North and South."

The

Constitution would not hold them together and the drama of
"Union and Disunion" would come closer every day.

Higginson

.
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resumed his ministerial duties fully convinced
of an "impending crisis." in fact, he wanted to do all
in his power to
promote it. By late December, there was no
doubt in his mind
that freemen and slaveholders were living in
"two nations." 24
Early in January he began sending out letters
requesting
attendance at the Worcester Disunion Convention. In
the

midst of the effort, Sanborn called him to Boston.
was inopportune.
in the convention.

The time

Higginson had too much of himself invested
Disunion was the country's "destiny and

duty," its "only hope."

He would not be distracted.

As with

the Burns rescue attempt and the Kansas trips, Higginson felt

good to know he was in the forefront of a cause.

From his

early days in divinity school he had always wanted to be a
"leader of men."

Symbolically, by his disunion efforts, he

was again battering down Court House doors.
"so much younger."

It made him feel

Sanborn's request and Brown's presence

were as much of an imposition as Parker's and Howe's failure
to send the Faneuil Hall crowd scurrying to his aid.

couldn't be bothered with Brown.

He

Unlike his fellow Kansas

committeemen, Sanborn, Stearns, and Howe, the minister

reserved judgment on Brown.

He was unsure of the man's char-

acter and was busy organizing the convention.

The possibil-

ity of help from Worcester could be discussed at another
time

25

Higginson' s attitude stunned Sanborn and disappointed
Brown.

Still, the lack of commitment was not an outright
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refusal and a brief examination of the
views Higginson
expressed during the convention indicate,

at least partially,

why it was inevitable that the minister
eventually allied
himself with Brown.
At the convention, held on January 15-17,
Higginson
openly clashed with Garrison. He rejected pacifism
and

political antislavery, he asserted that abolitionists
must
use "armed force" to thwart slavery and held that
"two antag-

onistic nations could not live together any longer."

Higginson was certain disunion must take place.

The sooner

it did, the better it would be for the North to "prepare for
a peaceful and dignified policy."

The Worcester abolitionist

agreed with Wendell Phillips' contention that "peace between
sin and servility" was not a benefit.

Even if abolitionists

gained control of the United States government it would take
"two or three generations" to rectify the abuses of the Slave
Power.

Political reform was too slow to "effect a cure."

Violent, disruptive, disunion was a "lesser evil" than the

"gradual dying out of slavery."

2 fi

In his own speech to convention delegates, Higginson

logically extended Phillips' position.

He asked the audience

why prior disunion efforts had failed, then answered his own

question by pointing out that those movements had drawn
"glittering blade" only to tuck it back into
scabbard" after waving it for popular effect.
things would be different.

a

a

"neat little

This time

Higginson wanted a "convention of

.
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ten men who had drawn the sword for the
right and thrown away
the scabbard." All they needed was a
"chance to come face to
face with the United States government" and
they could "revolutionize the world." 27

Ironically, at the conclusion of his speech,
Higginson

dismissed the importance of the very convention he
had helped
organize and convene. He also foreshadowed his commitment
to

Brown.

Higginson said it was "vain" to speak of difficulty

in promoting disunion.

The time would be drawn soon enough

by the "passions of men."

At best, conventions could only

partially prepare the way.

By the spring of 1858, Higginson

began to believe that John Brown was just the man to arouse
such "passions" and it was Higginson more than anyone else

who supported Brown and embraced his plan to foment
insurrection

a

black

28

Except for Higginson*

s

reticence, the first month of

John Brown's presence in New England proved entirely successful.

He had acquired 200 Sharpe

'

s

rifles, 500 dollars for

"necessary expenses," and, above all, solidly established his

personal character with those abolitionists in

a

position to

help him in Kansas and with future antislavery efforts.

He

was viewed as a man of intense religious conviction, high

moral character, and great physical self-control; a man who
was unafraid of using forceful means to stop slavery.

Brown

had not attended Harvard but as Parker indicated he seemed to
have "attained a superior culture."

Most important, Brown's
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personal value system was not foreign
to Sanborn, Parker,
Stearns, Howe, or Higginson.
His values were essentially the
same as their own.
He was neat, courteous, and
disciplined.
He preached industry, ambition, and
calculation
at the same

time that he spoke of "character" as the
ultimate prerequi-

site of leadership.
family.

Brown also had a strong commitment to

And like all of the men he met, Brown was
concerned

with "conventional civic repute."

As has been suggested,

Brown's "ideal person was comfortably within the
nineteenth

century mainstream."

No doubt this gave great solace to the

five urban, middle class, professionals

v/ho

interviewed him.

The one man most profoundly affected by Brown's person-

ality was Franklin Benjamin Sanborn.

In particular, Sanborn

was moved by Brown's obvious dedication to family.

To

a

young man whose own family life had been cut short because of
his wife's premature death, such a dedication illicited deep

sympathies.

Sanborn also revered anyone who left business

and pleasure to "make a study" of Kansas and abolition.

When

Brown asked the young man to accompany him to New York for

a

January 24 meeting with the National Kansas Committee,
Sanborn quickly accepted.

At the meeting, Sanborn requested

the committee to relinquish control of the 200 rifles turned

over to them by the Massachusetts Kansas Committee.

This

request was honored but the committee, led by chairman Henry
B.

Hurd, balked at Brown's desire for "all the guns it had

and over 1000 dollars worth of supplies."

They also rejected
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Sanborn's plea for

a

pledge of 5000 to 10,000 dollars.

Hurd

and the others initially felt Brown
was "too violent and
unpredictable" to be trusted because the
Kansas warrior
refused to be pinned down by questions
about what he intended
to do with the arms and supplies.
All he would say was that
the committee men knew him and his work
in Kansas.
if they

wished to give him anything, he wanted them to
"give it
freely." Finally, at the urging of its
eastern

membership,

the committee decided in Brown's favor by
pledging 5000 dol-

lars to help implement any "defensive measures"
he considered

necessary to preserve a free Kansas.

Brown was also author-

ized to immediately draw 500 dollars from the committee
trea-

surer as

a

portion of that sum. 29

Both men were pleased by the committee's action.

Before

leaving New York City, they discussed strategies which might
force an appropriation out of the Massachusetts legislature.

Such a grant coupled with the national committee's pledge

would leave Kansas freestaters amply supplied to resist proslavery attacks.

Upon returning to Boston, Sanborn wrote

Brown and informed him of the schedule for legislative hearings on the appropriation.

He advised the freedom fighter

that his appearance at the hearings would improve the possi-

bility of passage and force a quicker consideration of the
bill.

Sanborn realized that Kansas had been relatively

peaceful, under the strong leadership of Governor John Geary

but saw the proslavery legislature's recent attempt (January

12,

1857)

to set up a rigged constitutional
convention,

incident that could trigger renewed
hostilities.
should

raake it a

point to attend the hearings.

as an

Brown
His traveling

expenses would be paid and Sanborn even
hoped to "do some30
thing more
.

II

After leaving New York City, Brown journeyed to
his
North Elba home. On the way he stopped off in
Peterboro,
York to visit Gerrit Smith.

During a previous stopover,

Brown had been led to believe that Smith might make

bution to his Kansas efforts.

New

a contri-

Brown also hoped the wealthy

landowner had some information about the possibility of pur-

chasing additional acreage near the North Elba farm.

The new

acreage would help relieve some of the financial strain on
his family.

Brown was elated by his acquisition of guns and

money for freestate forces but his elation was tempered by
tremendous anxiety about his family's poverty.

Actually the warrior was quite confident that Smith

would have money for the Kansas cause.

The two men had known

each other since 184 8 when Brown came to New York to visit

number of black families who had settled 140,000 acres of
land donated to them by Smith.

The land was scrubbed and

almost impossible to cultivate but Smith believed it would
help blacks improve their material condition.

It was also

an attempt to help "colored people give up notions of being

a
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servants and become independent
mechanics and farmers." By
cultivating their own land, they
could avoid relationships
with those who hated them.
the end, the land's poor
quality doomed the project.
Still, Brown was impressed
with
Smith's desire to do something more
than talk about helping
black people. Then, in 1849, Smith
helped Brown purchase
land in the North Elba area and for
the next few years the
two men maintained a harmonious,
if relatively superficial,
friendship based primarily on the mutuality
of their antislavery sentiment.
In 1855, Smith invited Brown to a
convention of "radical political abolitionists"
in Buffalo.
At the
convention Smith read two letters from John
Brown, Jr., which
reportedly "drew tears" from many delegates. 31

m

But besides hoping that their friendship and
similar
antislavery views would stimulate a Kansas contribution,
Brown had specific information which led him to believe
Smith
was ready to assist the cause of freedom in the territory.
In his conversation with Higginson, Brown learned
Smith had

given full support to the minister's call for northern state

governments to enlist "militia volunteers" for Kansas.
Despite Smith's view that government was primarily established to protect property and over-stepped its jurisdiction

when going beyond that activity, Brown also knew that Smith
supported Vermont's state appropriation to Kansas.
too,

in his brief meeting

Then,

with Lawrence, Brown discovered

that Smith, in the early spring of 1856, had contributed 250
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dollars to the New England Emigrant
Aid Society, authorizing
Lawrence to use the money as he saw
fit.
Smith didn't even
mind if the contribution was used to
purchase arms for freestate settlers, claiming that there
were "instances in which
the shedding of blood" was "unavoidable."
in March
of 1856,

Smith had also pledged 3000 dollars to
Kansas asserting that
"we must stand by Kansas resistance."
While Brown did not
know the extent of Smith's Kansas aid (it
is estimated at
16,000 dollars), he was certain his information
indicated

a

willingness on the philanthropist's part to subsidize
the
violent defense of the territory. 32
Brown's assumptions were justified.

In fact,

just

before the Pottawatomie Massacre, in early May, 1856, Smith
made very strong statements about his commitment to the violent defense of freedom.

At that time, he asked an aboli-

tionist convention assembled at New York City to go with him
in "voting slavery to death."

If the assembled abolitionists

weren't ready to vote slavery to death, Smith announced he
was personally ready to put "slavery to a violent death."

He

no longer opposed the "bloody abolition of slavery" and was

ready to have it "repulsed by violence" and "pursued even

unto death by violence."

Two months later, in the heat of

Kansas fighting, Smith asserted that where government didn't

exist or when it had failed, men had to obey the "necessity
of the case," recognize themselves as government, stop "look-

ing to ballots" and start "looking to bayonets."

Those who

"

126

were truly antislavery men should
be "mustering armed men and
none but armed men." if "all
manhood" had not
left antislav-

ery men, they would not leave Kansas
settlers to be slaughtered.
He was no "bloody-minded man" but
felt the South must
be "dispossessed" of the idea that
northern people were
"cowards. 33

Shortly after arriving at Peterboro, Brown
described his
successful fund-raising campaign in New England.
Smith was
pleased to hear so many abolitionists had not
lost "all man-

hood."

When Brown discussed his family's difficult
economic

situation, Smith empathized and said he would see
about the

possibility of Brown's acquiring additional acreage in
the
North Elba area.

But when Brown finally asked Smith to

assist his fund-raising effort he received a sharp rebuff.
The philanthropist claimed his previous efforts to "save

Kansas to Freedom" had "exhausted his current means."

could not give more money.

He

The refusal jarred Brown but he

wisely refrained from pressuring Smith to reconsider his
decision.

Long years of negotiating various business schemes

had taught Brown when a decision was final.
ing would only antagonize Smith.

Further badger-

It might even jeopardize

Brown's plan to request Smith's financial aid for a future

assault on slavery.

One year from now Brown would return to

Peterboro and unveil

a

scheme (already focusing in his mind)

which sought to demonstrate the power of blackmanhood
would wait until then to press Smith. 34

.

He

127

If Brown had really understood
Smith's personality he

probably would have been more prepared
for the abrupt refusal
Smith was an individual of "paradoxical
intellect" whose
fierce denunciation of the Slave Power
and emotional outbursts in defense of violence were often
inexplicably contradicted by his actions.
From the beginning of his participation in the abolitionist movement, Smith
never hesitated to
advocate the use of force against slavery. At
Utica, New
York, in 1835, during one of the first abolitionist
conven-

tions he attended, Smith responded to mob threats
against the

meeting by calling himself a "poor peace-man" and
demanding
the use of "deadly weapons" to protect the right of
assembly.

Four years later, when he was again disillusioned by the

seeming

f ruitlessness

of his abolitionist efforts and again

feeling it was "almost hopeless" to spread "correct views,"
Smith determined that slavery could only be abolished by
"force" and never by "peaceable" means.

He reasoned that if,

as all antislavery men understood, violence was one of the

products of slavery, the country would go on with "proslavery

wickedness" until the institution had come "to
bloody end."

You fought fire with fire.

a

violent and

When Higginson

attacked the Court House during the Burns rendition, Smith
applauded the attempt and was reminded of his own efforts to
thwart the Fugitive Slave Law.

He belonged to Syracuse's

Vigilance Committee, helped establish an underground railroad, and took an active part in the successful rescue of
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escaped slave William (Jerry) Henry.

When "Jerry" was

arrested in early October, 1951, Smith
asserted that a judicial release was not good enough.
Such an "acquittal" would
be as "nothing" when compared to a
"bold forcible
rescue"

which clearly demonstrated the "strength
of public opinion." 35
Yet, in spite of forwarding these views,
Smith
always

stayed within the mainstream of abolitionist
reform efforts.
Like Sanborn, Parker, and Howe, he had much
personal ambivalence about violence.

Rhetorical flourish was one thing,

actually killing slaveholders was quite another.

During the

Jerry Rescue for instance, Smith advocated the use
of force

but was terribly afraid one of the policemen holding Jerry

might get hurt in the attempt.

He cautioned those partici-

pating in the rescue not to do bodily harm to anyone guarding
the fugitive.

Always an office-seeker, Smith finally won

election as an abolitionist candidate in

.1852

on a platform

that acknowledged "no law for slavery" but also asserted that

"national wars" and "the violence" to which misguided and

frenzied individuals" were prompted was "unnecessary." 36
Smith's term in the House of Representatives is also

suggestive of his paradoxical behavior.

The Peterboro squire

voted against a homestead bill because he claimed it confined
the "homestead priviledge to white people," then he turned

around and refused to back Republican efforts to table the

Kansas-Nebraska Bill by asserting that tabling was
cal tactic which infringed on democratic principle.

a

politiIt was

an odd position for one who had
long claimed that the Slave

Power controlled the political fortunes
of the country. 37
Actually from the moment of its introduction
in December
of 1853, Smith opposed the bill.
He didn't take part
in

"un-official efforts" to defeat it or sign
petitions circulated by Salmon Chase against it but he
did make a speech
condemning the measure in early April. Before

the full mem-

bership of the House, Smith claimed that he
hoped slavery
would "not end in blood" but "feared that it might."

He con-

sidered the institution a "conspiracy of the strong
against
the weak" but he admitted having no plan to end
it except

"unconditional" and "immediate abolition."

argued that any institution that reduced

Finally, he

a man to a "thing"

had committed the "highest crime" against humanity.

38

When Smith would not join efforts to table the KansasNebraska Bill he rationalized his behavior by claiming that
in rescuing a fugitive slave he took his stand "outside gov-

ernment" whereas in his role as

member of Congress he was

a

"bound to the will of the majority."

majority called for enactment of

a

If the will of the

measure perpetuating the

"highest crime" against humanity, Smith felt bound to obey
it.

Eventually the measure was put on the floor of the House

and Smith voted against it but by that time it was too
,

.

late

39

Smith's behavior was censured by many abolitionists.
The New York landowner was particularly upset by resolutions

"
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offered at the National Convention
of Colored People meeting
in Cincinnati.
The convention heartily regretted
his refusal
"to serve the cause of the oppressed."
Such criticism stung
Smith.
When it was coupled with his hatred
for "fixed rou-

tine," the feeling his "talents were
being wasted," continual
subjection to charges of being "out of order"
while on the
floor of the House, and little "admiration"
or "applause" for
his efforts, it prompted, in August 1854,
his resignation

from Congress.

The resignation was the final paradoxical

gesture of his congressional career because, in one
way or
another, Gerrit Smith sought political office
throughout

his

entire life. 40

For over a year after leaving office, Smith retreated
from antislavery activity.

He even remained aloof from ini-

tial efforts to organize and supply freestate settlers in
Kansas.

And,

in the wake of his political rejection, Smith

swung back to the position he had espoused intermi ttantly for
twenty years.

Smith now claimed to entertain "slight hope"

that American slavery would come to a peaceful conclusion.

There wasn't enough "virtue" left in the American people.
Law, education, politics, and religion conspired to blind men

on the subject of slavery.

Traditional institutions and tra-

ditional methods would no longer work.

Slavery had to die a

"bloody death. 41
By late spring of 1856, Smith's wounded sensibilities

had begun to heal.

He cautiously returned to the traditional
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arenas of antislavery activity.

Though not entirely giving

up his thoughts that slavery must be
violently overthrown, he

nevertheless reversed his assessment of the
American people.
He now felt they were "entirely ready" to
destroy
slavery.

All they needed were "leaders" to direct them
on the work of
destruction." It was a pity that "cowardly statesmen"
would

not forget their caution and "bid the masses to march—
not

with bayonets but with ballots." 42
In Smith's refusal to give money for Kansas, Brown

caught a glimpse of his rapidly shifting and sometimes outrageously paradoxical behavior.

Perhaps after their meeting

ended Brown instinctly understood that personal slights and

disturbing emotional experiences often had

a

profound impact

on the wealthy landowner's ideological posture.

In any case,

Brown left Feterboro satisfied that Smith would try to find
land for his family and optimistic that Smith could be

counted on for a contribution at some later time.
Ill

After spending

a few days in

North Elba, Brown again

traveled to Boston for his February 18 appearance before the

Massachusetts legislature's Committee on Federal Relations.
The committee was charged with investigating the idea of a

state appropriation for Kansas.

Sanborn had suggested

3rown's appearance before the group and worked hard prodding
its members to quickly consider the appropriation proposal.

.

132

His efforts were more than rewarded
by the speech Brown gave.
While poorly structured, haltingly
delivered, and, at times,
a simplistic assessment of the Kansas
situation, the brief
address revealed Brown's uncanny ability
to make a calculated

emotional appeal.

He was a failed businessmen who spoke
with

a monotonous cadence but he had not forgotten
the essentials

of salesmanship.

He knew what symbols

of his listeners.

resonated

the empathy

Brown stood before the committee and dis-

cussed the great sacrifices of time and energy made by
himself and other freestate settlers in defense of Kansas.

He

spoke of farmers' lost crops, settlers terrified by continual violence, and the tremendous loss of life and money in
the territory.

chains

In a dramatic gesture, he held up the trace

which proslavery men had used to imprison his sons

and then lashed out at the "barbarous treatment" they had

received.

Near the end of the speech he lamented his son

Frederick's death.

It was an impressive performance filled

with uplift maxims, Biblical allusions, and the unstated but
implied contention that though John Brown had sacrificed much
he was willing to do more if supplied with the necessary

funds

When Amos A. Lawrence heard about Brown's speech he
immediately contributed 70 dollars for Brown's "personal
use."

Lawrence also confided that although he had "no defi-

nite knowledge" on which to base his suspicions, he felt sure

Brown would be disappointed if he relied too heavily on the
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Pledges of the National Kansas Committee.
"not inspired confidence."

raise funds.
canny Brown.

The committee had

it would be difficult for them
to

Lawrence's words were not taken lightly
by the
Many times in the past his own business
ven-

tures had been ruined by poor management
and lost confidence.
He and his oldest son, John Jr., often
discussed the best way
to preserve trust among financial confederates.

3rown

thanked Lawrence for his "kind hints" and suggested
they were
an "exact expression" of his own "private
conjunctures."

Brown had come to Boston with a lifetime of experiences
at
requesting funds for one enterprise or another.

This letter

to Lawrence, his performance before the Massachusetts
legis-

lature, and, in fact, the whole tenor of his efforts with

Massachusetts Kansas Committee members suggests that he
applied the lessons of these experiences to the task of funding his Kansas work-

He was quite adept at calculating the

effect of his own actions and could quickly evaluate, as well
as, deftly manipulate the personalities of the men and women

around him. 44
Clearly, the man most influenced by Brown was Franklin

Sanborn.

After attending the legislative hearing and listen-

ing to the Kansas warrior's speech the secretary was a bit

overwhelmed.

Ke was so caught up with Brown that he claimed

to be certain "we shall get a bill"

— even

though a more care-

ful assessment of the legislature's attitud-..

gested otherwise.

Sanborn's use of the wor

would have sug.;e"

in his note

is highly suggestive.

it had been almost three months

he began work as a full-time committee
member.

si:
.nee

At first,

despite protestations to the contrary, he had
been plagued
with serious doubts about the wisdom of his
decision.
He

made vigorous efforts to overcome the anxiety,
prove his
worth, and expand his authority. But since Brown

had come to

Boston those doubts had disappeared.

His belief in Brown and the

correctness of his decision developed symbiotically— each

nourishing the other until Brown himself had become a kind of
living symbol of Sanborn's secure sense of place in the movement.

Brown was not only a person to commit himself to but

also a kind of prototype for all the personal qualities

Sanborn imagined to be prerequisite for success.
someone to be studied as well as

followed.

Brown was

The young man

who spoke of the need for independence yet "looked for
authority" had finally found "something to do."

Brown served

Sanborn's need for cause, career, and identity. 45

Brown was less certain about the state appropriation
than Sanborn.

This uncertainty and the "hints" in Lawrence's

letter prompted him to begin looking for funds in other
places.

For the next three weeks he rode rattling trains all

over New England in that quest.
ones for Brown.

These weeks were difficult

People were interested in his tales of

Kansas life but had little cash to spare.

Kansas remained

quiet, Geary seemed in full control of the territory, and

people were just beginning to feel the pinch of financial

panic that would sweep the country that
year.

At the same

time that funds for his Kansas work dried
up, the reality of
his family's desperate financial condition
pressed in upon
him.
The condition also affected his sons.
They didn't want
to "learn and practice war" anymore.
Despite Brown's

reminder that it was they not he who had engaged
in fighting
"in the first place" and that he had no "love for
the busi-

ness/' they all seemed ready to leave Kansas and return
home.
Some pressure was lifted off Brown when, in the first
week of
March, Samuel Thompson (one of the men who owned the North

Elba land Brown was negotiating for) loaned a small sum of

money to the family.

4fi

In spite of a growing sense of desperation, Brown occa-

sionally felt moments of accomplishment.

He sent newspaper

clippings to his wife Mary showing the "different stories"

being told about him but cautioned her that
t ell things as

I

tell them ."

"

none of them

Brown believed he could make

people realize their "duty" even though they stubbornly clung
to the delusion that they had a "right to give or not to

give."

Hoping to promote this conception of people's "duty,"

he published a broadside in early March which appealed to the

"friends of Freedom."

In it, he asked people to "hold up his

hands" with contributions and suggested that it was with "no
little personal sacrifice " that he came before the public
"in this manner."

He felt that the appeal, when taken

together with Buchanan's election, Taney's Dred Scot decision,
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and Buchanan's seeming foreknowledge
of it, would clearly
underline the price of freedom in Kansas. 47

At this critical moment in his search for
money Brown
welcomed an invitation from Sanborn to speak
at Concord
before an audience certain to be receptive
and
generous.

Sanborn hoped it would prove how much "he
regretted" that "so
little" had been done for Brown and how much he
understood

what it was like to "suffer from the false confidence
of the
public." Besides, Sanborn was sure "the ladies would
be

glad" if Brown would speak.

On the afternoon of March 11 Frank Sanborn paced ner-

vously on Concord's train station platform awaiting Brown's
arrival.

When Brown did appear, the two men greeted each

other warmly and went directly to Ellery Channing's place.
That evening Brown had dinner at Thoreau's home and afterward

narrated his role in the Battle of Black Jack where he had
relieved Henry Clay Pate of his magnificently mounted Bowie
knife.

The second night of his visit Brown was invited to

Emerson's home.

When the meal was finished the party

adjourned to the Town Hall where Brown addressed an assemblage of about 100 people.

During his speech the freedom

fighter again exhibited the chains that bound his sons in
Kansas and spoke of Missouri proslavery "ruffians" as having
the "perfect right to be hung."

For those who listened care-

fully to 3rown during the speech and throughout his visit in

Concord some hint of his wish to confront slavery in places

other than Kansas would have revealed
itself.
particular, should have been forewarned.

Emerson, in

Earlier that eve-

ning Brown remarked that "it was better
that

a

whole genera-

tion of men, women and children pass away
by violent death"
than to have a word of either the Bible or
Declaration
of

Independence violated. 49

Concord residents missed Brown's hints.

But they did

not miss the personal qualities which convinced
certain abo-

litionists he should be given a chance to confront slavery
in
a place other than Kansas.

Those qualities were eloquently

described by Thoreau when, some years later, he composed his
"Plea for Captain John Brown."

What impressed Thoreau was

Brown's rare gift of "common sense."

He was a "man of

action, ideas and principles" yet one who did not yield to

"whim or transient impulse."
in his speech:

Brown's essence was reflected

he always spoke "within bounds."

Thoreau

remembered how Brown referred to his family's sufferings
"without ever giving the least vent to his pent-up fire."

Brown was a "volcano with an ordinary chimney flue."

He was

an "experienced soldier" who "kept a reserve of force and

meaning."

Listening to Brown was like listening to Cromwell.

His puritan virtue and Old Testament enthusiasm moved Concord

and Boston audiences alike.

But it was his fantastic con-

trol, his unswerving discipline, which inspired their confi-

dence in his capabilities.

Discipline and control, these

were the virtues reverenced by many reformers in
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mid-nineteenth century America.

Properly applied, they could

help abate the social chaos stimulated by
industrialization
and emigration.
Properly applied, they could help resolve
economic uncertainty, dismantle the institution
of slavery,

and win freedom for settlers on the plains of
Kansas.

Prop-

erly applied, they could bring the return of traditional

American values.

Higginson claimed his trip to Kansas was

like revisiting the Battle of Bunker Hill.

Those Concord men

and women who listened to Brown speak that evening felt the
same way.

But Brown was more than a religious prophet, more

than a reincarnation of America's revolutionary spirit, he

was also a model of virtue for a newly developing urban mid,

die class.

50
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CHAPTER

IV

In spite of the enthusiasm and sympathy
which Concord

residents expressed for Brown and the cause of
freedom, they
donated very little money. The Kansas warrior

left town tre-

mendously dispirited and determined to change his
tactics of
request.

Up until the Concord address, Brown had traveled

widely throughout New England speaking with large numbers
of
antislavery men and requesting them to "help fill his hands"
for freedom.

He based the plea on the virtue of his own

character, his willingness to fight for freedom, and his

first-hand knowledge of the Kansas situation.
earned him only a modicum of success.

These efforts

He was given guns and

money by the Massachusetts Kansas Committee, a tentative com-

mitment of funds from the National Kansas Committee, and
number of small donations from Connecticut citizens.

a

But

from mid-February to mid-March Brown had not added substantially to these contributions.

In fact, he heard rumors that

Massachusetts would not make a state appropriation and the
National Kansas Committee was going to renege on its January
agreement.

When these fund-raising failures were linked to

his family's deteriorating economic situation and his sons'

growing reluctance to fight unless something could be done
for the family, Brown felt compelled to change his methods.

140

In the weeks following his Concord address
Brown pursued

funds more aggressively.

He showed less of the calm demea-

nor that made men wonder at his discipline and became
more
demanding.

He accentuated the self-sacrifice of his own and

his family's efforts.

He applauded the New England abolition-

ist community less and chastised them more for failing in

their moral obligation to assist the Kansas freestate movement.

Most important, the Kansas warrior focused his appeal.

He spent fewer hours traveling all over New England and more

time applying pressure on the three people most receptive to
him, Frank Sanborn, George and Mary Stearns.

Immediately after his Concord appearance, Brown went to
the Stearns mansion in Medford and outlined the poor response
to his efforts.

Stearns and Brown discussed the possibility

that the National Kansas Committee would try to back out of
its agreement.

They both felt that chances for a state

appropriation were slim.

Brown mentioned that the only peo-

ple who had shown any concern were the citizens of

Collinsville

,

Connecticut, who contributed 80 dollars and

promised to ship his grandfather's gravestone to North Elba

where it could be "faced and inscribed" in the memory of
Poor Fred " who "sleeps" in Kansas.

"

Our

For the first time, Brown

also spoke at length about his family's desperate economic

condition and the need to purchase more land around the North
Elba farm site in order to relieve that condition.

While

Brown admitted his needs more openly and discussed his
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efforts in greater detail it seems
unlikely that he told the
lead-pipe manufacturer everything. He
certainly did not

reveal his contract with the blacksmith
Charles Blair, while
in Collinsville, Brown met Blair and
agreed to buy 1000 steel
pikes for a dollar a piece. As part of the
deal, Blair also
agreed to apprentice Brown's son Jason for one
year providing
the young man with training, room, board, and
200 dollars for

his services."''

Stearns was sympathetic and understanding but not very
helpful.

He could make no personal commitment of funds

because of his own pressing financial obligations.

And he

told Brown that the Massachusetts Kansas Committee didn't

have any more cash to spare.

Stearns does seem to have sug-

gested that Brown write to Amos A. Lawrence about starting

subscription for the North Elba land purchase.

a

After all,

Lawrence had already contributed 70 dollars for Brown's "personal use" and Stearns believed it was quite probable he

would be willing to do more. 2
Brown was encouraged by Stearns' suggestion.
later while soliciting funds at

a

A few days

March 19 meeting in New

Haven, he took Stearns' advice and sent a short note to

Lawrence.

He asked the industrialist to assist some New

Haven friends who had pledged to raise 1000 dollars to help

purchase additional tracts of land around his North Elba
farm.

Lawrence balked at the request claiming he had just

spent over 14,000 dollars to aid the construction of public
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schools in Kansas and did not want to involve
himself in yet
another fund drive. He would think about "heading"
such a

subscription but couldn't possibly do anything
else.
Lawrence assured Brown that if something happened to
him
while he was engaged in the "great and glad cause" of
freedom, he could assume that his wife and children would
be

cared for "more liberally than you now propose."

Such guar-

antees were good to hear but weren't negotiable.

Brown still

needed funds.

He refused to give up on the demand that a

subscription be raised and in the next few weeks put intense

pressure on Stearns and Lawrence to help him purchase the
acreage.

For the moment, he hoped to appease his family by

sending them 150 dollars from funds he had already received.

3

By the last week in March Brown was exhausted from trav-

eling, discouraged by the continued fruitlessness of his

efforts, and irritated by Sanborn's recent note hinting that
the legislative appropriation would not pass.

Summoning what

little energy he had left, the Kansas warrior asked the young

committee secretary to accompany him to Easton, Pennsylvania
for discussions with ex- Kansas governor Andrew Reeder.

Brown

hoped to persuade Reeder to return to Kansas as an agent for
the National Kansas Committee and leader of freestate forces.

Charles Robinson, who along with James Lane initially orgaized the freestate militia, had lost the confidence of many

antislavery men in the East because of timid and conservative
policies.

Brown was certain that this loss of faith had
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affected his own fund-raising efforts.

With Reeder in a

position of leadership perhaps some of that
faith could be
restored and his own efforts enhanced. 4
Sanborn was just preparing for a trip to Washington,
D.C., when he received Brown's invitation.

He immediately

wrote and told Brown that he would be happy to assist
and

would meet the Kansas warrior at Easton upon his return
from
the nation's capital early in the first week of April.

5

Upon arriving at Easton, Sanborn received a summary of

Brown's reasons for trying to persuade Reeder to return to
Kansas.

Then, both he and Brown entered into discussions

with the ex- governor.

They urged Reeder to take the commit-

tee agency claiming that a man of his "great ability

.

.

foresight, boldness and prudence" would be an immeasurable

aid to the cause of freedom.

Reeder was flattered and

thanked his guests for their expressions of confidence but he
refused, saying simply that he did not want to return to the
territory.

Both Sanborn and Brown were disappointed by

Reeder 's reply and asked him to reconsider.

When he stood

firmly by his decision the two men thanked him for the courtesy of hearing them out and started back to Boston.

There is little doubt that Brown was sincere in his

request for Reeder'

s

help.

But the Kansas warrior was as

interested in isolating Sanborn for a few days in order to
thoroughly discuss his own financial difficulties, as he was
in obtaining the ex-governor's assistance.

Brown used their
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trip back to Boston to gently pressure
Sanborn into exerting
his influence to obtain more funds for
the Kansas compaign.
In very emotional terms, he discussed
the sacrifices of his
family with the overly sympathetic young
man.
Brown even

admitted that his sons wanted to leave Kansas
because of the
privation their absence caused the rest of the
family.

The

Kansas warrior claimed he wanted to make the
"best provision"
he could for his wife and children.

Brown also spoke of his

own disillusionment and uncertainty, his belief that
Buchanan

was a tool of the Slave Power, and his conviction that Robert

Walker's recent appointment as governor of the territory

would jeopardize freestate exertions.

Hoping to persuade

Sanborn how much his trust and help was needed, it is quite

possible Brown revealed his belief that even if freestaters
gained control of Kansas slavery would continue in the United
States until the day black men and women rose up and violently destroyed it.

7

Sanborn was moved by Brown's expressions of confidence.
And though he was unsure about the necessity of black insurrection, he completely agreed with the warrior's contention

that there was no possible political solution for slavery in

either Kansas or the United States.

His recent experience in

Washington, D.C., fully convinced him of that proposition.
While in the nation's capital he was terribly upset by what

seemed to be a very cumbersome process of government and he
was thoroughly dismayed by "what sort of men rule us."

The
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city was an incredibly "odd place,"
inhabited by a group of
men whose character was a "matter for tears."
As far as

Sanborn was concerned, of all the "creepy things"
an "office
seeker" was the "most loathesome." How could
such men be

expected to legislate slavery out of existance?
have enough character.

They didn't

Washington itself was an "absurd

sanctuary" of that very institution; it was the home of the
Slave Power and "full of abomination." 8

Sanborn was also confused and at

a loss

about what he

personally could do to alleviate Brown's financial headaches.
He had used as much influence as he had to get Brown

Massachusetts Kansas Committee funds and weapons.

He had

pushed the Massachusetts legislature to act quickly on the
Kansas appropriation bill, set up Brown's meeting with the

legislature's Committee on Federal Relations, journeyed to
New York with Brown to appeal for National Kansas Committee
help, and hurried to Easton for consultations with Reeder.

Now Brown was pressuring him to do more and even vaguely

hinting about a plan to start

a

black insurrection.

It v/as

all very disconcerting for the young secretary who, until the

trip to Easton, had not fully realized the demands Brown

hoped to make on him and other committee members.

Sanborn

could only suggest they check on the progress of the

Massachusetts appropriation.
When the two men finally arrived in Boston they were
confronted with more bad news.

The National Kansas Committee

s
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had decided to cancel its pledge to
Brown because of the
state of "public opinion." Lawrence had
guessed correctly.
The committee lacked the confidence of the
northern antislavery community and this, added to the
relatively stable
condition in Kansas that spring, made it impossible

to col-

lect the cash necessary to meet their commitments.

Along

with the notification of cancellation, Brown also
found

a 50

dollar contribution from Eli Thayer and 20 dollars
from
Thomas Wentworth Higginson.

The contribution from Higginson

particularly irritated both men.

They felt the 20 dollars

was a mere pittance compared to what might have been sent if

Higginson had made

a

serious effort to persuade the Worcester

County Committee of Brown's real needs.

Restraining his

anger (as he had throughout the last week of February and all
of March) Brown wrote a thank you note to Higginson.

He told

the minister of his anxiety to secure a "mere outfit," and

claimed he was being prevented from going to Kansas "at once"
by a lack of funds.

But even more upsetting than the

National Kansas Committee's cancellation and Higginson'
token contribution was a letter waiting for Brown from his
son Jason which informed him that federal marshals had been

making inquiries about him in Cleveland.

In the midst of

efforts to collect funds, Brown was forced to abandon even
these unsuccessful attempts by the threat of arrest.

Luck-

ily, Samuel Gridley Howe and other committee members were

able to prevail on the antislavery judge, Thomas Russell, to
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hide Brown in his home.

For the next week, Brown took
refuge

in a third floor bedroom at Russell's
place brooding about
his failure to collect substantial
sums and calculating how
to stir New England antislavery men
out of their lethargy. 9

A few days after Brown began his seclusion,
he started
work on an essay called Old Brown's Farewell

...

To

Plymouth Rock which he hoped Theodore Parker would
read
before his congregation.
In it, Brown discussed his personal
privations in seeking to assist Kansas freestate settlers
and
asserted that "every citizen" was under "equal obligation"
to

do all that he had done for freedom.

would not be forgotten.
to God."

Neglect of such duties

All men would be held "accountable

Brown complained that even though he had asked "no

wages" he couldn't secure "the necessary supplies of
soldier."

a

common

As far as he was concerned, New Englanders had

spurned their ancestors and their traditional support of liberty:

"How were the mightly fallen

I"

10

The essay was similar to his broadside issued in early

March and Brown was hopeful of a positive reaction.

But

before asking Parker to read the piece, Brown used the essay
(as he had the

Easton trip) as

a

subterfuge.

Claiming he was

unsure of the essay's reception, he asked Mary Stearns to
read it and offer her critical judgment.

The request was not

a random gesture but a carefully calculated move to convince

Mary of the legitimacy of his financial needs.

On at least

one occasion (probably many others) Brown and his son John
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Jr. discussed the role of a woman in a
business transaction.

It was John Jr.

!

s

opinion that when a woman "got an idea into

her head" it was "very hard to get out."

If properly

impressed, a "talking woman" could "exert some influence
in

such a transaction."

Brown could hardly have missed Mary

Steams' enraptured glances two months before as he sat talking to her boys of his role at Black Jack.

Nor could he have

missed the influence she exerted upon George Luther.

Now he

desperately needed funds from her husband and used her eval-

uation of the Farewell as

a

pretext for enlisting her hus-

band's personal financial resources.

Just a short time after

Mary Stearns left the Russell home, George Luther returned
there, strode up three flights of stairs to Brown's room, and

proceeded to authorize the Kansas warrior to draw on him for
up to 7000 dollars should the need arise when Brown returned
to Kansas.
.

correct.

Brown's judgment about Mary Stearns had been

11

In addition to the 7000 dollar authorization, Stearns

called a meeting of the Massachusetts Kansas Committee to

explore

for other sources of funds.

On April

9

the commit-

tee met and decided to allow Brown to sell 100 of the 200

Sharpe's rifles he had been given in January at 15 dollars

piece to "reliable" freestate settlers.

a

The moving force

behind this authorization seems to have been Stearns who had
originally purchased the rifles with personal funds.

Six

days later, on April 15, Stearns notified Brown that the

149

committee had voted him a "further

sura"

of 500 dollars.

The

Kansas warrior was so elated that he was hardly
disturbed by
Stearns added stipulations to the April 9 grant.
Stearns

requested that the "proceeds" from the gun sales
should be
used for the "benefit of Free State men in Kansas,"

and that

Brown keep an account of the sales "as far as practical."
This rather perfunctory injunction from the business-minded

Stearns only served to buoy Brown's enthusiasm and reaffirm
his faith in Mary Stearns' influence over her husband. 12

John Brown immediately notified his son John Jr. of the

windfall.

And it is fitting that the younger Brown shared in

his father's joy.

More than any other person John Brown Jr.,

had provided his father with guidelines for the successful
conduct of business transactions.

It was the younger Brown

who stressed the importance of projecting a keen organizational sense, advised his father about the use of influential

women in

a

transaction, and counseled his father to always

keep his business partners apprised of his comings and goings.
In his letter to John Jr.,

the Kansas warrior also spoke of

acquiring his grandfather's gravestone and hinted at future
plans which the younger Brown already knew about.

Brown sug-

gested that the stone had "sufficient size" to contain more
"brief inscriptions" and asserted that in one hundred years
the stone would be a "great curiosity."

Brown closed the

letter by thanking his son for his past advice "about the

value and importance of discipline."

The advice had been
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correct and was "fully" appreciated.

Brown had managed to

control his anger during the weeks
when contributions had
been poor and he was rewarded for this
control with substantial aid for Kansas.
He also gained the full confidence
of
two men and one woman in a position
to assist
his future

insurrectionary plans.

Indeed, John Jr. should be heartily

thanked for his remarks about the "importance
of disci13
pline."

II

It is ironic and typical that after exerting such
mas-

terful control over his emotions during his weeks in the
East, Brown's elation over acquiring funds stimulated an

over-aggressiveness that nearly destroyed his relationship

with the two men who had done most

to insure his success.

Because of an exaggerated belief in his ability to manipulate

Sanborn and Stearns, Brown tried to force them into filling

a

1000 dollar subscription for purchase of North Elba property.

And he did this in the face of their less- than- firm commit-

ment to raise the sum.

Brown hoped to pressure both men into

alleviating his family's financial difficulties as they had
his Kansas needs.

Admittedly, there was some reason for Brown's overly

optimistic assumptions about his ability to move Sanborn and
Just before he left Boston in mid- April, Brown

Stearns.

received

a

letter from Sanborn which more than justified his
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conclusion that the young secretary would
continue to be as
easily manipulated in the future as he had
been in the past.
Sanborn thanked Brown for "remembering me as
you have done
and claimed he would "prize" anything from
the warrior as a
"momento of the bravest and most earnest man it
has been my

fortune to meet."

The ex-schoolteacher hoped Brown would

never regard himself as an "unprofitable servant."

His

Boston friends took great interest in his "future career."
If anything happened to him in Kansas, Sanborn claimed
he

would see to it that Brown's family was made "more comfortable" and his "memory defended."

Sanborn concluded his let-

ter by suggesting that if he could serve Brown in any way he

would "reckon it an honor to do so."

Brown had also spoken

of his family's difficult situation with Mary Stearns when
she came to evaluate the Farewell and he felt she could be

counted upon to press her husband's efforts on their behalf.
Then,

too, Brown had discussed the possibility of a subscrip-

tion with Stearns throughout the spring.

It was Stearns who

first suggested Brown seek Lawrence's help in raising the
sum.

Before Brown left Boston he and Stearns had also talked

about the possibility of the Medford manufacturer's purchase
of some 200 revolvers for the Kansas effort.

At the time,

Stearns didn't seem pressed for funds and Brown assumed he
was both willing and financially able to take on the burden
of filling out the land subscription.

Brown did not antici-

pate (perhaps refused to anticipate) the possibility that the
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primary task of collecting money for the
land purchase would
stretch Stearns' generosity to the limit. 14
After remaining in North Elba for two weeks
Brown began
his concerted effort to pry funds loose from
his Boston
friends for the purchase. On April 29 he wrote
to Derrick
Foster, a Boston State House clerk, asking him to
inquire

about the subscription.
back to Brown.

Foster talked to Stearns then wrote

In his letter, Foster told Brown that Stearns

said the aid for Brown's family (which had only been "pa rtly
promised") would be made up with as "little delay as possible.

15
,,±D

Foster's inquiry taken in conjunction with

a

letter

Brown had sent a few days earlier greatly angered George
Luther Stearns.

Stearns disliked the tone of both.

Brown

was hoping to make a deal with T. W. Carter of the

Massachusetts Arms Company for 200 revolvers and had written
Stearns to tell him Carter was willing to sell the guns for
1300 dollars as long as the sale was "not made public."

Near

the end of the letter Brown tersely suggested that "if Rev.
T.

Parker and other good people at Boston would make up that

amount

I_

might at least be w ell arme d

obvious to Stearns:

.

"

The insinuation was

the subscription had been slow in coming

and Brown was angry.

Brown had been granted over

a

1000 dollars by the

Massachusetts Kansas Committee, placed in charge of 200
Sharpe's rifles, 100 of which he could sell, and he had been
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authorized to draw on Stearns for up to 7000
dollars once in
Kansas.
Now he was pressuring Stearns for an
additional 1300
dollars for revolvers and 1000 dollars for a land
purchase.

The volatile Stearns became enraged.

more than

a

hard-driving businessman.

He saw Brown as nothing

No firm commitment had

been made to Brown for either the purchase of land or
the
revolvers.

Stearns would not be prodded further.

He

responded to Brown with two stinging letters of rebuff.
May

4

On

Stearns told Brown that he and Lawrence had not been

able to raise the full subscription.

As a result, Lawrence

had written to Gerrit Smith asking him to "accept the 600

dollars now raised" and take
dollars.

a

mortgage from Brown for

Smith had agreed to these conditions.

4

00

Two days

later Stearns suggested Brown accept the proposition "to

mortgage for

4

00 dollars" and advised the Kansas warrior that

the committee would try to raise the rest of the money at

some other time

17

In these two letters and his response to Foster, Stearns

had firmly presented his case.

The subscription had only

been "partly promised" and it had been difficult to fill.
The committee was not reneging on its agreement and Brown

should understand the great difficulty in procuring funds.
He should settle for partial payment.

The Medford manufac-

turer believed his frank discussion of the matter would stop

Brown from making any more unreasonable demands.

In fact.

Stearns was so sure he had resolved the problem that he felt

8
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well enough to make a staunch appeal in the
Kansas warrior's
behalf before the National Kansas Committee on
May

10 in New

York City.

In his brief address to committee members,
Stearns

spoke of his personal acquaintance with Brown and
his "great

confidence" in the man's "courage, prudence, and good
judg-

ment."

Stearns begged the committee to reconsider its deci-

sion to withhold funds.

The men of the committee must keep

uppermost in mind Brown's "control of the whole affair."
Stearns stressed that Brown's discipline and experience would
give even the most timorous freestate men "confidence in

their cause." 1

But if George Luther Stearns thought his frank discussion of the subscription would placate Brown, he was wrong.
The letters only relieved Stearns' anxieties, Brown was still
irate.

He determined to have every penny of the land sub-

scription made up.

On May 10, he met with Smith and the

Thompsons at Peterboro, notified them of his intention to

obtain the full subscription, and dismissed Smith's suggestion that he settle for what had been offered.

Three days

later, he wrote a long letter to Stearns explaining his position.

He prefaced his remarks with a biting introduction.

Brown felt he "must have" the 1000 dollars "made up at once."
The Kansas v/arrior claimed he had not started the measure

though he was "sufficiently needy" and, in rather surly
tones, apologized if his demands were "hindering" either

Stearns or Lawrence.

The Kansas fighter then discussed the
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nature of his intended purchase in
detail hoping it would
give greater validity to his demand.
Brown claimed he had
agreed to purchase the land from "two young
men" named
Thompson. They had previously obtained the
acreage from
Smith and had made a number of improvements on
it.

The

Thompson's still owed a balance of 200 dollars to
Smith which
Brown intended to pay. Then, he would use the
remaining 300
dollars to complete the deal.

The Thompsons were expecting

that sum and had already negotiated for another nearby
farm

on the basis of that expectation. 19

Brown also pushed young Sanborn to see to it that the

money was "promptly raised."

Invoking the secretary's pledge

that it would be an "honor" to serve him or his family in any

way possible, Brown wrote Sanborn on May 15 and suggested
that a full subscription was "much the cheapest" and "most

proper" way to provide for his family's welfare.
also be "far less humiliating" for his wife.

It would

Aside from

highlighting the intensity of his campaign for funds, the
letter to Sanborn suggests how well Brown gauged the personality of the secretary and how deftly he operated in terms of
that assessment.

He knew Sanborn had a strong sense of fam-

ily and would have a hard time backing down from his pledge
to "take it on himself" to see that Brown's family needs were

met.

To the businessman Stearns, Brown had sent a detailed

analysis of the purchase agreement, to young Sanborn an emotional plea about family needs.

Brown knew his men well and
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operated on his knowledge,

In addition,

Brown knew how sen-

sitive Sanborn was on the issue of organizing aid
for Kansas

but not actually participating in settlement.

exploited the guilt fully.

And he

Brown closed his letter to

Sanborn by claiming that he would never have uttered
ble about the land purchase were he

"

a

sylla-

not conscious that

I

am

performing that service which is equally the duty of millions
who need not forego a single hearty dinner by efforts they
are called to make."

The lines stung the sensitive young

committee secretary so much that he hardly noticed Brown's

concluding assertion that he really didn't want to burden
Stearns and Lawrence nor "ride free horses" until they fell
A
A 20
dead.

Brown's letter caused Sanborn much discomfort.

Brown

was forcing him to push Stearns on the land subscription
issue and it was a task Sanborn did not relish.

Sanborn

realized how much Stearns had already done for Brown and what

difficulty he was having in filling up the subscription.
Brown was unfairly pressuring the Medford lead-pipe manufacturer.

After debating his course for a day, Sanborn went to

Medford on May 16 still undecided about whether or not he
Sanborn had not

should broach the issue with Stearns.

resolved where the bounds on his loyalty to Brown began and
his friendship with Stearns left off.

21

By the time he arrived at Stearns' Medford home, Sanborn

had decided to at least show Brown's letter to the committee
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1

chairman.

After reading it Stearns reciprocated
by showing
Sanborn his own letter from Brown and
denying that
he and

Lawrence had ever committed themselves to
the subscription as
fully as Brown implied.
Stearns claimed he had originally
refused outright to undertake the responsibility
and advised
Brown to seek aid from Lawrence. When Lawrence
refused, it

had been Brown who kept the subject alive not
Stearns or
Lawrence.

But even though the Medford businessman was upset

by Brown's insinuations Sanborn sensed that he was not
angry

enough to sever his affiliation with the warrior.

During the

remainder of the meeting Sanborn began to understand why this
was so.

Stearns showed the young secretary a letter he had

recently received from Martin Conway, one of the committee's
agents in Kansas.

According to Conway freestate efforts to

organize their own legislature at Topeka were likely to be
"supressed by corruption."
.

.

.

Freestate men were "increasingly

entering all around into business with proslavery men."

James Lane and Charles Robinson were trying to counter the

fraudulently elected proslavery legislature at Shawnee Mission with their own extra- legal freestate legislative body
but if Conway's views were correct the project was doomed.

There would be no counter- force to proslavery political
efforts.

And when Stearns tied this possibility to the real-

ization that a rigged, proslavery constitutional convention
was to meet at Lecompton in June and would surely vote

a

pro-

slavery document, he was pessimistic about political efforts
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to win freedom in Kansas.

Brown's words were biting, unfair,

and partially untrue but his valor and desire
to fight for
freedom in Kansas were beyond doubt. Stearns had
resolved to
continue his support of the warrior.
Sanborn was further

convinced of Stearns' willingness to continue aiding
Brown

despite the friction over the North Elba land subscription

when the committee chairman showed him a reply he had
recently drafted to T. W. Carter of the Massachusetts Arms
Company.

In the reply, Stearns presumed Carter wished him to

be "responsible" for the purchase price of the 200 revolvers

"until

.

.

.

paid by Captain Brown."

Stearns notified Carter

that he "cheerfully" assented to the wish.

Stearns

1

Before he left

home Sanborn also helped the chairman draft

to Brown explaining that he

(Stearns)

a

letter

had agreed with

Lawrence to make up the full subscription.

Stearns told

Brown that he would inform Lawrence that he "must fulfill the
agreement."
own to Brown.

Four days later, Sanborn wrote

a letter of his

In it he assured Brown that he need have "no

fear" about the money.
the "right hands."

It would be gathered up and put in

Sanborn agreed that it would be a "sad

thing" if Brown's family were not taken care of while he was

exposing himself to danger in Kansas for "the good of others."

But the secretary did have some disappointing news.

The "arts of politicians" had defeated the Massachusetts

appropriation for Kansas.

22
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Sensing a distinct change in attitude about the
subscription, Brown sent a temperate response to Stearns.

His

letter of May 23 was an attempt to do his part to ease
tensions which had arisen over the issue and to prevent any

further misunderstandings.

Once again he explained the North

Elba deal to Stearns, assuring him that there had been no

collusion between himself, the Thompsons, and Smith and that
he had no "previous arrangement" with Smith about the land

purchase other than to say he wanted Smith's contract with
the Thompsons' made over to himself on payment.

Brown wished

to demonstrate that he had pressed for the full subscription

only because it was promised and not because he was bound to
a prior contract.

Brown swore that Smith had given him "no

encouragement" about the purchase and had simply agreed to
the "arrangement."

Brown also hoped to prevent any mistaken

assumptions about how much Smith had pledged to him in Kansas
aid.

He preferred Stearns' annoyance in knowing Smith-

refused to give money because the previous year's effort had
"embarrassed him," to Stearns' anger at being deceived.
Brown told Stearns that rumors about Smith assisting his
Kansas work were false.

All Smith promised was that he

would do "all he could" when the "struggle was renewed."

23

The letter does seem to have reassured the Medford busi-

nessman.

He forgave Brown's insinuations and believed

Smith's behavior in the affair was proper.

In fact,

vigorously prodded Lawrence's efforts to fill the

Stearns
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subscription even though Lawrence continued
to assert that he
had never intended to do any more than "write
a

for the fund.

'heading'"

Before leaving Medford that June for a vaca-

tion in New Hampshire with his family, Stearns
exchanged letters with Martin Conway.

The letters further explain his

willingness to continue support of Brown.

Conway was certain

that the new territorial governor, ex-Mississippi Senator

Robert Walker, would attempt to disband the freestate Topeka
legislature.

Although Conway claimed to have confidence in

the "instincts of the masses," he confessed that he agreed

with Stearns

1

evaluation of the situation.

If freestate men

were defeated in the "Topeka business" they should, as
Stearns had suggested, "marshal armed forces for further

action."

George Luther Stearns' fears about the destruction

of freestate political efforts, Walker's proslavery leanings,

and the likely possibility of a proslavery constitution from
the Lecompton Convention, prompted his support of Brown in

spite of his irritation over the land subscription.

Polit-

ical antislavery had been defeated too often by the Slave
Power.

Only men like Brown who were willing to fight for

freedom could prevent a proslavery takeover in the territory.

Brown must be supported.

24

Near the end of June, Gerrit Smith also became convinced
that "fighting for Liberty" was the only way to assure the

survival of

a free Kansas.

Smith watched with mounting anger

as freestate efforts to form a legislature were ruled illegal
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by Walker and proslavery delegates debated
the Lecompton Constitution. Addressing a Milwaukee personal
liberty law meeting, the Peterboro philanthropist also lashed
out
at the

Supreme Court for the "naked despotism" it displayed
in handing down the Dred Scott decision.

A government that didn't

"promise protection in return for allegiance" was "not a

government at all."

When asked if he would let the decision

"arouse people to rebel against the Supreme Court," Smith

labeled such a question as "foolish."
the "rebel."

The Supreme Court was

It had refused to consider the Higher Law. 25

Smith met John Brown in Chicago late in June as the

warrior moved west to Kansas.

It was a month since the two

men had spoken and in the interim the ever-changing Smith
decided he would contribute to Brown's Kansas work.

Despite

his claims a few weeks earlier that his means were

"exhausted," he insisted Brown draw on him for 350 dollars
and left Chicago believing that freestate men "must not

shrink" from fighting for freedom even if federal troops were

used against them.

2^

Ill

When Brown finally returned to Kansas in early July
after an absence of almost eight months he saw a number of

hopeful signs for the triumph of the freestate cause.

A

large emigration that spring swelled the ranks of freestate

settlers in the territory to the point where they vastly
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outnumbered their proslavery counterparts.

Lane,

Robinson,

and other leaders had accepted Walker's call to
participate
in legislative elections scheduled for the territory
that

October.

They firmly believed frees tate men could gain

political control of the territory and displace the bogus
Shawnee Mission assemblage.

While there were still isolated

outbreaks of violence, most freestate men agreed with their
leaders about resolving the issue of slavery in the territory
by political methods.

27

As he assessed the situation and recuperated from a

debilitating attack of the ague. Brown realized that there
was an excellent possibility for the peaceful resolution of
the slavery problem in the territory.

As a result, he spent

more and more time thinking about and preparing for his
insurrectionary strike.

Brown also realized that he might

soon have to prevail on his Massachusetts "friends" for

financing and so made it a point to keep them informed of
his movements.

Some years before at the time of his failure

in the wool business, Brov/n and his son, John Jr., had dis-

cussed the reasons for that failure.

John Jr. felt that one

of the habits which had done "much injury" to them while

engaged in "business connections" was their failure to maintain proper communication with business partners.

should have given

a

"narrative

.

.

.

They

detailed account of all

transactions of interest as well as plans and bearings."
This oversight led to "groundless suspicions" or at least
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"uneasiness" among their associates.

Brown's son hoped they

could "mend" the habit so as to "lessen" the
occasions of

fault-finding in the future. 28
Brown tried to prevent "groundless suspicions" from

erupting with his May 23 letter to Stearns.

Now, as he wit-

nessed the new direction of Kansas affairs and realized he

might soon have to call on Massachusetts "friends" to subsidize his plan to attack slavery in the South, the Kansas

warrior used the autobiographical sketch he promised to
young Henry Stearns to further allay any tension which had
developed over the North Elba matter and to subtly hint of
future endeavors.

Brown's letter to the Stearns boy is a

revealing biographical and psychological document but it is
also a carefully constructed tactical device which was

designed (like Brown's March broadside and April Farewell
to cultivate confidence in his character.

)

While the letter

tells us a great deal about the values of John Brown, it

should be remembered that the Kansas warrior was quite cog-

nizant of who he was aiming the letter at and, therefore, it
is far from being a spontaneous,

thoughts and emotions.

f ree-f

lowing outburst of

Rather, it must be seen as a care-

fully constructed appeal which sought to highlight the values

Brown sensed would engender the utmost confidence in his

character among his Boston "friends."
us as much about their values as

it.

Thus,

the letter tells

does Brown's.
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Brown began the brief autobiography by speaking
of the
"necessity" of a "severe but much needed course of
disci-

pline" in the early years of his development.

He then

quickly moved to a consideration of the origins of his
abo-

litionism by describing slavery's disruptive effect on family
life.

He spoke of his encounter with the brutal treatment of

a "young negro boy."

The incident brought him to reflect on

the "wretched condition of Fatherless and motherless slave

children" who had no one to "protect and provide" for them.
As a youth Brown spoke of becoming "ambitious to excel in

anything he undertook to perform" and indicated that "this

kind of feeling" was one he would "recommend to all young
persons."

Subtly hinting of his future plans and at the same

time extolling the virtue of having a well-thought-out direc-

tion in life, Brov/n wished young Henry Stearns to always have
some

"

definite plan

never stuck to it.

.

"

Many men had none or, if they did,

This was "not the case" with John Brown.

He followed up with "tenacity" whatever he set about doing
"so long as it answered his general purpose."

As a result,

he "rarely failed" to effect the "things he undertook."
fact, he "habitually expected to succeed

.

"

In

And he always

united such feelings with the consciousness that his plans

were "right in themselves."

Near the end of the letter,

Brown once again tried to ease any frayed sensibilities

resulting from the North Elba issue.

Almost apologetically
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he suggested that his "habit of being obeyed" occasionally

prompted him to speak in an "imperious way." 29
Brown also appended a short note to his autobiographical

account which informed his Boston associates of other sums
that had been contributed to him.

At Hartford and New Haven

he had been promised 1000 dollars but had only received 285

dollars.

He chose to forget Smith's Chicago draft for 350

dollars and claimed the Peterboro squire had only supplied

him with 50 dollars for Kansas.

Smith also loaned him 110

dollars to pay the Thompsons' while the subscription was

being filled.

The Kansas warrior gently prodded his

Massachusetts readers to continue efforts to raise the land
money since the unpaid bill for the purchase had "exceedingly mortified" him."^
The autobiographical account was a brilliantly successful effort to prepare his listeners for his future antislav-

ery efforts and a perfect reaffirmation of the value system

which ingratiated him with Boston antislavery men that
spring.

He was following John Jr.'s advice in trying to

allay "groundless suspicions" and was again restating the

values that gave his Boston friends confidence in his character.

He had a keen organizational sense, was disciplined,

controlled, ambitious, and confident of success.

He,

like

his Boston friends, loathed slavery for its attack on the

fundamental institution of the family.

Brown did not stress

his belief that violence was the only way to destroy slavery.
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The men in Boston who had contributed to
his support admired
his courage and his resolution to resist
slavery forcibly.
But it was not primarily this which gave them
confidence in
the Kansas warrior.

They were chiefly looking for someone

whose system of beliefs was similar to their own
and who, by
the logical extension of that system, despised
the institution of slavery.

Brown's mid-July letter to Henry Stearns

reflects his own understanding of this situation and his

understanding of their ambivalence toward violence.
By early August, Lawrence and Stearns filled the sub-

scription and sent Sanborn to Peterboro with the 1000 dollar
draft.

The young committeeman was happy to make the trip.

It gave him a chance to visit with Edwin Morton, the Harvard

classmate who was tutoring Smith's children, and provided an

opportunity to meet Smith himself.

After delivering the

draft, Sanborn wrote to Parker and suggested that he believed

Smith to be a "greater man" than people in New England realized.

He was a superior individual who had "regular devo-

tion to his ideas" and "great personal influence."

But the

real highlight of Sanborn's journey was his visit with

Brown's family.

The young secretary gave Mary Brown a small

sum of cash left over from the subscription after the payment
to Smith and assured her that she could count on Brown's
31
Boston associates if anything should happen to her husband.

No doubt the impressionable and somewhat romantic young

man saw the Browns' poverty as

a

noble symbol of their
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heroic sacrifice for freedom.

The deferential tone of his

next letter to John Brown indicates how much the
visit to
North Elba reinforced Sanborn's desire to dedicate
himself to
the Kansas warrior.
Sanborn notified Brown that
the autobio-

graphical letter was "well appreciated" by all who read
it
and that the land purchase money had been turned over
to
Smith.

The secretary "regretted" that the payments had been

"delayed so long."

Forgetting Brown's pressure tactics and

his somewhat distorted view of who originated the idea of a

subscription, Sanborn suggested the delay had been Boston's
fault

and not Brown's.

It was the result of a "series of

mistakes" on the part of Brown's Boston "friends."

In some

sense, Sanborn's estimation was truer than he realized.

The

"mistake" these Boston "friends" made about Brown was in

failing to recognize that the major portion of his life had

been spent as a hard-driving yet unsuccessful business man.
They failed to realize that although Brown was pleading for
the noble cause of Kansas freedom, he treated his fund-

raising efforts like any other business promotion.

They

failed to realize the paradox of his own and their own value
system.

That system had been created by and had, in turn,

helped create the marketplace North--a place that alternately

appalled and encompassed them.

32
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IV
It is ironic that by the time Brown
received notifica-

tion of payment from Sanborn, the men who
contributed most to
his fund-raising drive began to back away
from even advocating force as the only solution to the Kansas
struggle.
They

did so for a variety of reasons, the most essential
being

a

belief that Governor Walker's promise to keep the October
territorial election free from fraud was given in good faith.
If freestaters could gain control of the territorial
legisla-

ture they could thwart any effort to force slavery upon
Kansas.

When Brown himself saw there was little chance of

"major disturbances" erupting in Kansas that August and

decided to "work back Eastward," he wrote Stearns on August
10 asking for "secret service" money with no questions asked.

Stearns rebuffed his request by flatly refusing it.

Stearns

was caught up in the financial panic that struck the entire

country that summer and fall.

Peter Butler, the man who had

rescued Stearns in 1853, was in desperate straits after losing large sums of money investing in the Michigan Central

Railroad.

It took Stearns and a number of others the entire

summer and fall to gather enough money to cover Butler's
debts.

.

Ke could do nothing for Brown.

33

Actually, there was much more to Stearns' reluctance
than Butler's fiscal headache.

The Medford businessman was

participating in Massachusetts efforts to raise cash to
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assist frees tate political chances in the October
election.
In the fall of 1857, when freestaters took control
of the

legislature, Stearns reversed his springtime assessment
about
the necessity of "force of arms" and became convinced
that

antislavery men would triumph by political methods.

And by

November 17 he wrote Brown cautioning him not to attack proslavery forces unless he was attacked first.

Brown heeded his advice, Stearns wrote to E.

To make certain
B.

Whitman, an

agent of the committee, and ordered Brown's access to com-

mittee funds and the 7000 dollar personal authorization
closed.

Stearns claimed Brown had been given authority to

draw on him only "in a certain contingency."

Since that con-

tingency had not occurred it would be "very unwise" to

attempt to "establish order by force
any of Stearns

1

.

"

funds for that purpose.

Brown could not use
The Medford busi-

nessman now believed the freestaters "true policy" was to
"meet the enemy at the polls and vote them down."

Stearns

1

34

retreat from the advocacy of violent means mir-

rored a similar process in Samuel Gridley Howe.

In late

spring, Howe journeyed to Kansas with small sums for the

frees tate cause.

On the trip he encountered Senator Henry

Wilson who was also going to the territory.

Wilson hoped to

"persuade" freestaters to vote in the October election

called by Walker.

At the time, Howe was "undecided" as to

whether freestaters should participate.
dent in Brown and the logic of force.

He was still confi-

This confidence is
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documented in a letter Howe sent to the Kansas
warrior in
mid- June. Ostensibly, the doctor was concerned
with Brown's
physical health, but his words reveal as much about
his alle
giance to the freedom fighter and force. Howe,
whose own

physical condition had been ravaged by the tensions,
cares,
and the responsibilities of his personal and professional
life,

saw similar signs in Brown during the early spring.

Now, in Kansas, the Boston physician heard rumors that Brown

was seriously ill.

Howe wrote the warrior to give him the

counsel of someone who could "understand and appreciate you.
It was important for Brown "to live and be in health" in

order to carry out his "noble purpose."

Howe was convinced

Brown could properly care for himself because Brown understood his own constitution and had the "self command" necessary to obey the "laws of God" when he knew them.

must not let excessive activity "burn him up."
"organization of rare power."

Brown

He had an

The doctor, who had dabbled

in phenology, also believed Brown had an "uncommon develop-

ment" of the

"moral regions."

It was a "great gift" to be
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"cherished" and used in the "cause of humanity."

But despite his understanding of the energy demands of

professional life and his regard for Brown's "self command,"
by the end of June, Howe also began to look for a political

solution to Kansas troubles.

He backed away from his ear-

lier, tentative commitment to the use of violence in Kansas.

At a private meeting called by Henry Wilson in late June,

Howe

joined

Stearns, Lawrence, and others in raising 25 0
0

dollars to help carry the October election.

By mid- July the

group appointed Thomas J. Marsh to bring almost 3000
dollars
to frees tate leaders.

for election purposes.

The money was to be "judiciously" used
It is interesting to note that in

less than three weeks Howe and the others had been able to

raise a sum it took Brown almost four months to acquire.

By

mid-November the Boston physician had fully followed Stearns
lead.

In the wake of the frees tate election success, he

warned Brown not to attack Missouri border "ruffians." 36
Like Stearns, Howe was also influenced by financial reasons to pull back from Brown's support.

That fall, when his

good friend Horace Mann came east to collect money for

a col-

lege building, Howe indicated the severity of the financial

panic griping New England when he suggested to Mann that
though Moses got "water out of granite" he doubted Mann would
be "as successful" among panic-stricken Bostonians.

Howe

himself was "cramped" and "pinched" by his falling income.
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Gerrit Smith joined Hows and Stearns in their retreat.
Two months after he had given Brown 350 dollars to help free-

staters "fight for Liberty," he was attending

emancipation convention in Cleveland.

a

compensated

In a speech before the

group, Smith asserted that since slavery was a "national

dilemma" and all men contributed to it, the North should help
the South remove the institution.

He was willing to make a

"direct appeal" to the selfish slaveholder if it meant
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hurrying that slaveholder to dissolve his immoral
relationship with the black man.
Smith was careful to avoid

accept-

ing the Dred Scott decision.

He was seeking to buy slaves

not because they were property but because he felt northerners had a "moral right" to help "slave owner and slave."

Smith, like most abolitionists, was as worried about slav-

ery's effect on white slaveholders as on black slaves.

Though his position on compensated emancipation was not

a

complete break with past ideas about force, his support for
the movement does indicate a growing willingness to try buy-

ing slavery off instead of fighting it off. 38

When William Lloyd Garrison labeled Smith's address as
"another gyration," the Peterboro squire claimed to be deeply
"pained" at so "palpable an injustice."
his advocacy of compensated emancipation.

But he soon dropped

Perhaps in an

effort to reestablish his abolitionist credentials with
Garrison and other less radical antislavery proponents, Smith
used his annual Jerry Rescue speech on October

1,

1857 to

reassert his belief in moral suasion and political abolition.
He also played down his advocacy of violent methods.

In the

speech, Smith asked if "we would have the slaves rescued by

violence" and answered with a resounding

would be "wicked" to make such
way.

a request.

"No'."

Smith felt it

There was

a

better

All people had to do was "vote the Federal Government

into the hands of abolitionists and every chain would fall

peacefully from every slave."

39
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V
Unlike his colleagues who quickly retreated from belief
in the necessity of forcible means as soon as the possibility
of a favorable political solution presented itself in Kansas,

young Frank Sanborn left that belief reluctantly.

For him,

retreat from force was tantamount to a retreat from Brown
himself.

And this was difficult for the young committeeman.

Sanborn felt his whole role in the freestate movement, abolitionism, and reformist Boston society depended on his rela-

tionship to Brown.

To retreat from support of Brown was, in

many ways, to deny the symbol of his own significance.

Nor

would the crafty Brown allow such a retreat to take place.
After Sanborn sent his deferential confirmation of the North
Elba purchase, for instance, Brown was quick to document his
gratitude and imply his great need for Sanborn's efforts.

Brown was thankful his wife and daughters would not be
"drawn to beg" or become a "burden" to his "Poor Boys" who

had "nothing but their hands to begin with."

Brown was

grateful to have found friends to "look after his family;"
„40

friends who were acquainted with their "real condition."

Prompted by the confidence Brown seemed to be placing
in him and his own desire to preserve the relationship,

Sanborn, in early September, made a bold effort to tap the

seemingly untouchable reserves of the Worcester County Committee.

Claiming that he had been informed that there was
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(some 3000 dollars) being held by the

committee, Sanborn aggressively asserted to Higginson that
there was "no reason" why it should be "kept idle."

wanted it donated to Brown.
for making such demands.

He

Higginson was furious at Sanborn

He immediately wrote back and told

the secretary that he had no control over the money of the

Worcester committee.

And even if he did, he wouldn't have

given it for Brown's "useless" efforts.

The sharp response

flustered Sanborn and he immediately toned down his condem-

nation of the Worcester group.

In the face of Higginson 's

angry reply, Sanborn admitted his "own two or three" committees had not excelled in giving Brown aid and that all free-

state committees were "culpably negligent."

committee was "no worse than the rest."

upset at Higginson'

s

Worcester's

Sanborn was deeply

assertions of Brown's "uselessness " and

defended the Kansas warrior's inactivity during the summer
by claiming that Governor Walker had knowledge of his pur-

poses and was "watching for him."
for Revolution" as any man.

John Brown was as "ready

All he needed was money and he

would be the "best Disunion champion" found.

Perhaps hinting

at Brown's plans for insurrection or at least restating his

own resolute commitment to Brown and forceful means, Sanborn

concluded his letter to Higginson by suggesting that with 100

men raised and drilled Brown would "do more to split the
Union than any man alive.

"

41
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Sanborn's letters to Brown during the late summer
and
early fall also indicate his refusal to desert the
warrior's
side.

When it seemed that the bogus Lecompton Constitution

would not be submitted to the people of the territory,
Sanborn declared to Brown that it would be best if the officers of the proslavery government were

extremely apologetic for Stearns
service" money.

1

"

hung

.

"

Sanborn was

failure to send "secret

He explained that money was "very scarce"

and the committee's treasury was exhausted.

When Brown con-

tinued his regular correspondence with Sanborn in spite of
the other committee member's waning interest, the young sec-

retary became even more respectful.
ting these continual reports.

He was glad to be get-

It made him believe that Lane

and Brown were the only "real generals" to be found in the

territory
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In December two months after freestate settlers had cap-

tured the territorial legislature and seemed in a good posi-

tion to prevent the Lecompton Constitution from being forced
on Kansas, Sanborn finally conceded that the situation could
be settled by politics though he claimed he would "not be

surprised" if Brown's "courage and arms" were again needed
there

Sanborn's absorption with Brown is not only reflected
in his seemingly die-hard commitment to force but also in the

Brown-like tones of his speech and thought.

By late fall of

1857, Sanborn was exhausted with his committee work.

The
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constant trips to Boston, never-ending committee
correspondence, and his occasional schooiteaching activity
tired him.

His response to this state of mental and physical
fatigue is

curiously reminiscent of Brown's.

In order to regain his

strength and energy, Sanborn decided to forego the "pleasures
of visiting Boston."

It was time to "deny" himself the com-

pany of "social flatterers" and retire to "regions where

everything passes for what it is."

And like Howe and

Higginson who looked for simplicity in Kansas, Sanborn wanted
a place where he could "avoid the destractions of life,"

where he could order his existence, and, like his hero Brown,
devote

himself more closely "to study and meditation" not

only of books "but of life itself."

Sanborn wanted to rid

himself of the pressures and tensions which arose when one
made abolitionism a "business and study."

Sanborn, like

Brown in his autobiographical account, felt the need to
"eradicate" certain "evil tendencies" from his "present way
of life."

He was looking for the benefits of "severe dis-

cipline."

He was willing to "live like a monk" for a while.

It was time to retire to his "cell."

Husbanding precious

energy was imperative for the young prof essional--a career
could be exhausting.

44

177

CHAPTER
During mid-March

18 57,

V

in the midst of his quest for

Kansas funds, John Brown journeyed to New York City for an

interview with an ex-soldier of fortune named Hugh Forbes

whose lecture circuit appearances in the East
a modest reputation as a military expert.

had earned him

Forbes, an

Englishman, had come to New York a few years earlier after

spending two years as a field commander in Garibaldi's army
of Italian volunteers.

His particular expertise lay in the

use of guerrilla tactics and Brown hoped to recruit the man to

help in Kansas and with future attacks upon slavery.

After

lengthy discussions, Brown hired Forbes for six months.

As

soon as the Englishman could put his personal affairs in

order he was to go to Kansas and begin training Brown's
recruits.

Forbes was to receive 100 dollars a month for his

services and Brown seems to have hinted that he might count

on a longer term of employment if certain "New England humanitarians" agreed to subsidize his future efforts.

Forbes was quick to enter the arrangement.

Hugh

His lecture cir-

cuit appearances and part-time newspaper work had not pro-

vided sufficient funds to take care of his wife and children
who still lived in Paris.

He needed money desperately.

1

Right from the beginning of their relationship, however,

problems developed between Brown and Forbes.

The ex-soldier
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demanded to be paid the 600 dollars in advance and then was
slow in joining Brown out west.

When Forbes did reach Mt.

Tabor, Iowa, and started drilling Brown's recruits in early
July, he urged that Brown reimburse him for money he had

spent preparing a military tactics manual.

In addition to

the friction caused by his tardiness and financial demands,

Forbes argued with Brown about how the recruits should be
trained.

Both men were convinced of their "unchallengeable

expertise" in guerrilla warfare and had a difficult time

accepting criticism.

Then, in August, when Brown began to

reveal his plan for an attack on slavery in the South, their

arguments became even more heated.

Forbes had his own ideas

about which type of foray would be most successful.

He

wanted to "muster along the northern slave frontier" with

a

highly trained group of "carefully selected colored and white

persons."

The former field commander wanted to "instigate

series of slave stampedes, running Negroes into Canada."

a

In

the process he hoped to render "slave property untenable."

Brcwn firmly rejected Forbes' scheme.

He had his own plan,

one which he had been working on for "many years."

The

Kansas warrior prepared himself by reading numerous works on
guerrilla tactics and carefully examining topographical maps

of the southern states.

Brown wanted to recruit twenty-five

and
well-trained, well-armed men, "colored and white mixed"

supply them with pikes.

The Kansas warrior would use this

cadre to "Beat up a Slave Quarter in Virginia."

While both
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plans seemed similar, major disagreement arose over the
pre-

dictability of a slave response to such a venture.

Forbes

was uncertain slaves would or could respond and felt strongly
that they should somehow be warned of the impending attack.

Brown was sure a warning wasn't necessary.
of a response."

He was "certain

Once the attack had begun between 200 and

500 slaves would join him.

He would then take 80 to 100 men

and "make a dash" against the federal arsenal at Harpers
Ferry.

After the assault, Brown would lead the entire group

into the Virginia mountains and hold on there until his "New

England partisians" called a convention to "overthrow the

proslavery administration." 2
Because of constant disputes with Brown about training
techniques, the plan, and finances, Forbes left Mt. Tabor in

mid-November.

Brown was disappointed to lose Forbes' obvious

military skills.

At the same time, he was relieved to be rid

of the only man in the small group who seriously questioned

his authority.

But it was not the last Brown would hear from

the ex-soldier of fortune.

Two months later, in mid- January

of 1858, the disconsolate Forbes threatened to destroy
In letters to

Brown's plan before it could be implemented.

Franklin Sanborn, Forbes alleged that the "New England Humanitarians" and, in particular, Sanborn had violated their

financial obligations.

According to the soldier, Brown had

promised to pay him 100 dollars
reneged on his commitment.

a

month for

a

year and had

Forbes suggested that Brown had

"
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not been able to pay him because New Englanders
failed to
supply sufficient funds. 3

Sanborn was angered by these allegations and
claimed he
"never heard of such an arrangement." The secretary
assured
Forbes that if he or other committeemen had known about
such
a contractual arrangement they would have made it
their busi-

ness to see that it was kept.

Sanborn angrily asserted that

he would never have let Forbes

money.

1

family suffer for want of

The secretary further claimed that he was "not

guilty" of cheating on or lying about the agreement.

rebuked Forbes for his "abusive language."
than Forbes' accusations that upset Sanborn.

And he

But it was more
For the first

time the young secretary doubted Brown's competence.

He

began to understand, as Stearns had during the land subscription episode, that Brown could be something less than self-

lessly heroic.

Indeed, Brown could be "imperious," insensi-

tive, and mistaken in his judgments of character.

Sanborn

immediately wrote to the Kansas warrior and asked what mis-

information Forbes had been given,

Sanborn also wondered why

Brown had not written the soldier to defend his 3oston
"friends.

4

Sanborn's letter jarred Brown.

He could not afford to

lose the confidence of his most dedicated and efficient

Boston "agent" at

a

time when he was about to request money

for his Harpers Ferry raid.

Nor could the veteran allow

Forbes to threaten his plans with any further disclosures.
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Such revelations not only destroyed
confidence but neutralized the plan's element of surprise. Once
again, in a moment
of desperation, Brown sought the assistance
of his son, John
Jr., and asked him to deal with the situation
by sending

Forbes a "sharpe" and "well-merited rebuke."

John Jr. should

notify the disgruntled soldier that he had not been
"engaged
for a year" as he claimed and that Brown did not "accept
it

well" to be asked to state an "untruth."
his father's advice.

"spiteful letters."

John Jr. followed

He wrote Forbes and berated him for his

They had done "great injury" because

they had "weakened" his father's "hands" with Massachusetts

supporters.

The letter John Jr. sent was temporarily effec-

Hugh Forbes became silent

tive.

— but

only for a few weeks.

5

Forbes' defection and his resulting attempt to seek
funds from the Boston committeemen worried Brown.

It created

doubts about his competence among those he was about to ask
to subsidize an insurrectionary thrust at slavery.

Yet it

was only one of a number of aggravating problems he faced in
the fall and early winter.

by recurring attacks of

During that period he was plagued

the ague, his funds dwindled, and he

had to watch as freestate settlers voted themselves into

power and eliminated the necessity of his violent efforts for
Kansas.

The October elections of 1857 put a freestate repre-

sentative in Congress and captured 33 of 52 seats in the ter-

ritorial legislature.

By early January of

1858,

the legis-

lature had even blocked submission of the fraudulent,
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proslavery Lecompton Constitution to Congress before
it could
be voted on by the territory's settlers.
It troubled
Brown

to see this political solution for he realized
it would

hasten the retreat of his Boston allies from their
radical
professions of the previous spring.

He had to move quickly

if he wanted to capitalize on what sentiment remained for
the

use of violent means against slavery.

By mid- January, he had

gathered his recruits, arms, and supplies at Mt. Tabor, traveled eastward through Ohio, and settled in upper New York
state.

During the journey Brown continued to discuss his

scheme, slowly revealing additional segments, and preparing
his men for their "ultimate destination" in Virginia. 6
By January 28,

18 58,

the Kansas warrior sequestered him-

self in the Syracuse home of Fredrick Douglass and set about

"perfecting" his "Virginia Plan."

He drew up a "Provisional

Constitution" which he hoped would eliminate "anarchy and
confusion" once he was established in his mountain fortress.
He also hoped it would demonstrate the care with which he

developed his "definite plan" to end slavery.

After complet-

ing work on the document, he began his effort to enlist the

support of Gerrit Smith and the Bostonian allies, Sanborn,
Stearns, Parker, Howe, and Higginson.

The letters Brown sent

to his Boston friends were models of calculation and amply

testify to his acute understanding of the men with whom he
was dealing.

Each request for help was carefully worded and

neatly tailored to the personality of the recipient.

Brown
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appealed to Higginson (perpetually concerned
with his manliness)

as both a "true man and true abolitionist"
and sought

"secret service" money for the "most important
undertaking"
of his whole life.
lars in sixty days.

The Kansas warrior needed 500 to 800 dol-

Claiming he had already written to

Parker, Stearns, and Sanborn about the project, Brown con-

tinued his subtle appeal to Higginson

1

s

ego by noting that he

was depending on the Worcester activist because he "did not

know as either Mr. Stearns or Mr. Sanborn are abolitionists."
In view of Brown's past assistance from both Sanborn and

Stearns, his comments to Higginson were a rather cynical

assessment of both men's abolitionism.

mined to have Higginson*

s

But Brown was deter-

participation in the venture even

if he had to flatter the minister at the expense of those who

had already done so much for him.

Besides, Brown was just as

determined that this would be his "last effort in the begging
line."

He would do whatever necessary to insure a successful

effort.

Higginson' s response was equal to Brown's plea.

Higginson claimed he was "always ready to invest money in
treason" but at present had "none to invest."

were either unwilling or "bankrupt."

His friends

The minister also

claimed to have prior obligations which demanded his attention.

He was gathering funds for underground railroad activ-

ity in Kansas.

However, Higginson did not want to entirely

dissuade the Kansas warrior and therefore slyly alluded to
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the very funds Brown was trying to obtain by hinting
that he

might be able to interest his county committee in supporting
Brown with the "trifling balance" they had left.

That "tri-

fling balance" was exactly what Brown was pursuing and he

immediately replied to the minister.

Indeed, it was "Rail-

road business on a somewhat extended scale" which was the

"identical object" for which he was "trying to get means."
Brown had been connected with the underground railraod since
"boyhood" and never let an "opportunity slip."

Would

Higginson meet him at Gerrit Smith's during the last week of
February?

He had a "measure on foot" that he was sure would

awaken something more than a "common interest" if Higginson

could hear it.

g

Higginson did not go to Smith's and wasn

'

t

even sure what

"railroad business on an extended scale" meant but his dis-

cussions with Sanborn led him to believe there was a possi-

bility that Brown was contemplating a slave uprising.
thought excited him.

The

Recently he had read about the prob-

lems caused by the "defiant and hostile attitudes of the

Negro population in Louisianna, Tennesse and Arkansas."

One

insurrection had been fomented by a white abolitionist named
Hancock who was eventually caught, tried, found innocent,
and shot.

If Brown was contemplating the same sort of esca-

pade, Higginson was sure his efforts were worth subsidizing.

After the Burns episode, the minister had few scruples about
the necessity of violence to end slavery and had repeatedly
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called for its use.

Then, too, along with the possibility

that Brown could free substantial numbers of
blacks by such
an effort, Higginson was also intrigued by the
impact such a

raid would have on public opinion.

He was disturbed by the

lost influence of the "radical antislavery element."

Sup-

porting Brown's effort might be a good way to reestablish
that influence.

Hadn't his Burns rescue attempt, Sumner's

beating, and the bloody struggle for a free Kansas done much
to rekindle antislavery fervor? 9

John Brown also wrote to Theodore Parker during the
first week in February.

He told Parker he was "perfecting

arrangements" for an "important measure" and was counting on
Parker's assistance because their "mutual friends" were not
as "deeply-dyed" in abolition as the minister.

understood his views "so well."

None of them

Brown's determined effort to

secure Parker's assistance is revealing.

Of all the Boston

"friends" Parker had been least supportive.

The minister did

little to obtain funds for Brown in 1857 and had flatly

refused the warrior's request to read the Farewell before his
congregation.

But Brown sensed Parker's ability to influence

efforts on his behalf.

Parker was the one that Howe,

Stearns, and Sanborn would seek in attempting to justify

their support of the plan.
of approval.

Brown needed the minister's seal

The importance of the meeting at Parker's home

one year earlier had not been lost on the warrior.

abolitionists had not gathered there simply as

a

Boston

matter of
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convenience.

The meeting was also symbolic.

Parker was the

undeclared leader of all Massachusetts antislavery men who

entertained notions of using violent means against slavery.

Even if Parker was ambivalent about the actual subsidization
of the project, his theoretical justification was vital. 10

Brown also wrote to George Luther Stearns requesting the

Medford businessman to come to Smith's in late February and
listen to the plan.

Stearns, however, had recently returned

from a business trip to New York City and was too tired to

make another journey so soon.

Nor was he really sure he

wanted to do anything for Brown.

In fact,

the pressures of

economic panic prompted Stearns to request that Brown return

money provided for his Kansas work.

The financially harried

lead-pipe manufacturer was no longer ready to "invest in
treason."

Brown had received money previously but it had not

been given "under obligation."

Kansas settlers no longer

needed aid in "defending themselves from marauders

Their

.

"

"true course" was "to meet the enemy at the ballot box" and

"vote them down."

And since the contingency for which

Stearns had given his "pledge" ceased to exist he wanted

remaining sums "returned without conditions."

Stearns

claimed he was not "indifferent" to Brown's request but would
only aid the warrior when it was "proper" to do so.

Now,

with friends being dragged under by economic panic and Kansas
ready to resolve its problems politically, Stearns doubted
the "propriety" of a contribution.

Stearns was also angered
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by Forbes' accusations and wanted to know
why the soldier
wrote such "abusive letters" to Brown's Boston
associates.

Unquestionably Stearns reticence to contribute
was also conditioned by a growing skepticism about Brown's
11
competence.

Frank Sanborn received two letters from Brown in
the
first week of February.

But quite unlike the past, this time

the young secretary was more cautious in his response
to the

warrior's requests.

Sanborn was still upset by the "slander-

ous and insulting tone" of the Forbes' letters and there is

little doubt he placed most of the blame for the letters on
Brown.

Writing to Higginson on February 11, ostensibly to

seek funds for Brown, the secretary spoke of his grov/ing

uncertainty.

Sanborn now claimed only to have enough "confi-

dence" in the warrior to trust him with a "moderate sum" for
his new venture.

The young committeeman had come a long way

from his pleas for a 100,000 dollar legislative appropriation

and a 5000 to 10,000 dollar grant from the National Kansas

Committee for Brown's use.

Sanborn was also upset by Brown's

manipulation of Edwin Morton.

In addition to Brown's letters,

Sanborn had received a note from his Harvard classmate claiming Brown needed

5

00 to 800 dollars to

a large part of the country."

reminiscent of Brown's that

"overthrow slavery in

Morton' s phraseology was so

even Sanborn could hardly have

failed to realize who actually wrote the letter.

young secretary disliked the pressure.

And the

Sanborn's reluctance,

however, was precipitated by more than Forbes' letters,
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Morton's seeming manipulation, and his own scanty financial
resources.

The young secretary had surmised that Brown "con-

templated an uprising of slaves" and that thought disturbed

him more than anything else.

His efforts to dispel his fears

about such a scheme are obvious in the conclusion of his letter to Higginson.

Sanborn half-heartedly suggested that "the

Union" was "evidently on its last legs."

Since Buchanan and

others were "trying to tear it to pieces" he believed "treason would not be treason that much longer but patriotism."
The statement was more of a question than an assertion.
During the next week Sanborn was finally able to con-

vince himself of his own definition of patriotism.

When

Brown refused the secretary's plea to come to Boston (Brown's
reasons for "keeping still" were sufficient to prevent him

from seeing his family)

,

for a trip to Peterboro.

Sanborn unenthusiastically prepared
But it is obvious that the trip

stretched the limits of his trust in and deference to Brown.
Indeed, from now on Sanborn would continue to function effi-

ciently for the Kansas warrior but never with the robust
admiration, unflagging confidence, and unfailing enthusiasm

which had characterized the first year of their relation.

.

ship.

13

Actually, John Brown did have an important reason for
"keeping still" at Gerrit Smith's home.

The warrior hoped to

unveil his plan among those who would receive it most favorably and Smith, more than any other individual Brown sought
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aid from, accepted the basic assumption on
which the venture
was premised. After a week of discussions with
Brown, the

Peterboro philanthropist claimed to be convinced
of need for
black violence to overturn the institution of slavery.
Only

in this way could white America come to a fundamental
under-

standing of black manhood.

This position was, however, not

solely the result of his intense conversations with Brown.
For over sixteen years Smith had debated the issue with himself.

Brown's words merely culminated the debate.

As early

as 1842, Smith addressed slaves on how best to change the

image white men had of them.

Blacks were to cultivate dis-

positions which were becoming to "poor and afflicted men."
They should always display patience, trust, and hope.

A few

years later the wealthy landowner advised blacks to cultivate

"self-respect" in order to "peacefully regain" their rights.

Although he gave such advice, Smith doubted whether blacks

would ever "exert an influence for the redemption of their
enslaved brethren."

14

But by January of 1851, some three years after Smith

attempted to found an independent black agricultural community where men could "avoid" those who hated them, the land-

owner's perspective on the issue of black manhood began to
shift.

While speaking at a state convention on the Fugitive

Slave Law, Smith asserted that the "days of American slavery

would be numbered" only "when white America was inspired with
respect for the black man."

Smith now entreated blacks to be
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less deferential.

They should "rise up" and quit
themselves

like men in all "political,
ecclesiastical and social relations." Smith asserted that he no
longer accepted a black
man's degradation on the grounds that it
was "forced." He
had "comparatively no concern" for the
"degradation" that

came from "others,"

It was the black man's "self-degradation"

that filled him with "sorrow."

it grieved Smith to know that

white men had murdered blacks but his "deepest
grief" was
that black men were "suicides." As is indicated
by

the tone

of these words, Smith, throughout the 1850 's,
gradually moved
to a position that demanded black men to actively
resist

white control.
man.

.

.

.

The world was in sad condition "until man as

for his mere manhood shall be held in honor."

Then, in January of 1856, Smith wrote a letter to Salmon

Chase and claimed that nothing but "prejudice against the

black man" sustained slavery.

"Not for a moment" could the

institution "co-exist with a full sense of his [the black
man's] manhood."

In the third week of February 19 57, as

Brown awaited Sanborn's arrival (none of the others were coming)

the warrior succeeded in

convincing

Smith that only

black violence could truly demonstrate that manhood.

1^

II

Huddled next to a small desk in Edwin Morton's third
story bedroom at Smith's mansion, John Brown roughly outlined
his proposed strike at slavery for Sanborn.

The specifics of
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this February 23 meeting are
not recorded.

But it is certain

Brown told the young secretary
that he had gathered a small
cadre of recruits for a raid on
slavery in the South.
He

hoped to "beat up a slave quarter,"
arm those slaves who rallied to his banner, attack a federal
arsenal in order to get

additional weapons (Brown listed a number
of federal installations)
and then retreat to a mountain fortress
in
,

Virginia.

The fortress would serve as a station
on the underground railroad and also as a base from which bo launch
further strikes
at slavery.
Brown claimed his many discussions with black

leaders convinced him he could count on a response
from
slaves.

To demonstrate that his plan was not hastily
con-

ceived, the warrior unveiled the Provisional Constitution
he

had drawn up at Douglass' in late January.

Throughout the

discussion Brown repeatedly stressed his belief that it was
necessary for black men to fight for their freedom.

In so

doing, they would break through the debilitating effects of

slavery and assert their manhood in the only way white men
could fully appreciate.
Though. Sanborn anticipated a plan of this sort,

incredulous as Brown actually revealed it.

he was

The committeeman

was amazed that the veteran "neither expected nor desired

a

large force" to make his strike and he was still disturbed by
the notion of black insurrection.

From Brown's hints in 1857

and the recent "intimations" of Hugh Forbes, it was obvious

Brown contemplated an "uprising of slaves."

Sanborn knew

"
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this before he came to Peterboro.

Higginson two weeks earlier.

He said as much to

But when Brown actually laid

the plan before him the young secretary
became confused and
uncertain. Even Brown's careful "methods of
organization and

fortification" and his elaborate "theory of the way
in which
the invasion would be received in the country at
large"

failed to allay the committee secretary's fears.

Sanborn

wasn't sure that blacks would actually fight for their freedom and complained of the "manifest hopelessness" of the
scheme.

Brown met such expressions of doubt with quotations

from the Bible and references to his numerous discussions

with black leaders.

In the end the young man felt cornered,

left only with the alternatives of "betrayal, dessertation or

support.

After hastily scribbling

a note to

Higginson in which he

suggested that the minister ought to be in Peterboro because
their "friend" was "about

.

.

.

entering into the wool busi-

ness in which he has been engaged all his life" and that he

had a "plan" which was the "result of many years of careful
study," Sanborn asked to speak privately with Gerrit Smith.
As the sun set on the snow-covered hills which surrounded the

Peterboro estate, the two men walked slowly and discussed
Brown's plan for over an hour.

stood Sanborn's reservations.

Smith claimed he fully underHe,

too,

had some doubts about

black participation and the "slender means" with which Brown
hoped to begin the attack.

He,

too,

feared the possibility
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that Hugh Forbes would break his silence
at any moment and
reveal the scheme. But black manhood could
only be demonstrated by the black man's own efforts for
freedom.
Besides,
Brown was a noble individual and truly religious
man.

if

blacks must rise up and kill their masters what
better man to
lead them in such efforts.
Slowly, Smith's words diffused
the young secretary's anxiety—but not entirely. 17

The next day, February 24, Sanborn prepared to leave

Peterboro only "half convinced" that he should support Brown.
He would convey the plan to his Boston associates but would

only unveil the general outlines of the scheme.

If Brown

wanted to be sure of support he must come to Boston and fill
in the details.

Brown agreed and promised to be there during

the first week of March.

The veteran apologized for not

being able to come sooner but claimed it was necessary for
him to travel to New York City for important meetings with

black leaders, Dr. J. N. Gloucester and J. W. Loguen, who had
"whole heartedly" approved his plan.

Even though Sanborn

left Peterboro claiming to be only "half convinced" about the

venture Brown felt confident about his support and that of
the other Boston committeemen.

While in the city he wrote

a

short note to his family which suggests how much control he
felt he exerted over Sanborn.
few

weeks he had had

a

Brown stated that in the last

"constant series of secret discour-

agement and encouragement" but felt his discussions with
Sanborn would bear fruit.

Indeed, the Kansas warrior claimed

.
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it would be "a very
strange thing"
„
„
9 if Sanh
Sanborn"
aid not join
„18
me

When Sanborn returned
to BostQn he
Howe, Parker, stea rns
ana „ igginson
,

and informed

Plan Brown contemplated.

^^^

He advise* them of

Ms own reservations and prepared them
for the warrior's
arrival in the
first week of March.
As promised, Brown
appeared in Boston
on Maroh 4 and registered
at the American House
hotel. That
same day all five of his
Massachusetts confederates
met him
his room.
Before Brown could explain
his plan he was vigorously cross-examined about
Hugh Forbes, why had
Forbes
made threatening accusations
,
what had Brown done about
the
soldier of fortune? What was
the nature of their contractual arrangement? Brown
calmly addressed their
questions.
He spoke of John Jr. 'a
letter to Forbes, told the group
why
Forbes had been contracted, and
described his interpretation
of the terms of their deal.
Brown said Forbes lied when he
claimed he had been promised 100
dollars a month for a year.
He had only been promised 600
dollars for six months service.
Forbes had been advanced the whole
sum in order to
take care of family problems but
had vainly squandered the
sum publishing his manual of tactics
and then expected to br
reimbursed.
Brown probably admitted that Forbes knew
abour
the aid he was receiving from New
England "humanitarians" b
Brown certainly denied that he ever led
the soldier of fortune to believe his salary was contingent

m

on that supporl.

195

Brown also denied that Forbes knew
enough about his plan to
jeopardize it even if he took it upon
himself to disclose

what he knew.

In the end, he approached the five
men as he

did the National Kansas Committee one
year earlier.

"knew him" and "knew he could be trusted."

They

And in spite of

some uneasiness his Boston allies did renew
their trust in
him.

Indeed, they should have.

Brown had spent over a year

carefully demonstrating that he possessed the
character and
values which each one of them believed was necessary

to pro-

duce a stable, ordered, and virtuous society.

By now they

could hardly reject the image he had so self-consciously
dis-

played and they had so self-consciously demanded.

To reject

Brown on the basis of his character would have been to reject
themselves.

19
"

After defusing the anxiety caused by Forbes' "abusive
letters," Brown began to discuss his insurrectionary scheme.
Again, as at Peterboro, he stressed his belief in the necessity of black efforts for freedom.

dom to anyone.

No one could give free-

Each man had to take his own.

asserted his conviction that blacks would fight

Again, Brown

— black

lead-

ers throughout New York, New England, and Canada had assured

him of this.

Only such black efforts would convince south-

ern slaveholders and their northern sympathizers that blacks
were not content to remain incarcerated by slavery.
Brown also discussed some details of his plan.

It seems

certain he spoke of alternative geographical areas into which
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his select force might strike.

He shrugged off assertions

that his cadre was too small by saying
that the scheme
depended on surprise and not numbers. The
warrior praised
the "highly moral" men he had recruited
and hinted that he
hoped to obtain the services of Canadian blacks.
Brown
boasted of the rigorous training his men had
undergone in

preparation for their "dash" South and displayed the
constitution he had drawn up to govern his mountain fortress
com-

munity.

The warrior concluded his remarks by suggesting
that

even if the proposed insurrection lasted only one day the

whole country from the Potomac to Savannah would be "ablaze."
No doubt, Brown's Boston confederates also realized they

would have a noble martyr to abolition if the escapade
failed.

Wouldn't Brown positively personalize the antislav-

ery issue as fully

ized it?

as Edward Loring had negatively personal-

And as Sanborn had so aptly suggested, they all

felt they were faced with the question of "dissertion,

betrayal or support."
to be assisted.

Even though they had doubts, Brown had

20

By the time Brown had finished presenting the plan on

March

8,

four days after his arrival, the five Massachusetts

abolitionists hesitantly decided to join with Gerrit Smith to
raise funds for his efforts.

They formed the Secret Commit-

tee of Six, made Stearns chairman, Sanborn secretary, and

began collecting 1000 dollars for Brown's "business operations."

The five from Massachusetts were to raise at least
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100 dollars a piece

and more if they could.

Brown would be

sure of at least 500 dollars and 1000 dollars
"in all probability." While Dr. George Cabot and T. R. Russell
were given
vague hints of the "speculation," the committeemen
resolved

that no other member of the abolitionist community
should be

"admitted to a share of the business."

Brown himself contin-

ually cautioned them about the absolute necessity of secrecy
and during the meetings even vetoed Sanborn's suggestion that

Wendell Phillips be brought into the "operation."

According

to Brown, Phillips was not a "man of action" and therefore

should not have knowledge of the venture. 21

Between March

8

and March 17, Sanborn pressed his col-

leagues to raise the money they had pledged.

On March 18 he

called a meeting of the group at Howe's place to coordinate
their labors.

At this meeting Stearns was made treasurer and

took control of approximately 150 dollars which had already

been raised.

It was decided that since Sanborn and Higginson

were "less able to raise money" than the others they should
be limited to a 100 dollar contribution.

Stearns, Howe, and

Parker should raise that sum and more if possible.

Stearns

promised to raise an additional 200 dollars, Parker also
claimed he "would do more," and Howe hoped to raise at least
50 dollars beyond the required sum.

the efforts that were being made.

Sanborn was pleased with
Sometime after the meeting

he wrote Brown a letter and advised the warrior that the

enterprise still looked "hopeful" to "speculative people."
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By April

raised.

1,

375 dollars of the minimum pledge had been

22

Despite the formation of a secret committee to assist
Brown and the collection of funds to finance the raid, the

Boston members of the group felt much like Sanborn did when
he first heard the plan at Peterboro.

They remained only

"half convinced" that they should support the scheme.

were reluctant conspirators.

They

Only gradually in the weeks

following Brown's revelations were their doubts abated by
Parker's theorizations
apprehension.

.

There were good reasons for their

All of them wondered about the venture's

chances of success given the "slender means" Brown sought.
The plan seemed well conceived and organized but a number of

unanswered questions still remained.

Brown never did say ho

many men could be counted on to join him in the initial
foray.

At Smith's, Brown had "casually asked" Sanborn what

he thought of a strike on the federal arsenal in Harpers
Ferry.

But at Peterboro, and again in Boston, Harpers Ferry

was only mentioned as one of a number of places where the

raid could be started.

By

the.

time Brown left Boston the

group had no idea which place he favored.

Brown said he

expected Canadian and free northern blacks to join him in hi

Virginia mountain fortress yet never suggested whether leaders of the black community had begun to recruit volunteers o

whether he was depending on

a

spontaneous reaction like the

one he expected from southern slaves.

Sanborn's euphemistic
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vagueness in his communications with Brown
and other membe:
of the secret committee (the secretary
always referred to the
raid as a "business operation," "speculation"
or the "wool

business") was prompted as much by the demands
of secrecy as
by a lack of precise information and specific
detail about
the scheme.

23

Then, too, despite the fact that each of these men

trusted Brown and may even have reverenced his character,
all
of them were forced to confront two personal convictions

which struck at the heart of Brown's scheme and raised strong
doubt about its chances for success.

All of the committee

members (excluding Higginson) had ambivalent feelings about

subsidizing a violent, offensive thrust at slavery.

Even

Kansas aid had always been for defense against the Missouri
"ruffians."

Now Brown wanted to begin an insurrection.

Everyone except Higginson had felt relieved by the successful

political solution to the Kansas struggle, now they were
being asked to finally and firmly reject a political settle-

ment on the question of slavery.

In effect, each member of

the committee was being asked to incite a Faneuil Hall crowd

and send it storming into Court Square.

And each of the mem-

bers faced that request with the same ambivalence that Parker
and Howe felt four years earlier.
In addition to Brown's unanswered questions and their

own ambivalence about using violence as an offensive weapon

against slavery, all of the committee members including
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Higginson had tremendous doubts about
the central premi;
ise on
which Brown's insurrectionary thrust
rested:
the willingness
of blacks to fight for their freedom.
All of the reluctant
conspirators were imbued with a romantic
racialist
image of

the black man's nature and did not
believe he was capable of
fighting his white oppressors. As recently
as January, in a
speech called the "Present Aspect of Slavery,"
Theodore

Parker perfectly explicated their racial
sentiment.

Indeed,

Parker fully accepted the racial stereotype
adhered to by the
defenders of slavery. But Parker claimed that far
from mark-

ing the black race for slavery, such traits
indicated that
the black man had achieved an advanced form of
Christian

piety and should therefore be a free member of society.

Parker spoke almost reverently of the African as the "most
docile and pliant of all races of man."

He almost applauded

the fact that the black man had "little ferocity."

which was "instantial" with the Anglo-Saxon

(as

Vengeance

well as being

the ultimate souce of his freedom) was "exceptional" in the

black man's history.

Even in their "barbarous state" Afri-

cans had never been "addicted" to revenge.

black man was "always prone to mercy."

In fact,

the

He was strong in the

"affectional instinct," "easy," and "indolent."

Unlike his

Anglo-Saxon brothers who owed their freedom to their ability
to fight for it,

the black man was "little warlike."

Brown

asked for far more than money from members of the committee.
He sought their trust without fully revealing his plan, he
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asked them to surmount their apprehension about using
violence, and, above all, asked them to accept views of the

black man that did not square with their own conceptions of
his nature.

It is no wonder that in the first days after

Brown left Boston the committee members remained only "half
convinced" about supporting the "dash" at slavery.

As Parker

noted sometime later, they simply weren't sure that Brown's

plan was the "right way" of getting at slavery.
Clearly, Parker's misgivings were the greatest among the

committee membership.

And this is exemplified by the minis-

ter's reaction to a request Brown made of him before leaving

Boston.

The Kansas warrior asked Parker to write two addres-

ses for his use during the invasion.

One was to be sent to

the "officers and Soldiers of the United States army on the

Duty of a Soldier."

In it, Brown hoped Parker would "power-

fully assert" the conviction that a soldier's duty (if he

understood what was morally right)

"was to desert the army

and join up with Ossawatomie Brown."

The second address was

to be used by Brown to inspire his insurrectionary forces.

And his request for it is an interesting projection of the

way in which the warrior cultivated the confidence of potential allies.

Brown stipulated that the second speech must be

short so as to be read and must be written in the "simplest
and plainest language."

The address must not have "the least

affection of a scholar about it."

Yet it should be construc-

ted with "great clearness and power."

The whole tone of the
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speech, like Brown's tone with his
conspirational associates,
must demonstrate that he was "'after other'
and not 'after
himself, at all, at all'." Parker should
also bear in mind
that "women were susceptible of being carried
away by the

kindness of an intrepid and magnanimous soldier
even when his
brave name was but a terror the day before." 25

Parker refused Brown's request.
a copy of General McClellan's

Europe."

"Report on the Armies of

The refusal indicates Parker's initial uncertainty

about Brown's plan.
leagues

Instead, he sent Brown

The minister like the rest of his col-

(except Higginson) had begun to collect funds for

Brown but had not really resolved qualms about conspiring to

subsidize the raid.

His trust in Brown's character and val-

ues carried him a long way but his skepticism about violence

and a black response prevented his entire commitment to the

project.
---even

Yes, he would raise funds for an attack he wasn't

sure would take place but he would not write speeches

that were premised on the fact that such an insurrectionary

thrust had already been made.

Subsidizing theory was one

thing writing speeches for the actuality quite another.

26

Yet even though Parker's tentative initial commitment to
Brown rested on a faith in the warrior's character, as weeks

passed he gave serious attention to Brown's contention about
the slave's willingness to fight.

commitment strengthened.

Slowly that theoretical

Slowly Parker began to dispel his

anxiety about the capability of blacks to exhibit "vengeful
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emotions."
sary

Perhaps Brown was correct.

(and possible)

Perhaps it was neces-

that black men fight for
freedom.

Brown's assertions forced Parker
to reflect on facts which
seemed to butress the warrior's
claims.

In early February,

18 56,

Parker had been considerably

impressed by the courage and initiative
of Anthony Burns.
After spending two years in slavery,
following rendition, the
fugitive's freedom had been purchased by
leading black
and

white abolitionists of Massachusetts.

When Burns returned to

Boston to express his gratitude he spoke
of his future plans.
The ex-slave claimed that he eventually
wanted to work "in
the South" as a minister.

He realized many black men didn't

wish to go back there once freed from slavery but
said he
felt compelled to do so in order to help his people

"out of

bondage."

Burns' courageous stand seems to have prompted

Parker to make inquiries of William Wells,

a

leading black

literary figure and historian residing in Boston, about black

contributions to the American revolutionary effort.

Accord-

ing to Wells these contributions had been substantial.
Wells'

contentions inspired Parker to write the historian

George Bancroft and ask that more attention be given to the

valiant role played by blacks at Bunker Hill. 27
When Parker linked the memory of Burns' statements with
Wells' assertions and efforts of Boston blacks to free the

fugitive slave Shadrach in 1852, Brown's contentions about
the black man's willingness to fight for his own freedom
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helped stimulate some new theorizations

.

in early April of

1858, Parker asserted that it was time for a
re-assessment of

white "out-door charity."

Parker was now convinced that sev-

enty percent of these charitable efforts had
only a "reflex
good action." That is, only thirty percent of
white charitable activity actually helped the intended
"receiver."

Most

of the time it was the "giver" who benefited himself
with a

sense of "his own righteousness."

Parker believed it was

necessary to "reverse" these percentages.
this

(as

The best way to do

Brown intended) was to make efforts which were

geared toward helping people help themselves.

Parker's

assertions about "out door charity" on the heels of Brown's

revelations say a good deal about the growing impact of the

warrior's statements.

After first being met with unspoken

skepticism, Brown's words forced Parker to re-evaluate the

effects of white reform efforts.

Parker now conceded that

such efforts were "mainly bad" and did "more harm than good."
The Unitarian minister even formulated a new law.

He hypoth-

esized that "charitable demand" was often "equivalent to the

organization to meet that demand."

When organized "depen-

dence" became "institutionalized" both giving and receiving

were simultaneously bureaucratized.

In the name of perfect-

ing society reformers might be inadvertantly thwarting the
one thing that could bring about such perfection:

vidual's own effort for perfection.

the indi-

No one could have made

this clearer to Parker than the highly disciplined,
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self-controlled, autonomous, Kansas warrior,
named John
Brown.
If Parker dared carry his new
theories to their logical extreme (and the minister seems to
have

done just that),

he must have begun to suspect the highly
organized and insti-

tutionalized efforts of abolitionism.

weren't helping blacks.

Maybe such efforts

Perhaps, as Brown contended, such

efforts only provided white antislavery advocates
with
sense of their own "righteousness."

a

Perhaps Brown was cor-

rect when he suggested that only black self-help could
be
effective. Parker's slowly developing enthusiasm for a venture he initially listened to with serious doubts

least partially attributable to this reasoning.

is at

It counter-

balanced Brown's lack of specific detail about the venture,
as well as,

the minister's ambivalence to violence and his

romantic racialist prejudice.

2Q

There was also another reason why Parker gradually

embraced Brown's plan.

A "revival of religion" was taking

place in Massachusetts and throughout the country that
spring.

pleased.

But the radical Unitarian minister was not at all
He felt it was a "false revival" especially when

ministers in the Boston area attributed it to "prayer."

To

Parker it wasn't "prayer" that brought religious reawakening

but "effectual fervant work" for the right.
and "hand-work" of "a righteous man."

The "head-work"

Simply gossiping

before bedtime, "tattling mere words," and then asking God to
do one's own duty was not true religious revival.

Uncertain
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as Parker may have been about Brown's
plan, the minister

could not overlook the fact that in "Ossawatomie
Brown" religion had an "effectual" and "fervant" worker.
Brown wanted
action not mere words. He not only spoke for the
right but
demanded that black slaves cease praying for salvation
and

start striking for it with their own hands.

In addition,

Parker viewed Brown as more than a righteous man.
way,

In his own

the man from North Elba was an intensely dedicated and

emotional minister of the gospel and Parker had always contended that it was a minister's duty "to awaken, strengthen
and quicken the religious power" of men.

It was the minis-

ter's duty to "diffuse ideas" which "molded society" so that
it could develop well under the direction of men of great

"natural powers."

Wasn't this precisely what Brown wanted to

accomplish by his insurrectionary efforts?

The warrior hoped

to change white views of the black man and thereby remold

white attitudes toward the institution of slavery.

At the

same time, he was asking slaves to assert their manhood.

Could there be a more competent "minister" to "diffuse" the

proper ideas and values to both black and white society?

Weren't Brown's values precisely those which Parker and his
colleagues hoped to impart to their fellow Americans?

Higginson felt there was something much more "real" about
Kansas settlers than there was in the rest of the "diseased"

American society.

Wasn't Brown

ied the ideals of Bunker Hill?

a

"real" American, who embod-

Couldn't Brown bring the

207

proper values to black

men- m aybe

even impart the "vengeful"

emotions so necessary for freedom? 29
Parker's speculations calmed the
fears of the "half convinced" Sanborn and his Kansas
committee sponsor, George
Luther Stearns.

Each of these men shared Parker's
ambivalence toward violence and his doubts
about black capabilities
In addition, they still wondered
if they had heard the last
from Hugh Forbes, they wondered if the
convulsion Brown hoped
to induce could be controlled, and
they pondered
their

responsibility if the warrior was caught.

In the face of

these and other doubts, Parker's theorizations
were reassuring.

Samuel Gridley Howe was particularly influenced
by his

good friend's notions.
ory of diffusion.

Parker's views resonated his own the-

When he thought about it, Howe realized

that he and Stearns had actually made a similar case for

self-help in their discussions about the handicapped.

If it

was important for the handicapped to be exposed to "normal"
people, wasn't it just as important that the black men, hand-

icapped by the institution of slavery, also have that opportunity.

Could blacks be exposed to

a

better man than Brown?

Howe also conjured up a four-year-old memory as he debated
the necessity of black violence.

He could still hear the

shouts of a young black woman as she watched Anthony Burns

being taken back to slavery.

He should "kill himself" she

cried as Burns walked by, "kill himself" rather than be taken
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back into slavery.

At that time Howe had realized
that this

ultimate gesture of self-sacrifice was
really the only thing
which would disabuse white America of
the notion that blacks
were suited for slavery. Perhaps Brown
was correct, perhaps
a fight to the death for freedom was
the only way for
the

black man to demonstrate his manhood and
hatred for slavery.
Wasn't the willingness to fight to the death
for freedom the
central racial trait of the Anglo-Saxon? Didn't
the black
man have to adopt the trait in order to demonstrate

his right

to freedom?

30

Parker's thoughts on "out-door" charity also caused
Howe
some guilt.

His own trip to Kansas had been an effort to do

more for the "giver" then the "receiver."

The excursion had

been as much a way of resolving personal doubts about his
character as it had been an attempt to assist Kansas settlers.
It was a "last chance" to test the purity of his motives,

to

overcome his fear of danger, and to recapture a romanticized
past.

In the end,

the trip only served to compound the uncer-

tainty he felt about his character.

He began to believe that

if slavery was to be actively resisted it would have to be

done by someone other than himself.

Now,

ironically, he not

only had the chance to subsidize someone else's effort but
also, in a somewhat less extravagant way, to recapture a sense
of his own self-worth.

All Brown asked was a chance to act.

Howe and his committee associates grew more certain each day

after Brown's departure that they could not refuse him.
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III

While Brown's Boston allies collected
money to subsidize
his "dash" at slavery and gradually
dispersed their apprehensions about the advisability of the scheme,
the Kansas warrior went to Philadelphia with John Jr. for
discussions with
black leaders in that city. His conversations
with
Rev.

Stephen Smith, William Still, and the militant
black minister, Henry Highland Garnet,

reaffirmed his convictions about

the willingness of free northern blacks to assist
the plan.

Brown left Philadelphia full of confidence.

He then traveled

to North Elba and recruited the services of his sons Henry,

Watson, and Oliver before quickly moving on to Syracuse.

There he visited black minister James Loguen who suggested he
seek the assistance of famed underground railroader Harriet
Tubman.

Brown sought the black woman out in St. Catherines,

Ontario but she made no commitments to his venture although
she suggested he might obtain assistance from Martin

R.

Delany the black nationalist who was living in Chatham,
Ontario.

Indeed, Delany was helpful.

He suggested they set

up a convention in early May where Brown might outline his

plan to radical abolitionists residing in Ontario.
Brown could also recruit interested parties.

Hopefully

After a trip to

Springdale, Iowa to advise his Kansas recruits of the state
of his plans, Brown returned to Chatham, May
for the convention.

8,

and prepared

Everything seemed to be proceeding
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smoothly.

Brown had the financial backing
of the Secret Six
the approval and support of
militant black leaders, and an
opportunity to recruit more men for
31
his "dash" at Chatham.
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CHAPTER

VI

As John Brown prepared for the
Chatham meeting, new outbursts by Hugh Forbes shattered the
confidence of the Secret
Six and forced postponement of the raid.
Once again Forbes

lashed out at the New England "humanitarians"
Sanborn) for their negligent treatment.

("especially"

This time he made it

clear that he would refuse to allow Brown's
"speculation" to
"go on." The letters Forbes wrote to Howe and
Sanborn
did

not indicate the soldier knew of the secret committee
but did

suggest he had greater knowledge of the scheme than Brown
had
led the group to believe during the March meetings.

Sanborn

had hoped to attend the Chatham convention and bring Brown
600 dollars.

Now,

in the wake of the Forbes ultimatum, there

was no chance of traveling to Canada.

The committee had to

act swiftly to prevent Forbes from "giving statistics" and

"quoting prices" to newspapers while they were "trying to

start a march on buyers and sellers." 1
And act they did.

On May

5

Sanborn, Stearns, Parker,

and Howe met to consider their proper course.

A careful

reexamination of the contents of Forbes' letters indicated
that the soldier knew "details of the plan" and also knew

that Stearns, Howe, and Sanborn were "informed" about it.

Parker and Stearns were quick to react.
plan had to be "deferred."

They decided the

Sanborn claimed to be "in doubt"
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though "inclining to their opinion."

Only Howe balked.

He

wasn't at all sure postponement was necessary
but could not
persuade his fellow conspirators to change
their
view and

ultimately acquiesced in their decision.

In addition to this

temporary withdrawal of support, it was also decided
that
Stearns should go to Chatham and speak to Brown.
In
the

meantime, Sanborn was to write to Gerrit Smith informing
him
of the situation and asking his assistance in explaining
the

secret committee's action to the Kansas warrior.

It was

hoped that Smith would also go to Chatham to discuss the
Forbes' threats and to help re-evaluate the project.

2

Two days after the meeting Sanborn received another letter from Forbes in which the soldier of fortune indicated

that he would stop at nothing to destroy Brown's effort.

After reading the letter Sanborn no longer "inclined" to

postponement but clung to it in panic-stricken desperation.
The committee secretary immediately wrote to Higginson saying

that Forbes had "exact knowledge" of the secret project, that
there was "a leak" somewhere in the secret committee's boat,
and that since everything was so "uncertain" the plan was

best terminated "for the present."

Before they did anything,

the secret committee must "get rid" of Forbes.

"grudge" against all of them.

He had a

Sanborn also openly questioned

the competence of John Brown, the source and symbol of his

"place" in Massachusetts abolitionism.

After asking

Higginson to make discreet inquiries about Forbes and

requesting the minister to
go to tanada
iCanada and
™h discuss
matters
with Brown (Steams now
claimed he was unable to
do
it),

Sanborn

flared angrily at his
erstwhile warrior patron/
The
secretary told Higginson that
he fully realized news
of postponement would be "hard" for
his "old friend" but
suggested
that the delay was entirely
Brown's fault. The warrior's
"too great confidence in
Forbes" had forced such a
decision
"upon the speculators." Sanborn
had been a bit upset by
Brown's "imperiousness during
the North Elba subscription
"
effort, was occasionally disappointed
when he didn't receive
news of Brown's whereabouts, and
was annoyed by the "abusiveletters Forbes wrote in January
but he was never tempted to
quit Brown's side. Now, however,
even as Parker's theorizations nourished his own and the others
confidence in the

advisability of the scheme, Forbes' behavior
created very
serious doubts about the wisdom of
supporting "Ossawatomie
3
Brown
.

Thomas Wentworth Higginson was the only member
of the
Secret Six who would not be stampeded into
postponement.

Higginson was irate when Sanborn notified him about
deferral.
He was determined not to go to Canada to appease
Brown.

He

rejected the committee's decision outright and immediately
wrote to the Kansas warrior stating his position.

The

Worcester activist was absolutely "against postponement."
the plan was postponed,
all,

it was "postponed forever."

After

couldn't Hugh Forbes "do as much harm this year as

If
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next?"

Higginson believed everything had gone "too far"—

hesitating at this moment meant "certain failure."

When

Theodore Parker tried to placate his protege by suggesting
that if Higginson "knew the extent" of "Forbes' knowledge"
he

would "not council" continuation, the activist refused to
listen.

4

Nor was Higginson the only member of the secret group

who had to be sold on postponement.

Parker also found it

necessary to convince Howe of the propriety of the May
decision.

5

Howe certainly "knew the extent" of Forbes

threats, since he had received one of the soldier's letters.

And initially the physician flew into a "tempestuous rage"
over the matter.

He was particularly angered by Forbes*

vague effort to inform Henry Wilson, Charles Sumner, and

William Seward of Massachusetts' plans "to overthrow slavery
at the South.

"

But Howe had not panicked like his colleagues

and still hoped to continue the project after Stearns,
Parker, and Sanborn settled on deferral.

Instead of abandon-

ing Brown, Howe felt it would be possible to confuse and

divert Forbes.

He fired off a "blistering" note to the sol-

dier of fortune claiming his accusations were based on "utter
fallacy."

Howe said it was "absurd" for Forbes to infer that

the committee's

(Massachusetts Kansas)

relationship with

Brown invested them with "any responsibility for his acts."
As far as the doctor knew there was no legal or moral con-

tractual arrangement between the two soldiers.

Even if Brown
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had entered into an agreement,
the committee "never delegated
power to anyone to bind it by legal
and moral obligation."
Howe hoped to "dissolve" Forbes of
any "lingering notion"
that he or "any members" of the "late
committee" had "any
responsibility for Captain Brown's actions."
Howe falsely
suggested that in the "last communication"
sent to Brown the
committee had urged him to go "at once" to
Kansas and assist
in the coming elections.
In his letter Howe also made a
great effort to keep Forbes from any further
meetings with
Charles Sumner who was still suffering emotionally
and physically from his beating on the Senate floor two
years
ear-

lier.

Howe told Forbes that he had personally notified

Sumner of Brown's "integrity" and "ability."

And the doctor

asserted that any future attempt by Forbes to convince Sumner
of negligence by his Boston friends would be wasted. 5

A few days after Howe wrote Forbes, he also sought
"dissolve" the suspicions of Henry Wilson.

to

Forbes had

approached the junior Senator from Massachusetts with vague
references to Brown's plan and accusations about possible

misuse of Massachusetts Kansas Committee funds.

Wilson was

shocked and immediately contacted Howe hoping to determine
the truth about the soldier's statements.

Wilson was afraid

that if Forbes' revelations were true and were made public
they would jeopardize the Republican Party's election chances
in the fall.

Massachusetts.

Wilson demanded

to

know what was going on in

Howe was quick to reply.

He assured Wilson
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that the Massachusetts Kansas
Committee had given "no countenance" to Brown for "any operations
outside of Kansas." Measures had been taken "to prevent
any such monstrous perversion of a kind as would be the
application of means raised
for the defense of Kansas to a
purpose which the subscribers
to this fund would disapprove and
vehemently condemn." Technically, Howe was being "truthful" with
Wilson.
Forbes did
not realize Brown's subsidization had
been taken over from
the Kansas Committee by the Secret Committee
of Six.

in the days immediately following the May

5

Also,

conference, pos-

session of the guns originally donated to Brown
by the

Massachusetts Kansas Committee and later reconfirmed
in his
possession by the Secret Six had been transferred back
to

George Luther Stearns whose personal funds had paid for
them
in the first place.

Bureaucratic subterfuge allowed Howe to

"truthfully" tell Wilson that the Massachusetts Kansas Com-

mittee had not "countenanced" the plans Forbes alluded to in
his statements.

But the Boston physician had stretched the

limits of truth considerably.

And he well knew it.

6

While Howe diverted Forbes and Wilson, Sanborn again
tried to bring Higginson into line with the views of the

other secret committee members.

He notified Higginson that

even Gerrit Smith agreed that postponement was the wisest
policy.

The secretary also claimed that he could not "quite

yield" to Higginson'

s

arguments because Forbes had it "in his

power" to remove "the terror" of Brown's proposed
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insurrectionary thrust.

Wasn't the element of surprise the

most essential feature in the plan Brown outlined
during
March? There was no doubt in Sanborn's mind
about

deferral

and the necessity of putting Forbes "off the
track."

Sanborn

further rationalized his attitude near the end of
his letter
to Higginson by claiming that even if he agreed
with

Higginson nothing could be done to change the May

5

decision

because the largest "stockholders" in the venture (Stearns,
Smith, and Parker) were adamantly opposed to any movement
by

Brown and would not raise money to support the warrior.
Since there was "little the rest of us can do

...

way," Sanborn felt he must abide by the decision.

in that

7

Higginson was cynically amused by the temerity of his
fellow conspirators and particularly angered by Sanborn's new
found obsequiousness.

As secretary of the Massachusetts

Kansas Committee, Sanborn never hesitated to wield the

authority of his office in Brown's behalf.

Whether he was

badgering Higginson for Worcester funds or soliciting Stearns
generosity during the North Elba subscription drive, Sanborn
had always been aggressive and calculating; never cowed by
his own lack of financial resources.

Now, however,

in the

face of possible exposure by Forbes, he had become uncharac-

teristically submissive to the major "stockholders."

As

Higginson reread Sanborn's letter he was also struck by the
secretary's use of the
only knew of violence

will

d

"terror."

For an individual who

theoretical way and who, along
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with the other secret committee members,
had steadfastly
avoided personal contact with violence,

terror was an unknown

commodity, a mere abstraction justified by
another abstraction known as Higher Law. For Sanborn and the
others, vio-

lence was a topic to be discussed in lecture rooms,
the gra-

cious confines of the Bird Club, and in front of
an abolition-

ist gathering.

Violence only had practical use to them as a

threat to slaveholders or as a rhetorical device to stimulate
and shape public opinion.

As far as Higginson was concerned,

Sanborn, Parker, Stearns, Smith, and Howe would never con-

front the reality of force, never take responsibility for

subsidizing it.

Higginson suspected that something more than

Forbes' disclosures held his colleagues back, a greater fear

gripped these men than concern about exposure.

Even though

they had committed themselves to Brown early that spring they

were all ambivalent about the use of violent means and continued to look for

a

reason not to follow through with sup-

port for the Kansas warrior.

Forbes' revelations provided

them with the perfect opportunity to swap abstractions.

They

traded the principle of justifiable violence for that of

self-interest.

They relieved their own doubts and fears.

Higginson was furious.
George Luther Stearns also worked to order the chaos

unleashed by Forbes.
track."

He also sought to throw people "off the

He warned Brown to hold on to the rifles and side-

arms he had been given pending further directions from the
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committee.

In a few days a member of the
secret group would

arrive at Chatham to discuss the "best
mode" of "disposing"
of the weapons.
The letters Brown received from his
Boston "friends"
telling of Forbes' destructive efforts and
suggesting postponement of the raid punctuated an already
disappointing convention.

Harriet Tubman failed to appear, fewer men than

Brown expected showed up to discuss the plan,
and some who came
expressed the opinion that the Kansas warrior would
be

"dis-

appointed in the slaves because they did not know sufficient
to rally to his support."

By the end of the Chatham meeting

he had not recruited anyone to join him, was stranded in

Canada without sufficient funds to pay his hotel bill, and

seemed to have lost all credibility with a majority of the
secret committee's membership.

In desperation, Brown again

turned to his son John Jr. and asked if he would "think over"
the matter.

Like so many other times when his ventures were

on the brink of failure, Brown hoped his eldest son could

shed "light on the subject."
quickly.

Brown knew he had to act

He must regain control of the situation or face the

possibility of complete loss of support by the Secret Committee of Six.

9

Calming himself, the Kansas warrior took the first step
toward reclaiming the confidence of his "stockholders" by

writing to the one man who stood firmly against postponement,
Thomas Wentworth Higginson.

The letter Brown wrote at this
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critical juncture in the conspiracy
is quite revealing.
it
tells as much about the image he
hoped to promote as his letter to young Henry Stearns.
Brown made no appeals to the
justice of his cause, no allusions to
his providential
instrumentality, no use of Biblical
quotation or inflated
antislavery rhetoric. Rather, he labored
to reestablish his
image as a pragmatic, self-controlled and
calculating "leader
of men." He told Higginson that it was
"invariable" with him
to be "governed by circumstances."
He would "not do
any-

thing" while he did "not know what to do."

None of his

Boston friends "need have any fears" about "hasty
or rash
steps being taken."

Only "knowledge" was "power."

Brown

assured Higginson that arrangements had been made to quiet
Forbes, asked for funds to pay his Chatham bills, and con-

cluded his letter with the pledge that he would "not

.

.

act other than to secure perfect knowledge of the facts in

regard to what Forbes had already done."

The course to be

taken in both Chatham and Boston should not be decided "under

excitement.

"^

Brown also wrote to George Luther Stearns.

Covering

much of the same ground with the Med ford businessman that he
had with Higginson, Brown closed his note with the injunction
he would live by:

direct thy paths."

"In all ways acknowledge Him, and He shall

But Stearns was not as deeply affected by

such biblical flourishes as he once had been.

Despite these

calm assurances the businessman was too upset with Brown to
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be impressed by religious incantations.

He wanted to know

why Forbes was acting so irrationally, how much
Forbes knew
of the plan, why Brown had been so indiscriminate
in trusting

such an erratic character, and what the true nature of

Brown's arrangement had been with the disgruntled soldier?

Most important, Stearns like Sanborn, Parker, and Smith had
lost confidence in Brown.

In March,

Stearns believed Brown's

version of the agreement; at the moment he was unsure of what
to believe.

The businessman's slowly developing willingness

to have faith in black capabilities and to repress his fear

of violence was shattered by Brown's indiscretion.

Could

Brown really lead a successful raid on slavery when he

couldn't even govern the behavior of
ciate?

a

former military asso-

Shortly after receiving Brown's letter Stearns wrote

to Higginson, notified him that Brown had been relieved of

the arms in his custody, invited the Worcester activist to

Boston in order to discuss postponement, and coldly advised
the recalcitrant committee member that if he would only listen
"we can convince you it [postponement] is for the best."

Brown's religious injunction hadn't made a dent in the lead-

pipe manufacturers' conviction to temporarily withhold sup-

port from the scheme.^
In the week between receiving Brown's letter of May 15

and Stearns' request that he come to Boston to be "convinced"
on May 21, Higginson continued his vigorous effort to salvage
the raid.

On May 18, he wrote Parker and again warned that
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"postponement was abandonment."

harm next year."

Forbes "could do as much

He firmly believed threats
of exposure

could only be countered by swift
action.

There was still

time to capitalize on the element
of surprise, still time to
"steal a march." He had "little
doubt" that a successful
effort could be made. Any "betrayal
afterwards " would "only
inCrease the P anic " cau sed by the raid.
To Sanborn's contention that Forbes could "injure the
operation" by exposing the
"smallness of its resources," Higginson made
a most revealing
rebuttal; one that indicates much about the
nature of the

plan unfolded by Brown in early March.

Higginson told Parker

that Sanborn had forgotten that by Brown's

"

original program "

the raid "was to be regarded (at first) as a
mere local

flurry with no resources at all."

From the beginning Brown

argued that the small size of his group would act as

a per-

fect camouflage to the ultimate design of general insurrection and Higginson was "amazed" his fellow conspirators

hadn't considered this before making their decision.

12

Higginson fought hard for Brown's plan on other grounds
as well.

In the last weeks of April and the first weeks of

May, Higginson became thoroughly convinced in the necessity

of black violence.

The minister gave testimony to that

belief and at the same time prodded his secret committee
associates in a May 12 speech before the New York Antislavery
Society.

Echoing ideas quite similar to Parker's notions

about "out door" charity, Higginson stated that "white
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Anglo-Saxon abolitionists" were "too apt
to assume the whole
work" of ending slavery and tended to

"ignore the great force

of the victims of tyranny."

if black slaves were "ever to

free themselves," they "must strike
the first blow."

For

many years he had been "disposed to think"
that the "salvation of the slave" had to be worked out
"not by him but for
him." Presently, he had begun to "see otherwise."
Higginson
admitted to wondering at the "patience of the
Negro" but was

confident that the time would come when seeing the
"aroused
strength" of the African, whites would "at last give
him
credit for the prudence which was waited until these
preliminary agitations [Kansas, Fugitive Slave Law]
the sympathy

.

.

.

needed for his support.

"

.

.

created

.

Abolitionists

often spoke of the African as "weak, down- trodden, degraded,"
and "cowardly because exposed to the institution of slavery."

But in so doing, Higginson realized that abolitionists might

have been perpetuating the institution by failing to see that
"behind all those years of cheerful submission

.

.

.

there

may be a dagger and power to use it when the time comes."
The African had been degraded by the institution of slavery

but it was time all Americans saw what he had once been and

what he "may be again."

Ironically, Higginson made his

claims for the black man partially on the basis of his own

romantic racialist notions about the origins of race traits.
In the end, he based his confidence in black capabilities on

the fact that they had received blood from "heroic races,"
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the Maroons of Surinam and Jamaica,
and these races had "mingled blood" with "a race [Anglo-Saxon]
which was the strongest in the world." Higginson also saw significant
indica-

tions of black willingness to fight for freedom.

Fugitive

slaves demonstrated the black man's desire for
freedom and
the Shadrach Rescue executed by Boston blacks was
a prime

example of northern freeman's regard for his chained
brethren.

Then too, as Brown noted in early March, the under-

ground railroad had "lodged tens of thousands in Canada" and
these black men and women "proved the possibility of African

civilization and African agriculture."

As Howe might have

suggested, Higginson believed that blacks had "learned their

strength" in Canada by being exposed to "normal people" and
they were now ready to use that strength in the cause of
liberty.

13

On May 18,

the same day that Higginson sent his letter

of protest to Parker, Sanborn wrote and told the Worcester

committeeman of Howe's efforts to "baffle" Forbes, Wilson,
and "God knows how many more" who had heard about the plan.

The secretary also informed Higginson that a committee meeting had been called for May 24 in order to formally

re-evaluate support of Brown.

Gerrit Smith promised to

attend since he had to be in town for an American Peace Society meeting.

14

II

Reeling from his brother's recent death
as well as the
disclosures by Forbes, Gerrit Smith came to
Boston in late
May to speak before the American Peace
Society. It is possible
that when Smith wrote his speech he was laboring
under
the

emotional burden of these two events.

In any case, his words

to the society on the morning of May 24, are
another example

of his "paradoxical intellect" at work.

The address con-

tained "two separate arguments" about the use of force.

In

one Smith spoke against a nation's involvement in external

war and in the other he spoke "in favor of armed force to
maintain internal order."

Smith believed war in the inter-

national sphere "could be avoided always" and that "no nation
known to refuse to engage in it need fear it."

A country's

refusal to fight would "unequivocally express" the "confidence" that war would not be made on her.

In addition,

a

nation must give "ample proof" of her "professed principles"
by dismantling forts and disbanding her army.

But Smith's

advocacy of this position on external warfare did not make

him a non-resistant (even Christ had practiced non-resistance
only from "expediency")

for he firmly believed that "armed

force" was essential to the domestic life of a nation.

There

was a definite need to "suppress frontier violence" and to

support the "irregular but righteous governments" set up in
Kansas.

Above all, domestic violence was necessary to

.
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deliver the slave from bondage "at
whatever harm to the
slaveholder and to restrain slaveholders
by whatever terrors
it is necessary to hold over them." 15
By two o'clock in the afternoon, as
Smith met with other
members of the secret committee in his Revere
House hotel
room, these theorizations about the necessity
of domestic

force gave way to the practical possibility
of

Hugh Forbes.

exposure by

Smith fully agreed with Sanborn, Stearns,

Parker, and Howe that support should be temporarily
withdrawn

from Brown.

The secret group also decided that the best way

to diffuse Forbes'

threats was to send Brown back to Kansas.

Howe had already suggested as much to the soldier of fortune
and Brown's actual return to Kansas might be enough to con-

vince him that the doctor was telling the truth.

In order to

induce the Kansas warrior to go back to the territory and
assure him that he had not been abandoned, the committee

decided to promise to raise 2000 dollars for resumption of
the project at a later date.

The committee also decided to

send Brown 500 dollars to pay his Chatham bills, to return

control of the rifles to the warrior, and to request his

presence in Boston for further discussion of the entire

matter

16

All of the secret committee members, with the obvious

exception of Higginson, were tremendously relieved by the
actions they decided upon in their afternoon meeting.
prisingly, the man who seemed to relax most was Samuel

Sur-

Gridley Howe.

He had not capitulated to
postponement until a

few days before the meeting, but
when he did he was happily
unburdened of the great pressure it took
to stand by Brown.

Writing to George Woods, Howe expressed
part of the reason
for his relief.

The doctor claimed he could now "powerfully"

and "truthfully" assert that Forbes was
"all wrong" in his
description of Brown's "intended movements." But
it was more
than just being able to speak "truthfully" which
eased his

mental and physical strain.

Again, as in the summer of 1856,

the clash between Howe's abolitionist activity and
his genu-

ine friendship for Charles Sumner had become a source of
par-

alyzing guilt. 1
Earlier in the month Howe had been forced to lie to
Sumner when the ailing friend asked about the truth of statements Forbes was making in Washington that spring.

The doc-

tor claimed he was amazed Sumner didn't "see through" a man

whose "hot temper" had blinded him to the wrongfulness of his
course.

Howe assured Sumner that the Massachusetts Kansas

Committee had never "directly or indirectly employed" Forbes
and that Brown's contact with the soldier had been made on
his "own responsibility."

What bothered Howe was a growing

fear that Sumner would be drawn into the Forbes situation and
be subjected to undue emotional stress.

Such stress might

further retard the slow recovery Sumner was making from his

beating.

In fact, by mid-May,

Howe wasn't certain that the

Senator hadn't already been affected.

Writing to Sumner on
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May 17, in the midst of the crises, he
cautioned his friend
to get plenty of "rest exercise and
fresh air" and advised
him to "avoid taxing his brain by keeping
away from people
and events" which "demand too much." Howe
frankly admitted
that his own "doubt" had been "painfully incurred"
by

Sumner's failure to improve his health and by his
recent
relapse.

In a comment that goes a long way toward
explaining

why Howe finally agreed to postpone Brown's effort,
the doctor stated that his doubts would have "disappeared in

a

sad

certainty" if he could have been sure that the relapse "was

not occasioned by any sufficient ex ternal caus e but was a

natural consequence of the internal condition of the injured
organs."

Howe was very concerned that the Forbes accusations

had contributed to Sumner's failing health.

Indeed, the very

next day, May 18, Howe suggested that his old friend should
resign his office and "stay away in Europe" for "a year or
"
two „18
.

By the time Brown received the secret committee's

request for a meeting in Boston at the end of the month, he
had calmed himself and had begun working to hold his cadre of

recruits in line during the period of postponement.

Writing

to John Kagi and other members of the group who left Chatham

earlier, Brown informed them that "such has been the effect
of the course taken by Forbes on our Eastern friends that

have some fears

...

I

we shall be compelled to delay further

action for the presen t.

"

The warrior told Kagi that he had
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been urged to postpone but had been
promised "liberal assistance after a while." Even if they
did have
to "defer"

efforts, no problem should arise in
"great and noble minds."
One should never indulge in "useless
complaints." it was in
a "time of difficulty"

that men showed what they were made of

and it was at such times that "men mark
themselves." 19

John Brown began to "mark" himself with his
"eastern
friends" on May 31 in Boston when he held the first
of a

series of meetings in his room at the American House
hotel.
Once again Brown was forced to explain his relationship
with
Forbes.

Once again Brown accused the soldier of being vain

and irresponsible.

But this time Brown did admit that he had

not fully perceived the man's character when he first

recruited him for the scheme and that Forbes knew more about
the plan than Brown had previously suggested.

Nevertheless,

Brown still argued that Forbes did not know enough to jeopardize the project.

Howe, Stearns, Parker, and Sanborn lis-

tened attentively as the warrior presented his case for con-

tinuation but like the pleas of Higginson, Brown's words did

nothing to change their determination to postpone the operation.

After Brown finished, the committee members began to

spell out the way they felt it was best to diffuse the situation.

Brown was formally notified of the committee's desire

to defer his "dash" at slavery, was asked to decoy Forbes by

returning to Kansas, and told that the secret committee fully
intended to support his venture next spring.

As a way of

230

demonstrating their continued commitment,
they gave" Brown
another 500 dollars for his expenses. 20
Thomas Wentworth Higginson was noticeably
absent from
all four days of the meetings held between
Brown and the

other four Massachusetts members of the committee.

He con-

tinued to fume about the attitudes and actions
of his fellow
conspirators and felt that by disregarding their
invitations
to attend the meetings and thereby "boycotting"
those meet-

ings he could most effectively register his protest.
ever, Higginson was in Boston while the June

1

How-

session was

being held and afterwards met privately with Brown to explain
his behavior.

Higginson'

s

memorandum of his conversation

with Brown adds substantially to our understanding of the
meetings and of the relationship the warrior had with the
other committee members.

Higginson noted that Brown had been

"pushed to postpone until next winter or spring," had been

"promised 2000 dollars to 3000 dollars" if he did so, and

asked to blind Forbes by returning to Kansas.

Though Brown

kept actual control of the weapons committed to him in 1857,
he was to legally "transfer property" so as to relieve the

committee of responsibility.

And in the future, the conspir-

ators were "not to know of his plans."

Higginson reported

that Brown was very disappointed by the committee's decision
to postpone and considered those in favor of it not to be

"men of action

membership.

.

"

Brown was very critical of the committee

He was angry that they had been "intimidated" by
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Wilson, felt Gerrit Smith to be a "timid
man," and thought
Stearns and Parker "did not
abound in courage." Brown
did admire Howe for initially standing fast
against postpone.

.

.

He made no comment about Sanborn. 21

ment.

Brown's harsh words did not offend Higginson for
his own

evaluation coincided with the warrior's assessment.

In fact,

more than at any time in their relationship, Higginson was
deeply impressed with the man.

He was a "sly old veteran"

who carefully calculated his actions.

Brown admitted to

Higginson that in the meetings he had "appeared to acquiesce
far more than he really did" because now more than at any

other time
less

.

"

"

it was essential they did not think him reck -

Brown's behavior in the wake of the Forbes' disclo-

sures truly "marked" him. 22

Nor were the five members of the secret committee who

had voted to defer aid to his project the only people to be

delicately manipulated by the image of a self-controlled
fighter for the right.

Higginson also earned his share of

Brown's attention by his steadfast refusal to postpone the
venture.

After their exchange on June

1,

Brown was deter-

mined to pay closer attention to the Worcester activist.

In

ensuing weeks he corresponded with Higginson more frequently,
spoke of his plans more freely, and regularly requested

Higginson 's

viev/s of them,

hoping all the while to deepen the

minister's interest in the scheme and earn
funds from the Worcester County Committee.

a

23

commitment of
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After seeming to "acquiesce" far more
than he actually
did, Brown left Boston on June 3
and headed back to Kansas as
the "decoy" that "T. P. and the S's
envisioned."
He refused,

however, to let the committee forget
their obligation to him
simply because he was out of sight.
Within three weeks he
wrote from Kansas prodding his Boston friends
to be "in earnest ... to carry out as soon as possible,"
the measures he
had put forward in Boston "during the early
spring." Brown
pushed them to begin collecting funds by claiming
he wanted
-no delay in the matter."

Brown also continued his efforts

to reestablish his image as a disciplined leader
of men who

had the ability to smoothly carry out his proposed "dash"

against slavery.

While in Kansas he had "concealed his pres-

ence," surfacing only long enough to let people know he was
in the territory but not "to create any excitement."

He was

not in Kansas to "open a quarrel or be the first to seek
revenge."

Even though the Kansas situation was gradually

resolving itself politically, Brown couldn't help exaggerating the possibility of new turmoil in order to sustain the

interest of his readers and further highlight his own discretion.

According to the warrior, frees taters lived in "con-

stant fear" of "new troubles" and they felt the whole Kansas

problem would start "afresh." 24
In addition to these efforts to pressure the Secret Six

and refurbish his image with them, Brown also seems to have

enlisted the aid of James Repath, the frenetic young

journalist who had journeyed into Kansas
with Higginson.
While no specific documentation exists
to suggest

that the

two men entered into an agreement, a
number of facts point to
that conclusion.
For one thing, Repath enjoyed the full
con-

fidence of the only man on the committee who
stood by Brown
during the Forbes affair, Thomas Wentworth
Higginson. Cer-

tainly Higginson could use help in pressing
Brown's cause.
For another, Repath had even more impressive
credentials than

Brown when it came to assessing the black man's
willingness
to fight for his freedom.

The young journalist had traveled

extensively in the South with the expressed purpose of finding out whether or not blacks were primed for insurrection.
Indeed, before Repath went south he claimed that if blacks

weren't ready for violence he would "disseminate discontentment" and prepare the way for "revolution."

Here was a man

with first-hand knowledge of all that Brown claimed for the
blacks.

It is hardly possible that the "sly old veteran"

would miss the opportunity to put a primary source in the
hands of Harvard scholars.

And there is an even greater

reason to believe Brown recruited Repath to promote his
scheme among the reluctant conspirators in Boston.

Repath

was as convinced as Brown was that the only way slavery could
be ended was by black insurrection.

Soon after a meeting

with Brown on June 27, in Kansas, Repath started east.

For

the next year he would press for the implementation of

Brown's scheme while residing in Medford, Massachusetts and
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preparing a manuscript for publication
entitled The Roving
Editor:
or Talks with Sla ves in the
Southern
An

analysis of this work, which was
eventually published in
November of 1859 and dedicated to Brown,
reveals a good deal
about what Repath told Brown's Massachusetts
supporters. 25
In this work Repath claimed to agree
with Brown in

doubting the "efficacy of political antislavery
action."
it
was founded on "expediency" and "the morals
of the counting
room" therefore it could do nothing to solve
the black man's
problems.

Like Brown, Repath urged friends of the slave
to

"incite insurrection and encourage in the North a
spirit

which shall culminate in civil and servile wars."

If,

after

all, the founding fathers had been justified in "their
rebel-

lion, how much more will the slaves be justified in "their

insurrection."

Repath also asserted that, like Brown, he was

ready to "slay every man who attempted to resist the liberation of the slave" and was willing like Brown "to recognize
the negro as brother however inferior in intelligence and

actual endowments, as having rights which to take away or

withhold is a crime that should be punished without mercy." 26
Repath 's book contained both his own reflections on the
slave's condition and those of other informed observers.

Samuel Gridley Howe contributed
New Orleans.

a

piece on a slave prison in

One of the centerpieces of the book, which the

journalist obviously felt went

a long way

toward documenting

his contentions about slave desires to fight for liberation,

is a section called "The
Insurrection Hero."

quoted long passages of

a

Here Repath

story written by John Vaughn
which

studied the motivations of a black
slave leader named Issac
who actually led an abortive insurrection
in the South.

According to Vaughn, Issac was "kind,
affectionate, and simple
as a woman" and "never tired of doing
for others."
Yet
he

had determined that insurrection was the
only hope for freeing his people.
Issac 's own rationale for this position
was
included in Vaughn's account. The slave claimed
he "knew

there was and could be no help for me, for my
wife or my
children, for my race, except we were free, and as
whites

would not let this be so and as God told me he could only
help those who helped themselves,

I

preached freedom to the

slaves and bid them strike for it like men."

Whether

Vaughn's piece was true or fictionalized is really not significant.

What is important is Issac'

s

rationale.

It sug-

gests what both Brown and Repath had been saying all along:

black men knew they must fight for their own freedom. 27
Repath

's

belief in the possibility of a spontaneous

insurrection ignited by an attack like the one Brown contem-

plated is also contained in

a

section he personally wrote for

the book entitled "The Underground Telegraph."

According to

Repath blacks would rally to the banner of those leading an

insurrection because of the existence of

a

rapid and effi-

cient system of communication among slaves which could effectively disperse the first news of a raid over a wide area of
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the South long before slaveholders
could hear of the attack
and organize forces to subdue it.
Repath claimed that this

elaborate "underground" telegraph had
begun as a "system of
secret travel" among slaves and then
had grown up into a
communication network initially because
of the slave's "love
of gossip" and later, because of his
"yearning
for freedom."

The journalist claimed that this system
linked hundreds of
plantations and there was no doubt in his mind
that its existence gave "power" to stir a "formidable
insurrection

directed by white men." 28
There is no doubt that all the Massachusetts
secret committee members who heard Re oath's descriptions were

skeptical.

All of them had studied slaves and slavery and had not
dis-

covered such a system.

Yet it seems likely that they contin-

ued to listen to him throughout the year, for none of these

men had the substantial first-hand experience that the jour-

nalist claimed.

It was becoming more and more difficult to

refute the growing evidence which seemed to indicate

a bur-

geoning black yearning for freedom and the willingness to
fight cor it.

Ill

But in the first few weeks after Brown left Boston neither his pressure tactics, Repath'

s

appearance, or the jus-

tice of black liberation concerned Stearns, Sanborn, and
Smith.

They were all too relieved at having narrowly escaped

exposure by Forbes.

George Luther Stearns eased himself
back

into a belief in the political
dissolution of slavery.
He
was cheered by the continually improving
condition of Ka nsas

and claimed to agree with E. E. Whitman
that if frees tate rs
were "moderately diligent" they would
thwart the Slave Powe r

and send the institution to "political
perdition."

While

Brown was in Kansas acting as a decoy, struggling
to recapture the confidence of supporters, and suffering
with the
ague, Stearns did little fund collecting for
the warrior's

"wool business."

Instead, he began remodeling his Medford

mansion, followed the Lincoln-Douglas debates, plotted
the

course of Donati's comet and argued

against those who

believed the superstition that "all great comets have been
closely followed by devastating wars." 29
Brown's "recklessness" in the Forbes affair petrified
Sanborn.

All along his commitment to the forceful dissolu-

tion of slavery had been based essentially on his attachment
to Brown.

In spite of Parker's theori zations about the

necessity of black self-help, the secretary found that once
his confidence in Brown was shaken he had great difficulty in

defending the proposed raid to himself or others.

Throughout

the summer and fall of 1858 he cautiously modified his sup-

port for the insurrection.

After all, if Brown bungled the

raid as badly as he did his relationship with Forbes it was

quite possible the entire membership of the secret committee
wou Id be faced with a lot more than "abusive" letters or the
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wrist-slapping criticism of people like Henry
Wilson.
son" had not yet become "patriotism"
as Sanborn

"Trea-

suggested to

Higginson weeks earlier.

A jail term still waited for anyone

convicted as an accessory to Brown's scheme.

And the thought

of going to prison horrified the ex-schoolmaster.

Sanborn's

reflections on Kansas partially indicate his
growing willingness to see slavery removed by other than violent
means.

He

even took it upon himself to lecture Brown on the
subject.

Sanborn was glad Kansas was "at peace."

He now felt her

"true course" lay in formulating an effective frees tate con-

stitution to guide territorial fortunes.

It was best for

Kansas to use traditional "political means to end slavery." 30
In May,

at the time of the Forbes blow up, Gerrit Smith

only wanted Brown's plan "deferred."

But by July, he was

telling Sanborn he didn't want to know anything about the

warrior's future efforts.

While Smith still claimed Kansas

had been saved by her "own brave spirits" and applauded the
efforts of Brown in beating back "border ruffianism," he

returned to political antislavery during the late summer and
early fall.

During that time the Peterboro landowner reen-

tered the political arena and ran for governor of New York.

Beginning in August, he attended some fifty- three campaign
meetings, traveled some four or five thousand miles, and

spent about 5000 dollars seeking office.

Throughout the

effort he claimed to have accepted the nomination "in faith
that frank, bold, persuasive speech backed by moral truth
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would be more than a match for the
[proslavery] press."
While he knew his chances for election were
not

great he was

optimistic about the aims of the campaign,
made vigorous
efforts to justify his "spontaneous" nomination,

and force-

fully promoted his antislavery views. 31

Even though Smith realized from the beginning
that his
actual chances for election were slight, defeat in
November
left him feeling indignant and self-righteous.

It seemed to

him that people simply were not ready to receive the "democratic theories" he spent his life inculcating.

Smith sup-

posed that he must "live and die an unpopular politician."
What was worse than his loss (for one is never sure Smith

wasn't intrigued by the cultivation of his own unpopularity)
was his feeling that throughout New York state antislavery

sentiment was dead.

By late fall, he began to change the

direction of his thinking.

He again became pessimistic about

the prospects of a political solution to slavery.

The "pub-

lic mind" had been drawn away from abolition into the non-

extension of slavery.

Again, in the face of his own politi-

cal failure and the death of antislavery sentiment, he

returned to a belief in the necessity of force.

Kansas owed

her salvation not to politics but to "ample preparations to

repel by physical force the aggressions of slavery."

It was

"men money and munitions" brought to Kansas by "eastern

enterprise and liberality" which had really saved the territory.

The Republican Party had actually become the
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"protector of slavery."

Perhaps Brown's effort would fail.

Perhaps his mishandling of Forbes was
portentous.

But in

the wake of political defeat Smith
overlooked such possibilities.
He returned to a belief in the efficacy
of "men money
and munitions." At the absolute minimum, an
insurrectionary

thrust at slavery would rekindle a "demoralized"
public sentiment.

IV

In the first weeks after Brown's departure, Theodore

Parker also became more cautious about advocating the use of

violence against slavery.

Unlike his friends, Stearns,

Sanborn, and Smith, however, the minister never entirely

turned his back on the issue.

Before he began a restful

journey in the Green Mountains that June, Parker outlined his

position to an audience at the annual meeting of the New

England Antislavery Society.

Parker claimed that it was just

such meetings that were the "best manner" in which to agitate
the slavery question.

Though he did admit even to this group

that in the various struggles between freedom and slavery,
the battle had always been "settled by war," and it seemed to

him that the "great and final" abolition of slavery in
America would have to be accomplished in that way as well. 33
By mid-summer, with Brown safely in Kansas and the

Forbes episode fading from memory, the minister intensified
his pleas for violence.

Examining the effects of slavery in
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a July speech he began by suggesting
that "compulsory toil"

was "not necessarily degrading."

Slaves learned "certain

special things" which they could not have
learned in Africa.
Indeed, it was a sign of the slave's "excellency"
that he

repudiated "individualism" and was "pliant before
his master 'swill" while he learned these "special things."

But,

ultimately, the institution of slavery was "essentially

degrading" because it denied blacks "history
.

.

.

on."

arts

.

.

.

.

.

.

science

literature" and "a great war to look back

The minister did not wonder at the slave's "despair"

and went on to point out what Brown had that spring.

Parker

was deeply offended by the fact that the wrong blacks suffered had awakened "very little sympathy in the mass of men,

who in their rudeness reverence strength and not justice."
Brown was correct.

A show of strength by blacks was the only

way to alter the black image among white Americans.

In his

speech Parker also warned of the potential for violence in

black men.

He wondered aloud to the audience what blacks

would do if the United States became engaged in

a

war with

England and answered his own question by claiming that "at
least three million [slaves] would take sides with the
enemy."
thing.

Free black men would "spontaneously" do the same
It is obvious from both of these speeches that

although the Forbes affair initially jarred Parker's confidence in the warrior, the theoretical case Brown made for

black insurrection continued to grip

hirn.

34
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Thomas Wentworth Higginson also became more
certain of
the correctness of Brown's theories in
the months following
his departure from Boston.
During the summer Higginson

advised William Lloyd Garrison to read an article
he had prepared on "African Proverbial Philosophy" claiming
that it

would present "quite a new view of the character and
capabilities of the [black] race." But Higginson' s most
revealing
expression of these "new" views are actually found in an

article he prepared for the September 1858 issue of the

Atlantic Monthly

.

Here, in an elaborate theoretical frame-

work, Higginson fused romantic racialist attitudes, the

beliefs of Brown and Repath about the black man's willingness
to fight, Parker's speculations on "out-door charity," and

Howe's "theory of diffusion" into a comprehensive rationale
for insurrection.

In this piece,

Higginson achieved his

fragile synthesis by reexamining the typology of courage and

suggesting that violence could serve as
assimilation.

a

mechanism for value

^

In Higginson' s view,

there were three forms of courage.

The greatest form was possessed by all "heroic races" and was

called the "courage of blood."

According to Higginson, men

who possessed this type of courage dared perils not merely
for the sake of principle but for "their own sake."

there was no special merit in such courage.
it hereditarily or he didn't.

Actually,

One either had

Indeed, the courage of blood

often concealed itself under the finer names of self-devotion

and high principle.

As an example of this kind of
courage

Higginson spoke of the activities of
evangelist George Barrow
"who convinced himself that he was
activated by evangelical
zeal to spread the Bible to Spain."
In Higginson 's opinion
it was "chiefly adventure" which lured
36
Barrow to
Spain.

In Higginson

's

typology there was an environmental com-

pliment to the "courage of blood" which was called
"transmitted courage." This second type was produced by
constant
training and practice and could "give steadiness" to
less

powerful inherited forms.

This "transmitted" variety was the

type shared by a captain with his men.

John Brown spoke of

this kind of courage (though not using the same terminology
as Higginson)

in 1857 when he spoke of organizing freestate

settlers into militia groups.

In these groups "strong" men

would bolster the courage of "weak" ones.

37

It was, however, in the examination of a third variety

of courage that Higginson fully revealed his "new view" of

black capabilities.

The third type of courage was the "cour-

age of self-devotion" or courage of "emulation."

kind of courage that women and Africans possessed.

It was this

This

courage was evoked by "special exigencies" and was powerful
enough to alter the character of slaves who had been "suppled" by long years of slavery and "softened" by mixed blood.
It allowed blacks to pass from "cowering pussilanmity " to the

topmost height of daring.

Under its influence a slave's

"giddy laugh" vanished, his "idle chatter" hushed, and the

"
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"Buffoon" became hero.

Self-devotion was the most noble fo rm

of courage because it entered the
"domain of conscience" and

was engendered by outstanding moral
leadership.

if black men

were exposed to the right leader they
would be sure to fight
violently for their freedom and produce
"results which seemed
miraculous." Higginson himself had a hard
time determining
where this courage came from or what it really
was.

In the

end, he could only suggest that it was the
"element of inspi-

ration" or a "superadded something" which was
"incalcuable
in effect.

Though he never said so directly in the article,

one is left with the unmistakable impression that the

Worcester activist was convinced that John Brown was just
the

man to induce this "superadded something," just the man to
kindle black desires to fight for freedom. 38
It is unimportant whether Higginson even fully believed

in his own theoretical analysis or merely forwarded it as yet

another prod to his reluctant colleagues.

The simple fact

that he attempted such a synthesis is significant.

It sug-

gests that Higginson was trying to resolve for himself and
his fellow conspirators a basic contradiction between their

romantic race thinking and the contentions of both Brown and
Repath.

Each of the conspirators, to one degree or another,

maintained a racial stereotype which was completely at odds

with the underlying reason for Brown's espoused willingness
to attempt to stimulate an insurrection.

While each of the

six men could believe in the free black man's "spontaneous"
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desire to assist enslaved brethren,
none of them believed the
slave was by nature capable of
anything more than
"docile"

and "pliant," though virtuous,
behavior.

both asked them to think differently.

Brown and Repath

Parker had begun the

attempt to alleviate the contradiction
with his preliminary
re-evaluation of the usefulness of white reform
activity.

Higginson brought this thinking to fruition
in his article by
providing the mechanism (the courage of
self-devotion) which,
though not erasing the contradiction, allowed
romantic

racialism and the possibility of black violence to
co-exist.
The other members of the committee still had some
major
doubts about Brown's competency, but at least Higginson
had
gone a long way toward putting aside their racial skepticism
and their ambivalence toward violence.

He had gone beyond

Higher Law for a justification of insurrection.

And Higginson did more than provide

a

theoretical

rationale for Brown's contentions in his article.

He also

slapped the wrists of his fellow conspirators for their
shameful behavior toward Brown during the Forbes episode.
so doing, he added

In

further insight about the motivation of

the other members for supporting the Kansas warrior.

Higginson began his criticism of the others in the

introduction to the article.

Here he started by claiming

that it was a "foolish delusion" to believe that the combined

power of gunpowder and peace had "banished" the necessity for

physical courage.

The demand would never pass away.
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Brown's raid.

Clearly, he was suggesting that their
actions

made both their radical abolitionism and
allegiance to Brown
suspect in his eyes. He implied that both were
a product of
elitist, egotistical, and self-serving principles
and that in
the end these same principles had been the reason
Brown's

plan was postponed. 39
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CHAPTER VII
Thomas Wentworth Higginson had advocated
execution of
Brown's plan in the face of the Forbes
disclosures.
Then he
showed his disdain for the secret committee's
faint-

heartedness by boycotting their May postponement
meetings and
censuring them in the Atlantic Monthly
But the minister
.

also understood the limits to which his colleagues could
be
pushed, and he realized that any further public furor about

slave insurrections would most certainly destroy their

remaining inclination to support the project.

As a result,

he was quite alarmed by a short letter he received from

Lysander Spooner near the end of November.

Spooner was an

abolitionist who had been active in Boston reform efforts for
years and had recently begun to press for the use of forceful
means to end slavery.

In his note to Higginson, Spooner

asked for an opinion of a "scheme" he had devised to foment
slave insurrections.

He enclosed two documents which he pro-

posed to have reprinted and circulated extensively through
the South.
,

slavery.

Both called for the violent overthrow of

1

In the longer of the two broadsides entitled,

"A Plan

for the Abolition of Slavery," Spooner demanded that slaves
be rescued from the "hands of their oppressors" by the "for-

mation of associations" dedicated to that purpose.

He wanted
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private war waged against slavery by private individuals.

He

also called for compensated emancipation, separation
of gov-

ernment from the interests of slaveholders, and the destruction of the "security and value" of slave

property.

The

second, smaller document was addressed to "non-Slaveholders"

and went farther than the first one.

In it,

Spooner stated

that slaves had a "right to be free" and a "right to take
that freedom by force."

It was the duty of all who were able

to assist this effort, particularly non-slaveholding whites.

While slaves were flogging and kidnapping their oppressors,
forming military cadres, and building forts from which to
"carry on warfare," it was up to non-slaveholders to be sup-

portive and let the black men "know they have your sympathy."
Such support would give slaves courage and self-respect as

well as making "men of them." 2

From the moment Higginson saw the Spooner plan he realized what disaster would befall Brown's project if the docu-

ments were circulated.

He knew the other committee members

were certain to abandon

Brov/n and

disband their secret group.

Somehow he had to dissuade Spooner.

In his reply to the

Boston abolitionist, Higginson claimed to read the broadsides

with "great approbation" and suggested that increased interest in the subjects Spooner alluded to was "one of the most

important signs of the times."

He fully agreed that the

freedom of slaves had to be accomplished "by action of slaves
themselves in certain localities with the aid of secret

250

cooperation from whites."

Insurrection would convince slave-

holders of the futility of keeping blacks in bondage
and

would force northerners "back on the fundamental question
of
Liberty." Obviously remembering Brown's words as he
responded, Higginson went on to claim that a "single insur-

rection with decent temporary success would do more than anything else to explode our present political platform." What

nineteenth century America needed was a sharp slap in the
face to clear its head.

But near the end of his note Higginson cautiously moved
to prevent Spooner from circulating the two pamphlets.

He

agreed that blacks needed help from whites but claimed to
feel that the cooperation should be kept "secret."

lutions "the practical end" always came first,

afterward."

"

In revo-

the theory

Admitting to Spooner that the proposed circula-

tion might serve to prepare the "public mind,

"

Higginson nev-

ertheless went on to suggest that he felt this had already

been accomplished by the "fugitive slave cases" and "Kansas
excitement."

He then asked Spooner not to distribute any-

thing until they could speak further.

This plea was echoed

by Wendell Phillips and Theodore Parker who also received

notes from Spooner.

Phillips said the plan was impractical.

Parker, like Higginson, requested Spooner not to do anything

until the two of them could "talk about it."

4

Spooner decided to temporarily postpone distribution of
the leaflets.

Then, throughout December, he met with Parker,
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Higginson, and the other Massachusetts members
of the Secret
Committee of Six.
In order to permanently derail Spooner
's
scheme, the committee gave him a vague
description of what
Brown intended, told him how the Kansas warrior
was counting

on the element of surprise, and warned him that
if his docu-

ments were connected to Forbes' revelations they might
ruin
any chance for successful insurrection.

At first Spooner

strenuously objected to these arguments by claiming that the
slaves needed "previous preparation."

But by early January

he relented and agreed to drop plans for distribution of his

insurrectionary documents.

Later in the spring, when Brown

had returned to Boston, Spooner met with the warrior and came
away from their discussion "wholly" convinced his decision

was correct.

~*

Just how much Lysander Spooner had to be told about
Brown's plan in order to be "wholly" convinced is difficult
to ascertain.

Up until the late spring of 1859, Brown him-

self had been purposefully vague with the secret committee.
It is quite possible, therefore, that even if Spooner knew as

much as the committee did in January of 1859 he didn't really
know very much at all.

What Brown himself told Spooner in

the late spring is unknown, though Spooner made some telling

remarks years later which suggest the limits of his own
knowledge.

He claimed then that "very few knew much about

the details of Brown's plan until it was actual ly developed

at Harper's Ferry."

Brown had broadly hinted where his
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assault was to begin, specified theoretical
considerations
upon which he based his plan, and continually
asserted his
own ability to execute the project but he did
not

outline the

specific tactics he hoped to use in the raid.

in fact,

Spooner came away from his meeting with Brown feeling
that
the aid furnished by the secret committee was given
primarily

because of a "general confidence" in him and sympathy with

him rather "than from any intimate knowledge of the plan."
Spooner'

s

observation is partially correct.

The committee

did base some of its support on confidence in Brown's character.

By late spring of 1859, however,

committee

— Sanborn,

four members of the

Stearns, Smith, and Higginson did know

many specific details of the plan.

During December of 1858 Brown, though still out west,

played a major role in influencing Spooner' s final decision.
In the midst of the secret committee's negotiations with

Spooner, newspaper reports revealed that Brown had run off

eleven Missouri slaves during the third week in December.
The raid was proof of what Boston committee members had been

telling Spooner for some time:

Brown had returned to Kansas

to divert attention and to discredit Hugh Forbes.

He would

soon come east to prepare his insurrectionary strike.

If

Spooner sent his pamphlets south the entire effort to "decoy"
Wilson, Seward, and all those to whom Forbes had spoken would
be ruined.^

Actually, Brown's Missouri raid did more
than help convince Spooner to end his circulation scheme.
It also went
along way toward informing the secret committee
that he was
"in earnest" and would soon be in Boston to
make good on

their pledge of the previous spring.
larly excited by Brown's feat.

Higginson was particu-

The Missouri venture stimu-

lated new confidence in the warrior and made the minister

more optimistic than ever that Brown would be able to "make
a dash" into the South.

insurrection.

Higginson was desperate for a black

Writing in the Atlantic Monthly that winter on

the need to educate women (who shared the "courage of emula-

tion" with Africans), the minister suggested that if "con-

tempt did not originally cause failure" it certainly "perpetuates it."

Any systematic effort to discourage a class or

individual would "in nine cases out of ten" cause that class
or individual to "acquiesce in their degradation," if not

claim it as a "crown of glory."

Brown's successful Missouri

raid meant that, in spite of the Forbes disclosures, he might

yet stimulate enough confidence in the other committee members to regain their full support for his proposed venture.

And in so doing, Brown would be given the opportunity to

begin the destruction of black "acquiescence" and white "contempt."

To Higginson the Missouri raid was not merely a

diversionary gesture but a tactical master-stroke with which
Brown hoped to win back support of the secret committee.
Still, Higginson was very careful to hide his rekindled

.

.

enthusiasm.

When Sanborn wrote excitedly about the
possibil-

ity of Brown getting "great results from
this spark of fire"
(the Missouri raid)

,

Higginson responded by claiming to have

"serious doubts" that Brown would ever execute his
plan.
The minister obviously sought to prod his youthful committee

colleague with pessimism and to remind him of the committee's

previous

f aint-heartedness

8

Like Sanborn and Higginson, Theodore Parker was also

impressed with Brown's effort.

When it was suggested to the

Boston minister that the warrior's conduct was motivated by
a desire to avenge the murder of his son Frederick, Parker

sprang to Brov/n's defense and labeled such accusations as
unjust.

If Brown had been motivated by vengeance he would

have sought "cheap and easy revenge on actual transgressors
in Missouri."

Instead, the man had freed eleven slaves at

the expense of only one white life.

Parker's defense was

stirring especially in view of the grave misgivings he entertained about Brown's leadership abilities only a few months

earlier
But the Unitarian minister never got to discuss the

Missouri effort with Brown or to participate in the final
planning for the Harpers Ferry raid.

By late January of

1859, his tuberculosis became so severe that Howe and other

Boston physicians advised him to leave New England and seek

healthful rest in warmer climates.

In early February,

Parker

began a year-long journey with his wife Lydia which took him

to the West Indies, London, Switzerland,
and Rome, where he

arrived in early fall. 10

Realizing that Parker's tuberculosis would
probably
"spread rapidly and remove the foremost man
of

the conti-

nent,

Samuel Gridley and Julia Howe decided to accompany
the

Parkers on the first leg of their journey.

The two couples

had lived near each other on Exeter Street in Boston for
some
years and were initmate friends.

Lydia and Theodore Parker,

childless throughout their marriage, considered themselves
second parents to the Howe children.

Both couples needed a

few weeks together before they were forced to part.

And, in

Samuel Gridley Howe's mind, there were other important reasons for the trip.

Howe himself was very ill, plagued by a

physical reaction to the heightening tension in his day- today existence.

He and Julia were quarreling again.

They

argued about separation, family financial problems, and
Julia's continued desire for

a

literary career.

Howe was

sure a leisurely vacation would do them both some good. 11

After a brief stopover in Nassau the two couples headed
for Cuba.

Here they toured the island together for a few

weeks before separating.

Theodore Parker was impatient to

see Santa Cruz, so he and Lydia said their last goodbye and
left.

Samuel Gridley and Julia decided to remain in Havanna

awhile longer before returning to Boston.

During their stay,

they met wealthy South Carolina plantation owner Frank

Hampton and his wife

— Hampton

was the son of Senator Wade

.

Hampton.

Despite different views on the
institution of slavery, the two couples got along very
well.
Hampton respected
Howe's work with the blind and Howe was
absolutely intrigued
by Hampton's acute analysis of southern
politics.
Before
leaving Havanna, the southern couple suggested
that Samuel

Gridley and Julia visit their plantation on the
way home to
Boston. The idea appealed to the Howes. They
liked
the

Hamptons, were very interested in viewing plantation
life
first-hand, and hoped that the visit would help resolve some

serious differences of opinion that they were beginning to
have about the nature and role of the black man in American
*
society
•

12

In late March, the Howes arrived at Frank Hampton's

prosperous

Carolina plantation.

But by this time, Samuel

Gridley Howe had given up all notions that

alleviate his sickness.

a

vacation would

Throughout his stay at the Hampton's

the Boston doctor suffered from severe headaches.

He was

still anxious about Parker; continually worried about the

state of his departed friend's health.

Then, too, spending

time on the plantation wasn't as rewarding as Howe had first

envisioned.
edly,

It actually made him squeamish.

Somewhat belat-

it occurred to Howe that the Hamptons were the same

kind of people Brown might have to sacrifice while leading
his black insurrection.

Howe realized that it was one thing

to talk about taking white lives for black freedom and quite

another to share the hospitality of the intended white

victims.

More than anything else, however,
Howe's uneasiness,
his tension and headaches were due
to a new aggravation in
his already strained relationship
with Julia. 13

Julia Howe had begun to revise her
abolitionist notions.
She had become irritated by the "calm
satisfaction" with
which some men divided the "national moral
inheritance."

she

disliked the fact that because of slavery the
South had been
given "all the vices" and the North "all the virtues."
Julia
was put off by the "habitual, sneer, denunciation and
malediction" which had become "consecrated forms of piety in

speaking of the South."

Northerners were not absolved from

their "labor for amelioration" of slavery but must restrain

themselves from the "infliction of wrong" and set bounds

which "the wickedest dare not pass." 14
Obviously impressed by the Hamptons* handling of their
slaves, as well as a vivid recollection of blacks she had

seen during the trip, Julia Howe felt she must be allowed
"one heretical whisper--very small and low."

She now

believed the "Negro of the North" was "an ideal negro" who
was "refined by white culture" and "elevated by white blood."

But the "negro among negroes" was something entirely different.

He was "a course, grinning,

flat-footed,

thick skulled

creature," who was ugly, lazy, and "chiefly ambitious to be
of no use to any in the world."

Even so, Julia felt strongly

that slavery must "gradually ameliorate" and "slowly die
out."

While she admitted that anyone who gave

a

"mild

.

.

.
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pallative view

...

of slavery" should be subject to "bitter

censure," she also asserted that "intellectual justice"

revolted from "rhetorical straining, exaggeration and denun-

ciation of facts" which northern abolitionists continually
employed.

15

If Julia Howe was at once censurious of inflated aboli-

tionist rhetoric, under estimation of white southern virtue,
and over estimation of black capabilities, she could still

wonder why the negro was so despised in the South.

In her

view his "gentle, attachable nature" should not have caused
such hatred.

But even though she saw the black as "gentle

and attachable" and was mildly impressed with Cuban negroes
(they were "fair" physically)

she would not recant her gen-

eral assumptions about blacks when she was criticized by her
husband.

She justified her position in a letter to Theodore

Parker late in 1859, just after she had published the revealing recollections of her journey in a small book entitled A

Trip to Cuba

.

At that time she admitted that her "little

spurt about blacks" had "caused some remark" but claimed that
"without asking council of anyone" she would stick to her

resolution to write what she thought no matter whom it
offended.

To Julia Howe, the aspiring writer, nothing was

more vicious than to make "observation conform to theory."
She was positive her observations of black nature were "genuine,

clear and immediate."

Abolitionist theory would just

have to "make the best of it."

After witnessing the "natural

259

indolence" of blacks her convictions about
the necessity of
"compulsory employment" were strengthened, though
she claimed
not to be arguing for slavery. 16

There is no question that Samuel Gridley was
deeply disturbed by his wife's views. He argued with Julia
during the
trip and during the months she prepared for the publication
of A Trip to Cuba.
lication,

As he painfully noted at the time of pub-

"Some things make me sad, e.g., the question of

whether viewing the actual condition of the negro enforced
labor is not best!

As if anything would justify the perpet-

uation of such a wrong by the strongest race."

His own

impression of blacks in Cuba led him to some other conclusions.

According to Howe, "climatic influences" were better

for blacks in Cuba and as a result blacks were "physically

improving."

Other influences didn't help as much.

Howe was

particularly concerned that there was "no organized effort
for their [the blacks] improvement, no organized effort to

keep them from going wrong."

Mentally blacks were "rising"

but morally they were "sinking."

It is quite obvious what

Howe was suggesting by such comments.

In a sense,

he was

arguing the same case that John Brown had been arguing for
two years.

Simply stated, both men felt that blacks once

freed would need the firm discipline of
man.

a

righteous and moral

Brown had drawn up the Provisional Constitution for

just such a reason and he had recruited highly moral and
,. 17

upstanding men to help execute the raid.
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Howe attached himself to Brown's cause in the spring
of
1859, at least partially, for the same reason that he sepa-

rated his own racial views from Julia's.

Both of the Howe's

accepted a romantic racialist image of the black man's capacity and ability but they seemed to divide over the question
of the derivation of that nature.

Julia tended to emphasize

heredity over environment, though she never entirely dis-

missed the influence of white culture on the black man.

The

doctor placed even greater importance on the environmental
causes of the black man's nature.

And it was because he

stressed the impact of environment in his definition that
Howe looked to Brown to lead an "organized effort" for black

"improvement."

Getting blacks out of the debilitating insti-

tution of slavery through justitif ied violence and exposing

them to a "normal" person like John Brown was the same thing
as moving the blind out of permanent residence at Perkins

School and back into the "normal" community.

Like Higginson,

who looked for Brown to illicit black violence by stimulating
the courage of emulation, Howe believed a violent effort by

blacks would be their first step out of slavery--a "morally
uplifting" stride into the "normal" community.

Justified

violence and the willingness to fight for freedom were really
keystone virtues among the righteous men and women of the

Anglo-American community.

Parker, Howe, Higginson, and the

rest of the secret committee all agreed that the essence of
by
the American political experience had been freedom earned

the willingness to fight.

blacks with this virtue.

Brown's raid would acquaint the

Brown would demand that blacks make

an effort for their own freedom— something
even Julia Howe

admitted was a prerequisite for black liberation.

In so

doing Brown would break the viscious circle of
environmental

debilitation and begin black assimilation of
culture.

a "superior"

Blacks would then start to exhibit the behavior of

"normal" men—men who lived day-to-day in the marketplace

North.

If exposure to "normal" persons could help the handi-

capped, then exposure to Brown and violence could do much for
the moral sensibilities and social outlook of the black

slave.

John Brown and justified violence would get the slave

"on the road to perfectibility."

The slave would be organ-

ized under the "proper influence." 1

When Howe arrived home in mid- April he found

waiting for him from Brown.

In it,

a letter

the warrior advised him

that all was going well and asked what efforts were being
made to raise the funds promised during the previous spring.
The only thing hindering successful execution of the raid was
a "trifling sum."

Brown used the Missouri raid as a negoti-

ating lever when he noted that the "entire success of our

experiment ought
ist.

1

..."

(I

think)

to convince every 'capital-

The old man was ready to move and Howe sensed

that this time there would be no false starts or Forbes-like

interruptions.

Despite some uneasiness about reports that

Brown had taken property as well as slaves during the
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Missouri venture, Howe began to seek funds
for the "dash"
19
south.

v

II

Just a few days before Kowe arrived in Boston, read
Brown's letter, and began to search for money, the warrior

began his own fund-raising efforts at Gerrit Smith's home.
He appeared at the landowner's Peterboro mansion on April
11,

and almost immediately started analyzing the Missouri raid.

Then he brought Smith up to date on the status of his Vir-

ginia Plan and cautiously inquired about Smith's willingness
to contribute funds to the enterprise.

reluctant to make any commitment.

At first Smith seemed

The only thing he seemed

interested in was a religious discussion.

The philanthropist

hoped to continue the theological debate they had begun one
year earlier, just before Brown revealed his plan to strike
at slavery in the South.

20

Underlying all of Smith's activities for the past two
and a half years was a strong desire to reexamine his per-

sonal religious convictions.

During this period the

Peterboro squire wrote three discourses on the "religion of
reason."

Smith began the whole review process in December

1857, while recuperating from a severe case of typhoid fever

which had hospitalized him in New York City for over two
months.

His illness reenforced an ever-present notion that

he was "ill and destined for an early grave."

When this fear

of his own death was coupled with the phenomena of
religious

revival sweeping the northeast in the spring of 1858, Smith

continued his intense reconsideration of religious principle.

Although he was gravely suspicious of theology (what was
important was the practical application of Christian ethics),
he started writing his first discourse on the "struggle for
a religion of reason" in early January of 1858 and had just

finished the piece when Brown arrived at Peterboro in late

February to unveil his Harpers Ferry project.

Smith intro-

duced his first discourse by suggesting that in America over
the last half century nothing had contributed to a religion

of reason more than the temperance and antislavery movements.

They had "awakened a sense of human dignity and human rights.
Both movements helped dispel the belief that salvation

depended only on believing in doctrines.

Both had shown the

fallacy of believing that it was immeasurably more important
"to have orthodox views in regard to the Trinity, the atone-

ment, and future life than to imbibe in the spirit of Christ.

Smith himself was searching for creeds that would "grow out
of life" and as far as he was concerned "true religion" would

only prevail when men were "judged by their life and character rather than adoption or rejection of creeds."

For Gerrit

Smith reason under God was the final judge of all questions.

2

Yet, despite Smith's radical theological posture, a
as
unique religious symbiosis took place between he and Brown

they waited for Sanborn to arrive in Peterboro.

Smith had
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never really shed much of the Calvinist teaching
of his youth.
And as a result, while he and Brown would
disagree on the
role of the Bible in a man's religious life,
they could agree
on many fundamental spiritual principles. Smith's
"manner of

stating his argument was considerably more terrifying
than
his doctrine."

Indeed, Smith like Brown believed in a God of

Divine Providence and Inspiration, he believed in the necessity of conversion, baptism, communion, and the future life.
Like Brown he also read the Bible regularly and claimed the

priviledge of interpreting it as he saw fit.

The religion of

Gerrit Smith was a blend of radical posturing and traditional
content.

22

In addition,

Smith's religious discourse was something

more than an examination of sacred things.

Religious dis-

cussion with Brown allowed him to vent his radical, lassezfaire, anti-institutional wrath.

Smith seems to have used

their spiritual debate as a vehicle to express certain social
concerns.

The debate appears to be both reality and rubric.

And it is for this reason that Brown was not worried when
Smith diverted his first efforts to discuss the commitment of
funds in April of 1859 by turning instead to notions he was

formulating for his third discourse.

Brown acquiesced because

he realized the Peterboro squire was still caught up in

feverish pietistic speculation and that in the past

such

concerns had helped him compose as much of his social theory
as his religious.

Brown realized that by listening closely

to what Smith now said about "true
religion," he would have

just as accurate an idea of Smith's
willingness to subsidize
insurrection as if Smith had spoken directly on
the subject.
Very soon after Smith had launched into his
newest religious

consideration, it became apparent to Brown that he
would

indeed be able to count on Smith for support.
Smith started the discussion by asserting that he now

believed every individual's religion "must stand in his own
judgment" and that the one standard by which a man must test
his religion was within and not without.

Not only must a

man's conscience be his guide but until it was no legitimate
religious community could be formed.

Smith downplayed the

significance of the Bible, feeling that the individual
"deeply dishonored" God by surrendering his own judgment to
it or the church.

While both might surpass the individual in

wisdom, the individual could not claim credit by simply

adopting that wisdom.

True wisdom (like true courage for

Higginson and true morality for Howe)

"became our own by

being wrought into our convictions and made part of ourselves."
gious.

One became truly religious by acting truly reli-

Smith was calling for an age when men "scorned to

work for party," and age where men should "identify themselves with all mankind and aspire to no lot than their indi-

vidual merits under Heaven's blessing can earn for them."

Through

a

religious metaphor, Smith was propounding radical

individualist views that squared in all essentials with those
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of Brown.

Indeed, the warrior could hardly have missed the

implications for Smith's eventual support of the proposed
"dash" at slavery.

And Brown's intuition about Smith's sup-

port was fully confirmed when the philanthropist began to
develop a less abstract definition of the truly religious
man.

For Smith, the truly religious man was "one who kept

all his passions, appetites and interests in subjugation to

reason."

For the squire from Peterboro there could be "no

greater test of a man's religion."
Brown as just such an individual.

Certainly Smith viewed

After all, Brown had

labored for nearly two years to establish that image with
Smith and the other members of the secret committee.

23

There was another "religious" reason for Brown's opti-

mism about Smith's support.

Smith believed that even the

"most barbarous people" could be christianized if ministered
to by a proper teacher.

He,

like his committee associates

who were concerned about exposure to "normal persons," was
sure that a true man of religion could impart that religion
to others.

At once, Brown could be insurrectionist and secu-

lar missionary.

The man who could pass the greatest test of

religion could surely impart the greatest of all religious
virtue:

control of all "passions, appetites, and interests."

Smith would support Brown for the same reason the others did.
a great
He would support Brown because the man could exert
ul
moral and organizing influence on blacks.
.

24
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After listening to Smith discourse on
religion for the
better part of two days, Brown was sure he
would

be able to

count on the landowner's support.

His assumption was cor-

rect.

When Smith stopped talking and listened as
Brown again
outlined his plan, he expressed complete sympathy
with the
project.

To Brown's repeated contention that black men must

be given the chance to strike for their own freedom, Smith

responded affirmatively by religious analogy.

He noted that

when Jesus saw that men were "enslaved to authority" he realized that the "experience of truth could alone set them
free."

Jesus himself "took men up out of bondage to super-

stition and out of
to authority."

.

.

.

debasing

.

.

.

blinding submission

He threw men "back upon their own consciences

and councilors and demanded they should judge for themselves
.

.

.

what is right."

Jesus' first effort had been to "indi-

vidualize and insulate each man."

Brown himself could not

have made a more eloquent "religious" defense of his position.

25

At the end of their second day of intense private discussions, ones which wove religion and insurrection into the

same fabric, Smith asked Brown to speak before a group of

abolitionists who lived in the area and Brown consented.

At

the gathering the warrior made a stirring (though purpose-

fully vague) appeal for funds to support his "work."

Edwin

Morton attended the meeting and later claimed that Brown's
appeal actually moved Smith to tears.

When Brown had
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finished speaking Smith immediately stood up
and pledged 400
dollars for his support. Then Smith briefly
addressed the
group.

According to Morton, Smith fervently claimed
that if
he were asked "to point out the man in all the world
I

think

most truly Christian,

I

would point out John Brown.

doubted in my own mind as to Captain Brown's course,

I

once

I

now

approve of it heartily having given my mind to it more of
late."

26

Brown left Peterboro appreciative of Smith's contribu-

tion and fully convinced he could count on him for more in
the future.

The warrior stopped briefly at North Elba to

visit his family and then hurried to Boston to promote his
project, obtain funds, and recapture the committee's confi-

dence

.

Once in Boston, Brown sought out the one individual who

had never refused one of his requests, Franklin Benjamin
Sanborn.

The young secretary was most responsive.

Ever

since early January when Sanborn read of Brown's daring

Missouri raid in the New York Tribune

,

he realized the days

of discussing the feasibility of Brown's project were over.
He knew that as soon as Brown got back east he would want the

funds promised to him the previous spring.

Brown had exe-

cuted his part of the bargain to decoy Forbes and would now

expect Boston members of the secret committee to honor their

part of the arrangement.

Sanborn knew also that it was

unlikely that any other incident like the Forbes disclosures

would erupt.

Higginson, Parker, and Howe had handled
Spooner

nicely and Forbes himself hadn't been heard
from for months.
Sanborn was sure of another thing: he would
bear major

responsibility for gathering the "2000 to 3000"
which had
been promised Brown. Parker was leaving for Europe,

Howe was

going on vacation in February and March and Stearns
was
totally absorbed in the financial problems of his
friends.
Since Higginson only responded to Brown, Sanborn knew
the task

would be his and his alone.

He was very anxious. 27

Throughout February, March, and the first three weeks of
April, Sanborn frantically searched for funds.

But during

the first two months of his effort he had little success.

The secretary was hindered by the tight money situation in

Massachusetts, the relative quiet in Kansas, and the need for
secrecy.

By late March he was so desperate that he sought

out George Cabot with the advanced intention of opening the
"whole matter" to him if that was what was necessary to get
funds.

Cabot had contributed 100 Sharpe

'

s

rifles to the

Massachusetts Kansas Committee during the early days of its
existence.

It seemed worth the risk to Sanborn to fully

inform him of Brown's plan in exchange for support.

At the

last moment, however, Sanborn balked and for some unknown

reason found it "not advisable" to enlist Cabot's aid.

By

mid-April, Sanborn had virtually nothing to show for two and
a half months of effort.

Finally, when the secretary visited

Howe shortly after his return from the West Indies, he
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received some promising words about acquiring
finances for
Brown.
Howe said he personally could not be counted
on for
large sums but firmly believed his friend John
Murray Forbes,
the wealthy Boston railroad magnate, would be willing
to make
a substantial contribution if Howe sent him a
strong charac-

ter reference on Brown.

relief.

Sanborn breathed a short sigh of

At least he had some good news for Brown. 28

On April 19, a few days after his visit to Howe's, the

committee secretary hurriedly scratched

Higginson which read:

a

brief note to

"Brown himself is in Boston."

Though

responses to his fund-raising efforts had been poor, Sanborn
was quite relieved to see him.

Soliciting for support was

always easier when Brown appeared in person to make the
request.

Sanborn quickly explained the difficulties he had

encountered.
angry.

Brown claimed to understand but was still quite

After all, the secret committee had promised to sub-

sidize his work.

Eventually the two men decided that Brown

should personally seek funds in other parts of New England
for a few weeks.

While Brown traveled, Sanborn would arrange

29
speaking appearances for him in the Boston area.

For the next three weeks Brown toured New England.

As

he did, he began to sense the real problem Sanborn had in

seeking contributions.

Funds for the antislavery cause had

dried up and he was tremendously disappointed.

Some two

weeks after leaving Boston, Brown received word from Sanborn
that he was to make a speaking appearance in Concord early in

the second week of May.

Brown greeted the news with relief.

Massachusetts abolitionists had been generous
in the
he hoped this would again be the case. 30

past, and

Brown appeared in Concord with one of his recruits,

Jeremiah Anderson, and spoke to virtually the same
gathering
that he addressed two years earlier.

But again his much pub-

licized visit was a dramatic success and financial failure.
He obtained only a small sum from his appreciative Concord

listeners.

Just why Concord citizens received Brown so

warmly and gave so little is difficult to determine.

Cer-

tainly they were not exempt from the financial toll of eco-

nomic panic.

But by the spring of 1859 the effects of panic

had begun to wear off and a tight money supply doesn't seem
to have been the major reason for their reluctance to give.

Most likely, Brown's Concord audience was uncertain about how
the warrior would use the money and about what he proposed to

do to end slavery

— Brown

was vague on both counts.

Alcott expressed this sentiment best.

Bronson

He claimed Brown left

his Concord friends "much in the dark concerning his destina-

tion and designs for the coming months" but "did not conceal
his hatred for slavery nor his readiness to strike a blow for

freedom."

Brown's most perceptive listeners may also have

noticed that he was more enthused and less controlled than
during his first visit to Concord.
wary.

This may have made them

Still, despite Brown's intensified tone, Alcott con-

tinued to regard Brown as "the manliest man" he had ever

"
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seen.

The warrior was "the type and synonym
for the

31
Just. JA

In view of the financial failure at
Concord, Frank

Sanborn was extremely pleased that Samuel Gridley
Howe made
good on his promise to enlist the aid of John
Murray Forbes.

Very soon after the Concord visit Brown was on his
way to
meet Forbes with a letter of reference from Howe.

In the

letter Howe described Brown as a man who could "deliver
our
land from the curse of slavery," and praised the warrior for

being "of the Puritan militant order."

Howe recommended that

Forbes assist Brown because he was "an enthusiast, yet cool,

keen and cautious."

Forbes should also bear in mind that

Brown had a "martyr's spirit" and would ask "nothing but the

pledge to keep to yourself what he may say."

The recommenda-

tion combined with the short speech Brown gave to clergymen

gathered at the Forbes home greatly impressed the railroad
magnate.

But he was judicious with his funds and gave only

100 dollars to Brown for "travelling expenses."

warrior left Forbes' home, however,

a

Before the

representative of the

ministers approached him and pressed five twenty-dollar gold
pieces into his palm.

32

Despite Howe's favorable letter to Forbes and his

intense personal desire to answer questions about black capabilities, friction developed between the doctor and Brown

soon after the Forbes meeting.

Howe really never forgave

Brown for the role he had been forced to play the previous

spring.

Brown's indiscretion made it necessary
for Howe to
lie to his friends and the doctor didn't
like it.
He alone
bore responsibility for putting Wilson and Sumner
"off the
track" and the effort still left a bitter taste
in his mouth.

For months Howe had been deeply impressed by the
values and

character of Brown— impressed by his discipline, control,
and
efficiency.

Now, one year later, the doctor was still upset

by Brown's apparent failure to live by the very principles
he

had initially seemed to embody.
fiasco were unforgivable.

Mistakes like the Forbes

Howe was also made uneasy by a

slight change he perceived in Brown's tone and temper-men t.
The doctor sensed a subtle difference in the day-to-day man-

ner of the "cool enthusiast" which irritated him further.
Brown seemed overly excitable, exceptionally nervous, and at
times unbearably imperious.

He seemed absorbed by considera-

tions quite apart from his immediate surroundings.

He seemed

too easily upset by criticism and repeatedly, almost mechan-

istically, quoted Scripture to quell any doubts expressed by
his supporters.

This kind of behavior deeply disturbed Howe.

The blind biblical spoutings and stronge disembodied aura

about Brown hinted at

a loss of control.

chastising himself for such behavior.

Howe was forever

He liked it even less

.33

in a man who was about to incite a slave insurrection.

The friction between these two men actually resulted in
a minor confrontation over the tactics Brown used during his

Missouri raid.

Howe balked at Brown's seemingly cavalier
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attitude toward the theft of slaveholder's property
during
the run-off.

Stealing slaves was one thing.

But stealing

the physical property of the slaveholder was entirely
differ-

ent.

Howe kept remembering the Hamptons.

The doctor and

warrior actually exchanged heated words over the issue.
Brown claimed he

v/as

right in taking property earned at the

expense of slavery and muttered a scriptural justification of
his acts.

Howe responded by reasserting his own view and

claiming he was entirely unimpressed by men who quoted Scripture to cover unlawful activity.

Theft was theft.

34

But even if uncertainty and anger caused Howe to doubt
Brown, the physician did not withdraw his support from the

proposed insurrection.

Concern about Brown's competence and

unresolved ambivalence about violence (masquerading as

a

worry about slaveholder's property) did not drive him away
from the plan.

There were too many new and unanswered ques-

tions buzzing in Howe's head about antislavery reform and the

nature of the black man once freed from slavery.

Brown's

intended strike was one of the ways in which these and other
questions could begin to be answered.

And there were other

reasons for continued support of the warrior.

During that

spring Howe wrote to Charles Sumner and noted the "importance
and duty of giving the fullest and finest scope to individ-

uals."

Each man must be encouraged to "work with his own

weapons in his own way."
God's providence.

3^

To allow this, implied

a

faith in

When Howe reflected on his experience with
Brown during
the past two years he realized much of the warrior's
erratic

behavior had been stimulated by not being allowed to
fight
for the freedom of the slave "with his own weapons"
and "in

his own way."
tration.

Brown's imperiousness was a product of frus-

Perhaps if he was given "the fullest and finest

scope" for his activities, black men all over the South would

rally to his banner.

Then, too, Howe once again reflected on

traditional political efforts to end slavery.
failed.

They had all

Indeed, political currents seemed to be "drifting

toward the destruction of the Republican Party."

Much as he

wanted to have faith in that party, by the spring of 1859

,

Howe believed strongly that it had contributed to its own
demise.

Any party "based on the principle of progress and

reform" must die away when "it ceased to call for any prog-

ress."

The antislavery movement had failed to extinguish

slavery and so had the Republican Party.
turn except to a man like Brown?

Where was one to
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During the weeks Brown spent in Boston he also met with
George Luther Stearns on

a

number of occasions.

Their most

memorable public exchange took place at the Bird Club, an
informal gathering of Massachusetts politicians, literati and

businessmen who regularly met at the Parker House.

Here,

before the many distinguished members of the club, Brown pre-

sented Stearns with the pearl-handled Bowie knife he took
from Henry Clay Pate at Black Jack.

The gesture deeply moved

.
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Stearns, though he was mildly upset by the
warrior's presentation speech. When Brown gave him the knife
he said he did
so with the thought that the two of them would
probably

"never meet again in this world."

Brown hoped Stearns would

accept the gift as a "token of his gratitude" and claimed
that in the future the knife might have some "little
historic

value."
Stearns.

The obvious fatalism in Brown's words disturbed

For months he had been led to believe that, though

there was a chance Brown would be killed, Brown fully

expected to come away from his venture alive and ready to
command a mountain fortress full of black men.

Stearns was

also disturbed by the angry exchange that took place between

Brown and Henry Wilson after the presentation.

Wilson was

intensely distressed by the Missouri raid and made it clear
that he "did not approve" of it.

rebuff from Brown.

His censure drew a sharp

Stearns was shocked by the vehemence of

Wilson's comments and realized for the first time what his

relationship with Brown might mean for his future standing in
the political abolitionist community of Massachusetts.

Still,

Stearns' uneasiness did not prompt him to pull back from sup-

porting the Kansas warrior.

When Brown left Boston he did so

with 1200 dollars which had been contributed by the Medford

businessmen
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Whether by mere chance or Brown's careful planning, one
incident which occurred in late May did

a

great deal to bol-

ster the confidence of Howe, Stearns, Higginson, and Sanborn

in the project.

Harriet Tubman, the black woman whose under-

ground railroad activities were legendary, appeared
in Boston
to support Brown.
Tubman's visit seemed to buttress what the
Kansas warrior had claimed all along:

once the insurrection

was started southern slaves could depend on the support of
their free northern black brethren.

impressed by the imposing woman.

Sanborn was particularly

He immediately notified

Higginson of her presence and asked him to come to Boston.
The minister would be "amazed" at the rescue stories she
told.

The secretary also hoped Tubman's appearance would

prompt Higginson to tap the Worcester County Committee funds

which both he and Brown had been pursuing for months.
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Higginson did travel to Boston to speak with the powerful Canadian black woman and after listening to her descrip-

tions of eight railroad trips to the South, he was indeed

"amazed."

Her "tales of adventure" were beyond anything in

fiction and her "ingenuity" was extraordinary.
to Boston did more than strengthen Higginson

's

But the trip

belief in

As he saw the efforts being made for Brown

Brown's project.

by Stearns, Sanborn, and Howe, the Worcester activist became
less critical of their decision to postpone the plan during

the previous May.

Now they all seemed very interested in

keeping their promise to raise funds for the venture and even
showed some confidence that the whole effort would succeed.
In particular, Higginson became more charitable toward

Sanborn who

v/as

again playing a very active role in Brown's

.
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behalf.

As a sign of this new-found respect
for the young

secretary's exertions, Higginson promised
to stop in Concord
during July to evaluate the progressive
educational program

Sanborn and his sister Sarah had devised for
the children of
39
the town

Ill

After having collected almost 2000 dollars from secret
committee members and other New Englanders who knew little
or

nothing of his proposed plan, John Brown left Boston on June
3,

1859,

for the last time.

He was generally pleased by his

fund-raising efforts and felt that "final arrangements" could
be made for the Harpers Ferry raid.

He confided to Sanborn

(who most certainly conveyed the message to the other commit-

tee members)

that he expected to be "on the ground" as soon

as possible and hoped to begin operations "by July 4th."

Brown seemed optimistic.

He had funds,

arms, a crew of fine

men, and continued hopes of "recruiting people from Harriet

Tubman's ranks."

On his way to New York City, the warrior

stopped at Collinsville

,

Connecticut and made the last pay-

ment on the 1000 steel pikes he had ordered from blacksmith
Charles Blair two years earlier.

Everything seemed ready.
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From his Peterboro mansion Gerrit Smith carefully followed the proceedings in Boston that spring.

As he did,

intensity of his commitment to Brown and insurrection
increased.

Before Brown left Boston the Peterboro squire

the

forwarded an additional 200 dollars for
his "Kansas work."
But Smith's commitment is reflected by
more than the allocation of funds.
He had just finished working
on his third

religious discourse and the degree of influence
Brown had on
him is clearly indicated in the tract. For
three years Brown
had been telling Smith that he felt a divine
inspiration,
a

mission to free slaves and overthrow slavery.

For the same

length of time Smith had just as vigorously advocated
a

"religion of reason" which emphasized man and conscience not
doctrine, the Bible, or God's providential manipulation of

human events.

Now in June, 1859, Smith made a revealing the-

ological concession to Brown.

Before submitting his final

discourse for publication, Smith felt compelled to incorporate the notion of divine inspiration into his own religious
theory in a way which significantly departed from his previous treatments of the concept.

In his third discourse he

asked whether or not reason alone was sufficient to achieve
"true religion" and answered that it was not.

Smith asserted

that "unless Divine influence" upon men was increasing there

could be no "true religion."

Enlightened reason was vain

unless there was also a "God-given spirit of submission to
its control."

Reason and will were vain unless man allowed

"his maker to work in him."

Man must let Heaven dispose him

to put his physical, mental, and moral powers to "heavenly

use."

Certainly these notions about inspiration can be

interpreted in many ways.

They may be seen as just another

280

manifestation of Smith's desire to maintain
certain wellestablished Calvinist concepts while
advocating a radical
religion of reason.
it has already been shown that
during
Smith's religious perambulations he always
held to
certain

basic Calvinist tenets.

And Smith was never one to worry

about maintaining seemingly antithetical
positions at the
same time. Yet, it also seems that Smith's
need to discuss
inspiration and the emphasis he accorded it is
reflective of
both Brown's argumentation and Smith's view of him
as the

"greatest living Christian."

Smith's support of Brown was

based primarily on his regard for the warrior's individualist
values, on Brown's control, discipline, and ability to

"restrain passions and appetite."

But, at least in part,

it

was also premised on a belief in Brown's assertions of his

....

own providential instrumentality.
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Smith indicated the strength of his support for Brown

more fully in the months ahead, particularly in the way he

handled his annual invitation to speak at the Jerry Rescue
commemorative

ceremonies on October

1,

at Syracuse.

When

the invitation was submitted to Smith in late August he

declined to speak.

The refusal was extraordinary.

Smith had

participated in the rescue effort and had always used the
ceremony to elaborate his abolitionist views.

The speeches

he gave in the years following the attempt were harbingers
for his continually shifting thoughts on the direction in

which abolitionism should be moving.

In 1856,

for instance,
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he used the occasion to lash
out at the moral decadence of
southern slaveholders, claiming they
were victims of "a total
delusion" which had been endorsed by
most of the churches and
clergy of the country. Slavery was
ruining the slaveholder
"soul and body for time and eternity." 42

But in August of 1859, Smith shocked and
disappointed
many who had shared the occasion with him
previously
by

asserting that it was "unwise to repeat the
farce any longer."
The rescue attempt had been a noble effort.
Its participants
had had their "humanity up" when they acted to
resist Jerry's
arrest.

They understood there could be no law for slavery.

But as far as Smith was concerned, it was now time to
again
"let

.

.

.

professions make room for practice."

People who

talked well for slavery should stand aside for those who

would vote well against it.

Actually, Smith pushed aboli-

tionists to do more than vote.

He went on to suggest that

any declarations which were made against forcible resistance
to the laws of slavery were "senseless."

It was to instances

of forcible resistance that nations were "indebted" for their

"greatest progress."

American government was in rebellion

against the "right of every innocent man to his personal liberty."

Indeed, it was because of this rebellion against jus-

tice that the New York abolitionist felt it might be "too

late to bring slavery to an end by peaceful means
to vote it down."

— too

Rather, it must "go out in blood."

late
In

Smith's opinion there was not enough virtue left in white men
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for them to vote slavery down.

Blacks had "come to despair

accomplishment of this work by white
people." The feeling
among blacks was that they must
deliver themselves and it was
a feeling that "gained strength
with fearful rapidity."

There was no resource left to black
men but "God and insurrection. " Smith then promised that
white Americans could
look for insurrections "any year, any
month, any day."
Insurrection was a "terrible remedy" but
it was necessary to
overcome a "terrible wrong." Even an abortive
uprising would
have an effect.
It would fill the South with horror
and

startle northern moral sensibilities.

Smith closed his let-

ter with a warning to all those who took his
remarks lightly.
He was "not a lying prophet— another Cassandra."

ers' blood would be shed

— soon. 43

Slavehold-
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CHAPTER VIII
Before John Brown left Boston for his
base of operations, he promised to start his insurrectionary
thrust by

Independence Day.

But once he arrived at Chambersburg,

Pennsylvania, he realized that the promise would
be impossible to keep.

There were good reasons to delay the raid.

None of the Canadian or northern radical abolitionists
who

had hinted they might be willing to join him came south
and

when Brown revealed that he wanted to instigate

a

full-scale

attack on the federal arsenal at Harpers Ferry some of the
men he had recruited began to grumble.
self became extremely cautious.

Then, too, Brown him-

Throughout the summer he

continually postponed the attack for fear that he did not
have enough intelligence information.

financial problems.

These delays caused

Maintenance costs for the small cadre of

recruits and his payment to Charles Blair all but depleted
the funds he had received in Boston that spring.

By early

August he again pressed Sanborn for money so that his "operations" would not be delayed.

He also sent John Jr.

to seek

further support from George Luther Stearns.^"
Sanborn received Brown's request and immediately wrote
to Higginson asking for assistance.

Sanborn claimed to take

great pleasure in hearing that the warrior had completed the
first phase of his "business" and pleaded with Higginson to

284

help him make up 300 dollars so as not to thwart final
execution of the plan.

But by the first week in September, the

committee secretary hadn't come close to raising the amount

Brown desired.

Samuel Gridley Howe did send 50 dollars south

and then started scurrying around Boston looking for more
money.

Higginson could only raise 25 dollars for Brown.

When Sanborn pressed him for more, the minister became infuriated by the implication that he was somehow shirking his
duty.

At the same time that Sanborn looked for funds Stearns

listened to John Jr.'s pleas for assistance.

Stearns told

him that he had the "fullest confidence" in his father "no

matter what the outcome of his efforts," but the Medford
businessman refused to give anymore money.

Finally, in the

third week of September, Sanborn sent 50 dollars to

Chambersburg along with an apologetic note explaining why he
was unable to raise the full sum Brown had requested.

2

For the next two weeks Sanborn continued to search discreetly for funds.

On October 6, that search ended when

Sanborn met and interviewed young Francis Merriam, the emotionally erratic nephew of the distinguished Boston abolitionist, Francis Jackson.

Merriam was obsessed with the

thought of joining Brown and asked Sanborn to give him specific information about the warrior's plans.

He already knew

a good deal about the scheme because of his friendship with

James Repath.

At first, Sanborn balked.

But when Merriam

offered to contribute 600 dollars to the effort if he were
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allowed to participate in it, the committee
secretary reconsidered the request. Sanborn quickly summoned
George Luther
Stearns and Lewis Hayden to Concord to assist
him in making
the decision.

During the evening of October

morning hours of October

7

,

6

and the early

all three men rigorously ques-

tioned Merriam about his motives for wanting to join up with

Brown and the personal qualifications he had for assisting
the scheme.

Merriam said he had traveled with Repath in 185 7

and 1858 as the journalist gathered information for his book

Talks w ith Slaves

.

In spite of these experiences neither

Sanborn, Stearns nor Hayden were impressed with the unstable

youth.

But all of them knew of Brown's desperate need for

cash. Merriam might not be qualified to participate in the pro-

ject but the money he would contribute insured execution of the

plan. Eventually, they all decided to send him to Chambersburg

Within a few days Sanborn received a note from Merriam
indicating that he had joined Brown, turned over the 600 dollars and patiently awaited the "business operation" that was
to commence Saturday, October 15.

enthused.

Sanborn was tremendously

Later, when he received a letter from Higginson

complaining about Brown's failure to execute the plan and

questioning the wisdom of sending Merriam south, he felt so
confident that Brown was about to begin the venture that he
boldly criticized Higginson for his doubts.

Sanborn asked

Higginson if they had "seen so little print" from Brown's
labors "that we should distrust

...

his valor?"

Hadn't

'58."
Brown "saved Kansas in '56 and wounded Missouri in
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There was absolutely no reason to doubt
Brown.
also met Higginson 's criticism of Merriam
with

matured cynicism.

The secretary
a

highly

Merriam had not been chosen because of any

"great passion for Repath" or belief in the
youth's personal

capacity.

Sanborn agreed that Merriam was about "as fit to

be in the enterprise as the Devil to keep a powder
house."

Merriam had been selected only because of the money he
could
contribute to the project.

Sanborn reminded Higginson that

"everything has its use and must be put to it if possible."
Then, after informing Higginson that news could soon be

expected from the site of Brown's activity, the secretary

concluded his letter with a brief lecture on one of the most
important lessons he had learned in the past few years.
Sanborn told Higginson that he never expected much from anybody but believed there was "a grain of use in all persons
and things."

When a plum dropped in one's mouth, one

shouldn't refuse to eat it because it wasn't "a peach or
pumpkin."

a

Francis Merriam might not be "Divine property"

but he was a "plum" and had his use.

4

By Monday, October 17, a few days after he received

Sanborn's note Higginson was forced to agree.

been useful.

Merriam had

His money had primed an explosion at Harpers

Ferry, Virginia.

Reports circulated in Worcester about an

attack on the federal armory in that small southern town and

Higginson was thrilled.

In fact, he thought of rushing south

to assist Brown and claimed he would have done it if it
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weren't for his wife's poor health.

He considered Brown's

venture the "most formidable insurrection"
that ever
occurred, felt there was "great capacity
and

skill" behind

it,

and was sure it would weaken the Slave Power.

in the

past nothing had so strengthened the institution
of slavery
as the black man's "timid submission."

Now, as Higginson

heard the first, sketchy, reports of the raid, he was
confident that such submissiveness was ended.

If this new assert-

ive attitude was coupled to "constant communication with

Canada" it would teach blacks "self-importance and resistance."

Since first reports of the raid were incomplete,

Higginson eagerly awaited Brown's retreat to the mountains
where he would establish
Jamaica.

a

Maroon colony, like those in

Hoping to publicize the positive effect that such

a fortress community would have on blacks and at the same

time discreetly link himself to Brown among those abolitionists who were not already aware of the connection, Higginson

wrote James Russell Lowell at the Atlantic Monthly asking if
he could do an article about the Maroons of Surinam and

Jamaica-- "suggested by the late Virginia affair."^
The minister's initial optimism was soon replaced by

utter dejection because further reports from Virginia indicated the raid had failed.

After quickly joining Howe, John

Andrew, and others in forming a defense committee for Brown,
the minister spent the next week reading newspaper accounts

of the attack and carefully gauging the impact it had on
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northern public opinion.

In a speech given at Brimley Hall

in Worcester on October 25, the day
Brown's trial began,

Higginson claimed that "nine out of ten of
the republic of
Worcester sympathize with the insurrection and
only regretted
that Captain Brown was not successful." Despite
this bold
claim Higginson knew that in Worcester there was
less enthu-

siasm for insurrection than the man who attempted it.

People

were unsure about the act even though they had a strong,
personal sympathy for Brown himself.

predicament upon the minister.

This situation forced a

On one hand, he knew that

given such tremendous popular sympathy Brown's martyrdom

would be a powerful spur to antislavery sentiment.

On the

other, Higginson himself had very strong feelings that he

should make some kind of effort at rescue.

Higginson

's

ambivalence is fully reflected in his emotional response to
his mother's scoldings about the failure of Massachusetts

abolitionists to do anything to secure Brown's release.

Higginson told his mother that of course he thought about
Brown's plight but claimed he didn't feel certain the warrior's "acquittal or rescue would do half as much as his

being executed."

He assured his mother that a defense com-

mittee was doing all it could for Brown.
counsel and even sent

a

They had provided

young Athol lawyer named George Hoyt

to assist Brown and to act as a liaison with his Massachusetts

supporters.

Beyond such help no way seemed open for anything.

There was "no chance for forcible assistance and next to none
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for strategem."

The minister had never seen a
situation more
impractical for rescue. 6

Higginson was torn between the desire to
make
attempt in spite of its impracticality and
,

a rescue

the desire to

exploit Brown's death for the cause of abolition.

No doubt

he remembered the advice of Wendell Phillips
and Albert

Browne in the wake of the Burns rescue attempt.

At that time

the two men told him to shake off any despair
about the fail-

ure of his efforts.

Burns rendition was a secondary matter.

What was essential was Higginson* s effective use of the
issue
to influence popular opinion against the Fugitive Slave
Law.

Higginson had been involved with the tactics of abolition
long enough to understand the effect Brown's death would have
on the mind of the northern white community, abolitionist and

non-abolitionist alike.

While no specific documentation

exists to prove the contention, it also seems certain that at

least a small portion of Higginson 's willingness to subsidize

Brown was based on this realization.

After the Burns affair

there can be no question Higginson clearly understood that

a

failed abolitionist effort often did as much for the cause as
a

successful one.

He said as much in a letter to John Jr.

shortly after the raid aborted.
that his father

"

Higginson told young Brown

had failed in his original effort only to

succeed in a greater result

7
.

It has been suggested that Thomas Wentworth Higginson

denied John Brown by never again admitting what he had when
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first reports of the attack filtered
into Worcester, namely,
that the warrior's actions were directed
at inciting
the

"most formidable slave insurrection ever."

He has been crit-

icized for waiting a long time to make even

a

veiled attempt

to explain the absence of a slave uprising
at Harpers Ferry.

But this so-called denial becomes more understandable
as we

examine Higginson's awareness of the way in which northern

public opinion responded to Brown.

Higginson's overriding

concern in the days after Harpers Ferry was to exploit the

personal sympathy that welled up for Brown and was fueled by
his heroic trial behavior.

As Higginson saw it, his primary

task and that of other northern abolitionists was to promote

Brown's character and play down the act of insurrection.

Tactically this was simply a variation on the same theme used
by Howe, Parker,

and Phillips when they attempted to remove

Edward Loring from his probate judgeship after the Burns rendition.

Higginson knew that many northerners had not accepted

the justification of violence and insurrection; therefore it

was necessary to evoke their empathy by personalizing the
issue.

It was not insurrection which was justified but

Brown's character.

In this way Brown could do "more than

Sumner or Kansas to re-awaken antislavery agitation."

John

Andrew, the abolitionist lawyer and state representative,

made the point most clearly in an address to abolitionists
who gathered at Tremont Temple shortly after Brown's sentencing in early November.

Andrew claimed not to consider

"whether the enterprise of John Brown
and his associates in
Virginia was wise or foolish, right or
wrong." He only knew
that "whether the enterprise was one or
the other, John Brown
himself was right." Like Higginson and other
noted abolitionists, Andrew claimed to sympathize with
the man and the
idea, because he believed in "eternal right."

He never said

anything about sympathizing with the actuality of
insurrection.

II

Julia Howe read about Brown's raid in the Boston Transcript.

When she told her husband, he is said to have casu-

ally replied, "Brown has got to work."

That simple assertion

belied Howe's tremendous inner turmoil over the seemingly
disastrous results of the attack.

This turmoil flared into

panic on Wednesday, October 19, when an investigation uncov-

ered letters written to Brown by Howe and the other members
of the secret committee at the Chambersburg headquarters.

While Howe claimed to be confident that Brown wouldn't com-

promise himself or those dealing with him, he couldn't help

remembering the Forbes fiasco.

During the weeks following

Brown's arrest, the doctor was virtually paralyzed by the
fear of being implicated in the venture.

Although he joined

Higginson, John Andrew, and others in setting up a defense

committee for Brown, his apprehension prompted vehement oppo-

sition to even the discussion of using extra-legal efforts to
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gain the warrior's release.

And the fear also forced Howe
to

become excessively dependent on the
advice of Frank Sanborn.
This dependence is ironic because
Sanborn was quite as
unnerved by the whole episode as the doctor. 9
In February 1858, shortly after leaving
Smith's home

with Brown's newly revealed plan ringing
in his ears, Frank
Sanborn received a short letter from Edwin
Morton.

In the

note Morton recounted a curious experience
with Brown.

It

seems that shortly after Sanborn left Peterboro,
Brown asked

Morton whether he would mind accompanying him on
ning walk.

Morton said he'd be happy to.

a

short eve-

After walking side

by side through drifts of freshly fallen snow for some time,

Morton began to daydream and lost consciousness that Brown
was walking with him.

Then when he realized what he had done

and he turned to apologize to Brown for allowing his mind to
wander, Morton found that he was indeed walking alone.

turned around to look for his companion and saw Brown
yards

behind him.

He
a few

The warrior was alternately looking at

the fresh imprints his boots made in the snow and the untrod-

den expanse that lay before him.

After a few moments of

silence, Brown looked thoughtfully backwards where his and

Morton's footprints lay uncovered in the snow, he turned to

Morton and spoke slowly, "I like to see my tracks behind me."
Morton felt like he was in the presence of

a man

"leave tracks in the snows of centuries."

And Sanborn heart-

ily agreed.

who would

After Harpers Ferry, however, Sanborn was
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considerably less sentimental about the
"tracks" Brown left
behind.
Those "tracks" were incriminating letters

from him-

self, Howe, Stearns, and Smith which were
left in a leather

sachel at the Chambersburg farm house Brown had
used as his
base of operations. They led all the way back
to
Boston,

Peterboro, and the Secret Committee of Six. 10
On October 19, many newspapers carried the first full

account of the contents of the sachel.

In it there were two

letters from Sanborn, a note from Gerrit Smith, and an envelope addressed to Brown from Howe.

Sanborn were dated September

4

The two letters from

and 23, and contained drafts

for 50 and 55 dollars respectively.

In the draft sent on

September 23 Sanborn told Brown he was "glad to hear all
goes well and is so ready for business."

Even more disheart-

ening to Sanborn and the other committee members was the New
York Herald

s
[

published report on the questioning of Brown's

men about northern assistance.

The Herald noted that all of

prisoners stories were the same except for "Young Brown."

He

answered a question about whether or not his father had
received support from radical northern abolitionists by saying there were "parties in the North connected with this

movement „11
4.

Sanborn was very distraught when he read these reports.
Late in the afternoon on Wednesday (the same day the account

was printed) he rushed to Stearns' home in Medford to decide

what action he should take to prevent the inevitability of

.
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arrest.

After consultations which lasted into
the early
morning hours on Thursday, October 20, the
two conspirators
decided to seek the assistance of Stearns' legal
counsel,

John Andrew.

In their meeting with Andrew both men
wanted

to know if they were liable to arrest in
Massachusetts for

their complicity with Brown, though they did not give Andrew
the "full particulars" of what that complicity entailed.

Since Andrew was uncertain about what the two men had actu-

ally done, he was only able to give vague answers to their

questions.

Stearns and Sanborn became more upset.

As a pre-

cautionary measure against arrest, they decided to run to

Canada for safety.

Late Thursday afternoon they boarded a

cargo ship bound for Quebec.

One day later they arrived in

Canada
Once in Canada, however, the two secret committee mem-

bers began

to have second thoughts about their flight.

Both

Sanborn and Stearns feared arrest and fled Boston hoping to
avoid it but during their stay they began to see how panic
had intensified the threat.

At the same time they attempted

to rationalize their behavior by claiming that they only left

Massachusetts to keep the size of Brown's effort concealed.
By so doing, both the reach and character of the raid would
be "exaggerated."

While in Quebec the two conspirators

received further disheartening news about their legal position.

views.

Wendell Phillips sent

a

detailed analysis of Andrew's

According to Phillips, the lawyer now believed
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Stearns' and Sanborn's complicity could be regarded
as treason.

These words shattered both men.

A year earlier they

were certain that such treason would be considered
patriotism
by most northerners.

Now they were confused about where they

should be, uncertain about what they should do and doubtful
about support from the citizens of Massachusetts.

It seemed

that treason would not be considered patriotism. 13
Phillips' letter did contain some information that gave

them hope.

Andrews felt that if they were arrested for trea-

sonous activity they could only be "tried in the district

where the acts had been committed."

This advice, coupled

with Higginson's urging that they come home immediately,

a

tearse note from Emerson suggesting the same thing, and their
own worries about running away, prompted a return to Boston
on October 26 just six days after they had started their

panic-stricken flight.

They arrived home just in time to

read newspaper accounts of Brown's stoic trial behavior.

Unquestionably, the guilt they already felt was compounded by
the warrior's heroic posture.

But that guilt was not enough

to prevent either man from further flights,

further denials

of complicity, further rationalizations, and further panicked

discussions about the possibility of arrest.

14

In Worcester, Thomas Wentworth Higginson was shamed and

angered by the dichotomy between Brown's behavior and that
of his fellow conspirators.

more than

a

He saw their actions as nothing

shabby re-enactment of the cowardice that

characterized their activity during the Forbes
disclosures.
The same patterns of moral self-righteousness
and non-

existant physical courage were appearing once
again.
Higginson didn't like it.

And

In fact, he was so outraged that

he began to re-enact some behavior patterns of
his own.

This

time he decided to do more than boycott a few meetings
to

show his displeasure.

This time he tried to completely dis-

sociate himself from his fellow committee members.

This time

he would separate himself by more than a few stinging words
in the Atlantic Monthly

.

Though he fully realized the impor-

tance of Brown's death to the antislavery movement and though

knew the logistical impracticality of any rescue effort,

Higginson began toying with the idea of rescue.

It was his

way of divorcing himself from Sanborn and Stearns and atoning
for the dishonor their acts brought to the committee.

Years

later, Higginson claimed he acted because he would have been

"ashamed of doing nothing for Brown."

But during the last

days of October, as Brown's trial proceeded to its inevitable

conclusion, the minister thought of rescue less out of shame
for having done nothing to help Brown, than out of shame at

being associated with the other members of the Secret Commitc
tee off Six.
.

15

As Brown's trial ended on November

2

and he was sen-

tenced to hang one month later, Higginson began

attempt to free the warrior
tion.

—a

a

"mock"

symbolic gesture of dissocia

He traveled to North Elba ostensibly to pick up Mary
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Brown and bring her back to Boston
from where she was to
begin the journey to her husband's
side in Charles town.
Higginson actually made his trip to the
Brown homestead for
a far different reason.
He hoped to persuade Mary Brown
to
argue the case for rescue with her husband
who up

until then

had steadfastly spurned all such suggestions.

The minister

was counting on a plea from Mary to change
Brown's mind and
convince him that escape was still desirable.
Even if Brown

refused Mary's request, Higginson knew her visit
wouldn't be
wasted.
It was sure to "evoke sympathy." 16
On November

Higginson.

4

Mary Brown arrived in Boston with

She was warmly greeted by many prominent members

of the Massachusetts abolitionist community at a reception
in the American House hotel arranged by Sanborn, Stearns, and

Howe.

Early the next day she departed for New York City

accompanied by George Hoyt, who had recently returned from
Virginia, Thomas Russell, and Higginson.

When the group

reached the city, Higginson turned around and headed back to
Worcester.

The others continued on to Philadelphia where

Higginson had arranged for Mary to be met by J. Miller McKim
who was to accompany her to Charleston.

But soon after his

return, Higginson received a telegram from George Sennot

another young Massachusetts lawyer sent to Virginia by
Brown's Boston defense committee.

Sennot told Higginson that

Brown had been informed of his wife's pending visit and did
no t want to see her.

The warrior felt certain the meeting
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would only distract Mary's mind and add
to his own "affliction." He didn't feel a visit could
possibly do any
good.

Higginson immediately notified McKim, explained
Brown's
reluctance to see his wife, and asked that Mary

not be taken

south.

17

Higginson doubted that Brown's desire to see Mary was

merely a "matter of sentiment."

It occurred to the minister

that Brown might be worried about her being called as a witness in the pending trials of others caught in the raid.

Higginson also felt something other than Mary's well-being
prompted Brown's refusal to see her.

Mary Brown might not

only be distracted she might also distract.
ance might disrupt the image of Brown as

a

Mary's appearsolitary warrior

struggling against the institution of slavery.

Higginson now

strongly sensed that Brown knew (better than anyone) the

implication of his own martyrdom.

Brown's composure at the

trial and his consistent refusal to save himself by pleading

insanity or contemplating rescue, all led Higginson to wonder
at the "mysteriously inept" handling of the raid.

Brown's

veto of Mary's visit stimulated that wonder even more.

Higginson was now certain that Brown fully understood how
much a failed attempt at insurrection could mean to abolition, and his own historical identity.

A failed attempt

could mean as much as a successful one--perhaps more.

It

could mean that others would see Brown's "tracks" in the
snows of centuries, that the further inscriptions on the
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Brown family gravestone would have meaning
and that there
would be no speculation about the historical
significance of
his gift of Pate's knife to Stearns.
For a failed

ex-businessman martyrdom at Harpers Ferry could
mean success,
in the wake of an inglorious string of failures. 18
Soon after the effort to send Mary Brown to Charleston

had failed, Higginson wrote a short note to the Brown
children explaining what had happened.

He told them of their

father's reluctance to consider escape but suggested that

something might still be done for him.

Higginson claimed

that there was always a possibility their father would change
his mind once he realized his sentence would not be commuted.

But there can be little doubt that Higginson made such

remarks only to bolster the children's spirits.
November, the minister
his mind.

By early

fully realized Brown would not change

He never mentioned it to the children but

Higginson knew their father wanted to die. 19
In addition to the minister's sense of Brown's wish, two

letters further reinforced his conviction about the impracti-

cality of rescue.

On November

7

Higginson received a note

from John LeBarnes, a former Kansas freedom fighter, who had

traveled to Charleston to check on the feasibility of rescue.
LeBarnes told Higginson that the whole idea of escape was the
furthest thing from Brown's mind.
ten to it.

The warrior would not lis-

Six days after receiving the LeBarnes

Higginson heard from James Repath.

letter,

The journalist's note
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convinced Higginson that his
assumptions about Brown and martyrdom were correct and all but
ended his flirtation with
rescue.
Repath wrote from Baltimore where
he had traveled in
search of members of the raiding party
who had
not been cap-

tured.

He told Higginson that he heard
rumors about a

planned rescue attempt and expressed
surprise that anyone
would undertake such a scheme. Repath didn't
want
Brown

freed.

He didn't have the faintest hope that
the warrior

would escape from martyrdom.
abolition.

Brown's death meant too much to

Repath himself had already begun the effort to

enhance the warrior's reputation.

As soon as

"Old B was in

heaven" the journalist intended to publish a biography which

would glorify Brown's martyrdom and quietly repudiate "the
notion that his wrongs in Kansas had any influence on his

present movements."

Such notions cheapened the Harpers Ferry

attack and degraded Brown "from the position of Puritan (warring for his Lord) to a guerrilla chief of vindictive man-

ner

,,20
"
.

Higginson understood the implication of "Old B's" martyrdom.

He understood the catalytic effect Brown's death

would have on northern antislavery sentiment.

He understood

Brown's repeated refusal to cooperate with rescue efforts was

based on

a

complete understanding of his martyrdom's impact.

He knew of the near strategic impossibility of actually

breaking the warrior out of jail.
ning.

Yet, he continued plan-

Higginson did so in direct response to his fellow
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conspirators who continued to behave in ways
which angered
and disturbed him. Making such efforts,
even if they were
ritualistic, provided a dramatic way in which
to dissociate
himself from their acts.

Higginson also felt Gerrit Smith squandered his reputation by the way he acted after Harpers Ferry.

Smith

In August,

boldly predicted insurrection "any month, any week,

any day," but Brown's capture shocked and unnerved him.

Fearing his own implication (especially when some of his letters to Brown were found at the Chambersburg farm house)

Smith immediately sent his son-in-law Charles Miller to

Boston to collect all other letters that might link him to
the scheme.

Smith's Peterboro mansion was guarded day and

night and parcels arriving for the landowner were inspected
for bombs.

During Brown's trial and while he awaited the

gallows afterwards Smith became deeply distraught and spoke
of going to Virginia himself to assist the warrior.

what he intended to do by such action remains

Just

a mystery.
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Smith's biographer suggests that these feelings of
shock, anger, fear, and guilt put a tremendous strain on the

philanthropist in the weeks following the raid.

Indeed, he

suggests that when this strain is coupled with the residual

effects of Smith's bout with typhoid in 1857, the exertions
of the gubernatorial campaign in 1858, and Smith's arduous

religious research in 1859, the reformer's breakdown in the
se cond week of November is quite understandable.

Smith is

.
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said to have gone "down under a troop of
hallucinations."

He

supposedly stalked around the Peterboro mansion
ranting about
his responsibility to Brown and claiming
he ought to go south
and join the warrior. Because his family believed
he might
try to actualize these fantasies they had him
committed to

Utica Asylum under the "humoring notion" that he was
indeed
going south to share Brown's fate.

attended by Dr. John

At Utica, Smith was

Gray during the next four weeks.

P.

Then, shortly after Brown went to the gallows, Smith was

released from the asylum, spent

a few

weeks recuperating at

Gray's home, and returned to Peterboro on December 29 fully

recovered 22
It is difficult to say whether or not Smith actually did

break down only to recover miraculously in four weeks.

There

is no doubt that Smith had a long history of physical and

emotional collapse in the face of extreme tension.

On a num-

ber of occasions such breakdowns were treated by isolation,
rest, and relaxation.

And it is entirely possible the trauma

caused by Brown's capture and his own implication in the
scheme demanded repetition of such therapy.

It is also pos-

sible his incarceration at Utica was an elaborate effort to

avoid arrest.

However, to suggest that Smith went "temporar-

ily insane" as one historian has is quite another matter.

accurate medical analysis of his collapse exists and
down under pressure is

a

far cry from insanity.

a

No

break-

What is cer-

tain about this whole episode is that Smith, like his
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co-conspirators in Boston, had contemplated Brown's
failure
but not prepared himself for his own
implication
in the

effort.

Neither Smith nor his committee associates
ever

dreamed that Brown would leave letters behind in
Chambersburg
Brown's mistaken character evaluation of Forbes

was one thing;

the idea that he did not have enough sense to
burn correspon-

dence before venturing out to Harpers Ferry quite another.
Nor did Smith understand Brown's seeming ineptitude in getting the raiding party trapped inside the federal armory.

If

Brown was anything he was a disciplined, controlled, and com-

petent guerrilla leader

.

Given such eventualities Smith's

nervous breakdown seems plausible.

In any case,

Smith and

his family must have realized that a brief stay at Utica made
a

great

deal of sense whatever his condition.

The asylum

was the perfect sanctuary in which to avoid the retributive
acts of proslavery adherents and to await the actions of

authorities who were investigating the possibility of conspiracy.

By mid-December, when it looked as though the only

prolonged investigation of the affair would be handled by

a

Senate committee chaired by James Mason of Virginia, Smith
felt he could relax.

Word had it that Mason was more intent

on playing down the notion of conspiracy than exposing the
-

existence of one.
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In addition to Smith's so-called "insanity," Thomas

Wentworth Higginson continued to be disappointed by the

behavior of Stearns and Sanborn.

During Mary Brown's visit
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to Boston,

the two men incessantly discussed
the eventuality

of arrest and what to do about it.

Rumors also circulated

that Stearns had asked George Sennot to
retrieve the supplies
Brown used during the raid in order to recoup
some of the

money he had invested in the project.

contemplate

a

flight to Canada.

Sanborn continued to

He claimed to have "no

intention of going to Canada to avoid arrest as

a

criminal

nor for any cause," but he rested that claim on the
stipula-

tion that he could be "reasonably sure" of being protected
by
his Concord townsmen.

And though he often stated he would

"hate to leave" Massachusetts he asserted he wouldn't hesi-

tate to do it rather than go to jail for six months or a
year.
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Throughout the first- two weeks of November, the panicky
committee secretary frequently huddled with Andrew for advice
though still holding back "full particulars" of his partici-

pation in the conspiracy.
pleasing to hear.

The advice Andrew gave him wasn't

Andrew believed that under an 1846 law

material witness could be arrested by warrant from
judge without any previous summons.

a

a U.S.

While there was some

possibility for a writ of habeus corpus in the procedure, the
lawyer felt that unless a state judge was willing to rule the
law unconstitutional the only way a witness could be released

was "by tumult."

When Higginson wrote to Sanborn advising

him to seriously reconsider running to Canada, the secretary
somewhat angrily insisted that if he, Howe, and Stearns had
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the same assurance of citizen
protection which Higginson had
there would be no need to run.
Sanborn also lectured

Higginson on the undesirability of Brown's
rescue.
claimed to agree with Bronson Alcott that

He

the "spectacle of

martyrdom" would be of "greater service to
the country than
years of agitation by Press and voices of
partisans."

Higginson didn't need the lecture.

By this time he was cer-

tain Sanborn was more concerned with Brown's deathly
silence

than his deathly service. 25
The minister was also upset by the poor advice Sanborn

seemed to be giving Howe and Stearns.

Prompted by Sanborn's

views on the reasonableness of flight, and Andrew's dismal

assessment of their legal position, both men fled to Canada
shortly after Mary Brown's visit.

They were reluctant to

leave Massachusetts but decided that unless

a

resolution was

introduced in the Massachusetts legislature to protect them
they should stay in Canada as long as it was necessary.

Howe's rationale sounded remarkably like Sanborn's.

The doc-

tor claimed that Brown's "best chance" was "the appearance of

acting upon his own motive and responsibility

.

.

.

without

the active cooperation of organized Committees or from

individuals of the North."
It was Higginson'

s

.

.

.

26

view that flight documented conspir-

acy far more completely than if secret committee members

stayed home.

But even in his anger at the activities of

Howe, Sanborn, Stearns, and Smith, Higginson continued only

a
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ritualistic consideration of rescue and
had all but abandoned
the scheme during the first two
weeks of November because of
his own realization of the importance
of Brown's martyrdom.
He abandoned the idea, that is, until
November 15 when he
picked up a copy of the Worcester Telegram
That day the
.

Tjele^ram and other newspapers around the
state contained a

disclaimer card from Samuel Gridley Howe.

In the card Howe

attempted to justify his flight to Canada and disavow
any

responsibility for John Brown's actions.

He insisted that he

had no specific knowledge of the Harpers Ferry raid, implied
he had no general knowledge either, and suggested that his

expatriation should "draw attention to the infamous act by
which slaveholders throw a lasso over northern citizens." 27
When Thomas Wentworth Higginson read the denial card he

immediately roughed out a response.

He thought it was one

thing to rationalize flight quite another to begin believing
in ones own rationale.

In fact, Higginson considered it to

be "extreme baseness" for Howe to deny complicity in Brown's

general scheme.

He reminded Howe of his suggestion that

secret committee members make no statements about their relationship to the warrior.

The minister understood the impro-

priety of judging other men's acts but said he could not help
but feel that Smith's "insanity" and Howe's card were the
"only two bad results of the whole affair."

It would be the

"universal" opinion of all "intelligent" people that the
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doctor denied "all knowledge" of the raid,
"not merely the
precise time and place." Higginson knew
28
this was false.

Surprisingly, Higginson did not send his rebuke
to Howe.
Instead, he drafted a second note of protest and
sent it to
the individual whose advice he suspected was
behind Howe's
act, Franklin Benjamin Sanborn.

In a brief letter to the

secretary, Higginson asked if there was "no such thing
as

honor among confederates."

Sanborn replied by apologizing for

Howe's card but claiming not to accept the minister's conclu-

sion that it was the "height of baseness."

Sanborn said he

saw good reason for any effort to prevent southerners from

knowing who Brown's accomplices were.
Higginson must have construed to be

a

Then he made what
ridiculous assertion.

Sanborn claimed that if names of the conspirators were kept
secret they might "work in the same way" again.

As far as

Sanborn was concerned, it wasn't "any worse to conceal the
facts now than before the outbreak." 29

What worried Sanborn much more than Howe's card was the

possibility of erratic behavior by the volatile Higginson.
Any factual testimony by the minister about the secret com-

mittee's activities would be disastrous and Sanborn knew

Higginson was capable of doing just that if only as

a ges-

ture of atonement for the "dishonorable" acts of his fellow

conspirators.

The minister's testimony threatened Sanborn

far more than Smith's "insanity," a few burnt letters, some

trips to Canada or a denial card.

So Sanborn tried to head
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off any such action.

In his reply to Higginson, he
suggested

that the minister could recoup his own
"honor" by declaring
himself in Brown's plot. But Sanborn warned
Higginson that
he had no right to implicate anyone else.

Only such an

implication, declared the petulant committee secretary,
con-

stituted the definition of "baseness."

Maybe Howe hadn't

"acted well in all ways" but neither had Higginson.

Sanborn

concluded his note by suggesting that "so long as each person
acts for himself we must allow some diversities." 30

The covert efforts of Sanborn, Stearns, Smith, and Howe
to deny their relationship with Brown prompted Higginson to

contemplate a rescue attempt, if only as a gesture of disdain
for their acts.

He needed a lever of dissociation.

Yet,

up

until Howe's card and Sanborn's petulant reply to his remonstrance, Higginson held back from total commitment to the
rescue.

His efforts were more ritualistic than real.

Now,

in the face of Sanborn's rejection of the scheme and Howe's

contention that Brown's death would be "holy and glorious,"
the minister began a serious effort to gain the warrior's

freedom.

He would not allow men who were totally lacking in

physical courage to dictate his actions.

Ironically, it was

just as Howe wrote to Andrew from Canada and confessed that
he was beginning to believe he had "come away from Boston on
a fools errand,"

that Higginson began the process of separat-

ing himself from the other committee members by returning to
his plans for rescue.
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The minister first wrote to Sanborn.

He assured the

secretary that he would not "expose the
whole matter"and he
would not reveal the names of the other
secret committee members if he decided to testify about his
own role in the
affair.

Next, he contacted John LeBarnes and resumed
dis-

cussion of rescue.

LeBarnes seemed to be more optimistic

about an attempt than he had been a few days earlier.

He

now felt a rescue project might have a chance and
that assis-

tance could be obtained in Kansas.

Finally, xHigginson began

considering specific rescue proposals.

Lysander Spooner sug-

gested chartering a boat, sailing up Chesapeake Bay, kidnap-

ping Viginia's governor Robert Wise and then exchanging him
for Brown.

When LeBarnes heard of the scheme he applauded

its audacity but wasn't sure it would work.

thought in more conventional terms.

He and Higginson

They debated a variety

of infantry assaults on Charles town, though both realized that
some one thousand soldiers guarded the town and a direct

infantry attack could only be accomplished with 200 to 300
men.

The two men also discussed the possibility of sneaking

a handful of well- trained mercenaries into Charlestown.
32
Stealth might be more effective than strength.

Five days after LeBarnes and Higginson began their
debate, Lysander Spooner contacted the minister and notified

him that LeBarnes had recruited men,
the "Richmond expedition."

a pilot,

and a boat for

Spooner expressed full confidence

that the plan would work if someone would furnish the money.

—
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On November 22 Higginson received another report from

LeBarnes in which the freedom fighter assured him that one
of the plans they had discussed could be managed.

Only the

money was "uncertain."
But the same day Higginson also heard from Brown and the
letter severely dampened his enthusiasm for rescue.

Brown

tried to explain more fully why he had refused to see his

wife and also wanted to assure everyone that though he was
unable to write he had not forgotten their love and kindness.

Brown's obvious effort to appear heroically resigned to his
own death stunned Higginson and made his rescue gestures seem
foolish.

When Higginson coupled this feeling with the pes-

simistic tone of a report LeBarnes sent him on November 24,
his momentary sense of foolishness was converted into a deci-

sion to totally abandon the rescue project.

LeBarnes wrote

about the progress he was having in recruiting men and, in
the process, signaled his skepticism about the Richmond plan.
He said that he didn't feel well enough about the scheme to

go in other than a supervisory capacity and claimed to agree

with Wendell Phillips that "success would be brilliant
defeat fatally inglorious."

34

Even though both Higginson and LeBarnes had really given
up on the idea of rescue, they played out the charade during
the course of the next few days for appearance sake.

On

November 27, LeBarnes notified Higginson that 15 to 25 men
had been assembled and were ready to attack Charlestown or to
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execute Spooner 's Richmond scheme.

The men were resolute and

confident of success, though LeBarnes
himself thought that
under the circumstances such confidence

was unwarranted, even

"strange."

If 1500 to 2000 dollars could be
raised,

the

"

desperate chance" could begin; if not the whole
matter must
be forgotten.
LeBarnes didn't have to wait long
for an

answer.

One day later Higginson notified him that
the money

could not be raised.

Within hours the minister received a

simple reply from his confederate:

"objects abandoned." 35

Soon after receiving this confirmation from LeBarnes,

Higginson wrote to Lysander Spooner to explain the reasons
for failing to carry out a plan.

There were several objec-

tions to an advance on Charles town. It was "absurd" to assume

that money could induce the "worst men in the country to a

desperate act."

Anyone of them could have made twice as much

by betraying the scheme.

Richmond plan.

The same held true for Spooner'

Near the end of his note Higginson said he

felt "most unwillingly compelled to abandon the hope of

redeeming the honor of the Free States in the only way open-by the rescue of John Brown."

36

At one level of intention Higginson was entirely sincere
in his efforts to rescue Brown.

He had the natural and laud-

able desire to save an admirable individual from what he con-

sidered to be an unjust execution.
have saved Brown he would have.

mitigate Higginson

1

s

If the minister could

But to suggest this does not

equally strong impulse to see Brown

312

martyred.

Higginson knew quite well the significance
Brown's

death would have for the abolitionist
movement:
inflame popular indignation in the North.

it would

Even if most

northerners were just as horrified by the thought
of insurrection as southern slaveholders, Brown could be
portrayed
as a man of the highest Puritan virtue "warring
for the

Lord."

The intense personal sympathy which went out to him

could eventually be converted to the cause of abolition.

What is more, Higginson knew perfectly well that Brown himself understood and relished this fact.

Thus, in examining

the correspondence between Higginson and those who helped

develop rescue plans, one senses an underlying reluctance to

ever carry out such plans.

Not only were these schemes prac-

tically impossible, they were also at odds with abolitionist

exploitation of popular sentiment.

As LeBarnes noted, defeat

of an attempt would have been "fatally inglorious."
in this context then that Higginson'

s

It is

remarks about "Free

State honor" and "honor" among confederates should be interpreted.

Higginson's effort was less of an attempt to redeem

northern integrity than an attempt to redeem the integrity

which he believed had been squandered by the other members of
the secret committee.

In the wake of Canadian flights,

Smith's retreat to Utica, Howe's disclaimer card, and

Sanborn's repeated denials of complicity with Brown,

Higginson felt compelled to dramatize his contempt of such

behavior by a mock rescue effort.

It was his way of

boycotting the actions of the secret committee;
his way of
dissociating himself from their lack of probity.

Perhaps the

most poignant symbol of the way in which Higginson
used the
rescue attempt is the comment he made to LeBarnes

at the end

of one of his letters.

While other members of the committee

were making exertions to destroy all incriminating
evidence,

Higginson warned LeBarnes not to burn any of their correspondence.

Some demonstration of integrity and conviction had to

be made by those individuals who subsidized Brown.

Higginson

believed he was the only committeeman capable of doing it.
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CHAPTER

IX

In Rome, Theordore Parker read about
Harpers Ferry in

letters written by his many Massachusetts friends.

As he

did, he grew more and more certain that the
money contributed
to Brown by the secret committee had not been thrown
away or

"wasted."

Over three thousand miles from America, separated

by a vast ocean from threats of arrest or trial, Parker felt
free to speak calmly and rationally about the whole affair.
As far as he was concerned,

Harpers

Ferry was just the

beginning and "many acorns must be sown before one comes up."
But if Theodore Parker could remain dispassionate about the
episode, such was not the case with his longtime friend and

fellow secret committee member, Samuel Gridley Howe.

The

doctor was thoroughly confused, and his panic-stricken behavior from the time he was notified of the raid's failure until

Brown was hanged in the first week of December underscores
that confusion.

Howe was terrified by the possibility of

his implication with Brown and looked for other men to make

decisions for him.

When John Andrew told him that he might

be indicted or imprisoned and Sanborn justified any action to

prevent arrest Howe guiltily ran to Canada.

It wasn't until

just before Brown went to the gallows that the doctor was
able to regain control of his emotions."'"
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Soon after Brown's execution Howe asked
Andrew for a
re-evaluation of his legal status and an estimate
of public
sentiment in Suffolk County toward those who
might have

assisted Brown.

Andrew did not give him encouraging news.

Efforts to change the law of 1846, by which

those implicated

with Brown could be compelled to give testimony, had bogged
down in the Massachusetts legislature.

Even though Andrew

had written numerous letters to newspapers assuring

Massachusetts citizenry of Howe's innocence, he did not feel
that people were aroused enough about the issue to prevent
the doctor from being taken outside of the state.

Andrew

also told Howe about rumors circulating throughout Boston of
the possibility that a special United States Senate committee

would be selected to investigate the raid.

The lawyer felt

that, if these rumors were true, Howe, Stearns, and Sanborn

would surely be summoned to testify.

He speculated that once

in Washington anything could happen.

They might be "spirited

over the river to Virginia and lynched; or taken by Va
authorities and proceeded against as accessories before the
fact if they gave Brown aid and comfort for general purposes
2
even if they were ignorant of special purposes."

Despite Andrew's dire prediction, this time Howe didn't
panic.

He was waiting for an opinion from Charles Sumner

about the state of affairs in the nation's capital.

Howe was

certain that Sumner's views would be more accurate than
Andrew's.

Besides, Howe wanted to testify.

He had begun to
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feel that it would be a better way
to alleviate his problems
than continued flights to Canada. He
wanted to atone for his
behavior during the past two months and was
beginning to feel

bolder now that the only person outside of
the secret committee who could give prima facie evidence against
him
was

dead.

3

By the middle of December, rumor became fact.

A special

investigating committee was appointed under the chairmanship
of Senator James Mason of Virginia.

As soon as news of the

committee's appointment reached Boston, Howe, Stearns, and

Sanborn met and debated their course of action.

Sanborn

refused to consider the possibility of going to Washington

when Howe suggested it.

Stearns was less adamant.

Sanborn

was certain Andrew's assessment of their fate was accurate:
a trap was being set for all who were suspected of assisting

Brown.

When Howe disputed this view but could not prove oth-

erwise (he hadn't received a reply from Sumner yet), he and

Sanborn argued.

Howe wanted to testify.

having issued the disclaimer, felt

a

He felt guilty for

strong need to recoup

his public reputation, and he was tired of panicky trips
north.

Then, too, Julia was expecting their fourth child at

the end of the month; he wanted to be with her.

Sanborn wouldn't budge.
"avoid a conflict."

4

He would not testify just to

He would not honor a summons because he

was certain that was what the South wanted.

And there were

other reasons for resisting Howe's arguments— reasons Sanborn
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kept to himself.

Unlike Howe, who only received
second-hand

information about Brown's movements in
the last few weeks
before Harpers Ferry, Sanborn was directly

linked to the war-

rior in the days prior to the raid.

If the committee ever

found Francis Merriam and persuaded him to talk,
Sanborn knew
he would be in deep trouble.
Sanborn was also beginning to

believe he could count on protection from arrest by
citizenry should he ignore the summons.

Concord's

Above all, Sanborn

resisted testifying because he felt certain his own contentions about the hearings were correct:

they were an elabo-

rate pretext to lure Brown's friends into prison.

of a jail sentence terrified him.

The thought

5

The intensity of his fear is clearly reflected in his

treatment of Francis Merriam.

A few days after meeting with

Howe and Stearns, Merriam appeared at the door of Sanborn's

Concord home looking for help as he dodged arrest by Virginia
authorities.

He was heading toward Canada and needed food,

shelter, and funds before continuing his journey.

Sanborn

refused to see him; refused to have anything to do with the
"plum" wno only a few weeks earlier had been of such great
"use" to the cause of freedom.

The secretary later claimed

that his inaction had been governed by "a regard for his
[Merriam's] safety,"

that Merriam was "wholly crazy," and

that to have been seen with him would have jeopardized the

entire secret committee.

There is, however, little question

about whose safety most concerned Sanborn.

He did send his
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sister Sarah to speak to Merriam and
Sarah, in turn, sought
Henry David Thoreau's help. Thoreau
introduced himself to
Merriam as "Mr. Lockwood," took the youth to
the Concord
train station, and gave him a ticket to Canada. 6
Because Howe had not received word from Sumner
about the
political climate in Washington, he grudgingly conceded
that

Sanborn might be correct about the possibility of

a trap.

So

both he and Stearns went back to Canada to await Sumner's

assessment and continued the debate about their course of
action.

They remained in Canada for a little over a week and

then came back to Boston ready to give evidence as long as
they didn't have to "give their bodies."

Howe was determined

to "own up" to his part in the affair and he told Andrew this

in a letter written from Canada just before his return.

When

Andrew received the letter he immediately informed Sanborn.
The young secretary again made efforts to quell Howe's
desire.

Writing the doctor on December 19

(a

few days before

Howe and Stearns returned) he assured Howe that his reasons
for going to Canada were "righteous," that he should not be

upset at Higginson

'

s

criticism of the disclaimer card and

that such criticism was by no means reflective of popular

opinion about his behavior.

According to Sanborn, Howe

should not feel pressed to testify in order to regain his
reputation.

He had never lost that reputation and should

understand that Higginson 's remarks to the contrary were
"extravagant."

Sanborn desperately tried to head off Howe's
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testimony by convincing the doctor
that he had no reason to
atone for his behavior. The secretary
also tried to hold
Howe in place by suggesting that once
information
came in

from Washington on the nature of the
investigation they could
all act publically.
He seemed to hint at a willingness
to

testify in some other forum than a Washington
hearing room.
Actually, Sanborn's hint was only a ploy.

intention of testifying anywhere.

wrote Howe indicating

a

7

He had no

About the same time he

desire to act in public, he also

wrote Higginson and scolded him for leaving incriminating
letters in John Andrew's possession.

Sanborn was bent on

destroying every piece of evidence that could possibly tie him
or any other committee member to Brown.

He also told

Higginson that he believed Boston abolitionists should direct
all their attention toward challenging the federal govern-

ment's right to compel individuals to leave their own state
in order to give testimony before a committee like Mason's.

Sanborn felt that repeal of the 1846 statute was

a

good issue

for reformers to stand on and said he hoped Henry Wilson

could be persuaded to lead the fight.

No matter what anyone

said, Sanborn knew that abolitionists didn't "stand a chance"
in Washington D. C.

How could they?

It was a place that

couldn't protect its own senators, an absurd sanctuary for
"creeping things" called office seekers.
As already suggested,

returning failed.

g

the effort to stop Howe from

The doctor and George Luther Stearns came

.
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back to Boston fully intending to
appear before the Mason
Committee. Both men were buoyed by
Sumner's contention that
they had "nothing to fear from Virginia's
menaces." They
called for a meeting at Henry Wilson's
offices on the day

before Christmas and asked that Sanborn and
Martin Conway, an
ex-Kansas Committee agent, attend. When the group
convened,

they first had to endure an outburst by the
tempestuous

Wilson.

The Senator was furious about the whole Harpers

Ferry episode, claimed he would do nothing to block
summonses
from the Mason Committee, and insisted that anyone called
to

Washington to testify ought to do so.

Wilson felt that any

attempt to avoid testimony would endanger Republican Party
chances in the

coming fall elections.

If it wasn't made

clear to the public that the party had nothing to do with

Brown and had not sanctioned his violent, illegal activity,
then all hopes of increasing party strength in Congress were
doomed.

Wilson also assured the group that they would be

perfectly safe in the capital.

Howe was angered by Wilson's

outburst and defended Brown's effort by claiming that the

warrior only strove to carry certain "currents of antislavery
thought to their logical sequence in action."

But when tem-

pers finally settled, Howe, Stearns, and Conway reaffirmed

their desire to face Mason and the other members of his commi t tee

9

Frank Sanborn did not agree to honor
mons.

a

committee sum-

He believed that Howe and Stearns were mistaken in
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their decision and condemned
Wilson for acting like ",a craven
and a blockhead." As far as the
secretary was concerned,
there were "a thousand better ways of
spending a year in warfare against slavery than by lying
in a Washington prison."
By the time he received his summons in
early January, he was
so upset that even assurances of protection
couldn't keep him
in Concord.

So he fled to Canada.

Once there, he claimed

that friends and family urged him to go away

.

He also sought

to legitimize his flight by writing Mason and
making a request

he knew the Senator could not allow.

Sanborn claimed that he

was willing to give testimony but only in Massachusetts.

But

what Sanborn really wanted to do was "go abroad" and join
Edwin Morton who had fled to England at the first news of
Harpers Ferry.

Sanborn also toyed with the idea of taking up

permanent residence in Canada where he could go on with his
work for the black man.

There he could continue to "set an

example" and continue to make antislavery his "business."

He

could "go down among the fugitives and explore their condition with a view to some better organization of them.

Throughout his life Sanborn was always trying to organize one
group or another.
In addition to being afraid of arrest and censurious of

those who disagreed with his refusal to testify (they were
all "wholly crazy," "extravagent,

"

or "blockheads"), Sanborn

now became as concerned about his public reputation as had
Howe.

He wanted to avoid jail and maintain the respect of

those who applauded his efforts for
Brown.

To do so, he

wrote the one man who would most likely
criticize his behav-

ior—Thomas Wentworth Higginson.

In the letter to Higginson,

written only a few days after arriving in Canada,
Sanborn
claimed he would have been "glad to give Massachusetts
a

chance to keep her citizens at home" but didn't
"have much
faith in her people in the capacity of defenders
against the
law."

Indeed,

the

"

keeping back of evidence " was much "too

important to leave to chance."

Without testimony, Sanborn

was certain "no new light could be thrown on the matter."
The South would exaggerate the raid and the North would

extenuate it.

The committee secretary also believed the

North's silence would very likely foster similar schemes and
he claimed he wanted to "reserve" himself for that time.

A

few weeks before he had attempted to alleviate Howe's guilt

in order to keep the doctor in Canada but now he tried to

create guilt.

At the end of his letter to Higginson, Sanborn

criticized the minister for "rushing upon" his friends and
implied that any harsh words about his flight to Canada would
not do.

Sanborn also pleaded with Higginson.

He "implored"

the minister not to tell what he knew to the "enemies of the

cause.

,,11

The meeting with Wilson and his eventual summons drove

Sanborn to Canada, but they had
Samuel Gridley Howe.
to Washington.

a far

different effect on

The doctor stood by his decision to go

He was through running and through taking
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Sanborn's advice.

Henry Wilson wanted to use the
hearings

to exonerate himself and the
Republican Party and Howe wanted
to use them to recapture the civic
reputation he believed he

had lost.

A few years earlier, in the midst of a
crisis of
character, the doctor had admitted his feelings
of cowardli-

ness in "dangerous situations" but at the time
he also

remarked that he was proud of his ability to seem
"cool" in
such instances.
Between October 16 and December
24,

had failed even to act cooly.

1859, he

He had failed to maintain a

calm demeanor for public consumption and he was deeply embarrassed.

His concern for what "one or the other may think" and

his worries about lost "public approbation" far outweighed
his fears of arrest.

He had once been wary about being lured

into prison if he set foot in Washington.

Now he wanted to

go there, correct his "misteps," set himself "in rectus

curia

,

"

and "express the admiration and respect" he felt for

John Brown.

12

But if Howe wanted to redeem his reputation, he was

decidedly against fully revealing his true relationship with
Brown.

He wanted to exonerate himself,

avoid imprisonment,

and "express his admiration" for Brown but he intended to

divorce himself from the warrior's "special purposes."

He

would claim that his hands and those of other abolitionists
who supported Brown were "clean."

He intended to use

Massachusetts Kansas Committee records to prove this contention before a public tribunal.

And obviously, he never

324

thought of mentioning the Secret
Committee of Six.
if questions were asked about the arms
distributed by Massachusetts
Kansas he would claim that the arms were
only to
be used as

the subscribers intended.

Stearns had instructed Brown about

this but the warrior had disobeyed orders.

Howe also thought

of suggesting that Brown was "already tete
exalte

but intensified to the verge of madness."

:

not mad

This monomania

took "the form of the love of arms," but these weapons
"had

only been entrusted to him for the defense of Kansas." 13
Howe also stood by his decision to testify because he

had begun to hear stories from Washington that cast some

doubt on James Mason's willingness to fully document conspiracy.

The doctor reflected this information in a letter to

Charles Sumner in mid- January.

Howe said he wanted to "clear

up" the matter of his relationship to Brown but was certain

that by the time he testified Mason would "have got so much
of what he did not want that he will hardly press me into

service."

And to make sure this was the case, Howe asked

that the date of his testimony be moved from January 24 to
the first week in February.

The more Mason heard the depth

of support for Brown, the less likely he was to pressure

those most closely associated with the martyr.

Thus, with

evidence assembled to dissociate himself from Brown's "special purposes," a strong possibility Mason didn't want to

document the conspiracy anyway, and the assurances of Sumner
and Wilson that he need not fear coming to Washington, Howe
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was prepared to correct his "misteps."

He was relieved with

his decision to go on; relieved that
he had stopped yielding
"too much to others." The thought of
evading testimony was
always "repugnant" to him though he admitted
having some mis-

givings about a trap when he was first notified
of the committee's formation. Now he wanted to stand boldly
before the
Senate investigators. 14
One man in Massachusetts watched Howe's new found
bold-

ness with curiosity, confusion, and a bit of disgust.

In

fact, Thomas Wentworth Higginson was so upset with the

actions of Howe, Sanborn, and Stearns that he refused to
"expostulate" on their motives anymore.

In November, long

before the Mason Committee was set up, Higginson had decided
not to volunteer testimony because, even though he did not
fear proclaiming his relationship to Brown, he was worried

about implicating other secret committee members.

Now he saw

that none of the other members were hindered by such consid-

eration for him.

Each had offered their "own confession" on

their "own terms," after urging him to hold back evidence.
The minister wondered what Sanborn hoped to accomplish by

running to Canada or what Howe felt he would prove by consenting to testify after

twice

flying there.

Howe and

Stearns couldn't accomplish a thing by going in front of

investigators who didn't want to throughly probe the alleged
conspiracy.

Higginson had recently discussed the matter with

Vermont's Senator Jacob Collamer and knew, as he was sure

Howe did, that Mason's determination
to uncover wrong doing
was beginning to weaken. According to Collamer,
all the

Virginia Senator wanted to do was claim he had
tried to
expose the conspiracy but had failed because he

"could not

obtain the necessary information."

Collamer speculated that

Mason took this new approach to the investigation because
he
was very fearful of "the effect on the country of witnesses

who shall defend John Brown." 15
Higginson suspected that personal considerations fully

controlled the actions of his less than honorable confederates and he was deeply offended.

Previously he had criti-

cized all of them for a lack of physical courage while con-

deding their moral courage.
anymore.

But he wasn't sure of even that

The only thing he was certain of was why he had not

been called to the Mason hearings.

He had always openly

refused to go to Canada and refused to disavow his support of
Brown.

If Collamer was correct,

the committee chairman

wasn't willing to take a chance on examining

a

witness will-

ing to speak the whole truth.

Jacob Collamer 's comments to Higginson about James

Mason's fears were astute.

The Virginia Senator was worried

that popular emotions would be inflamed by men willing to

defend Brown.
result.

Still, he had not always been afraid of such a

As early as October 21, only two days after the dis-

covery of documents hinting at the possibility of an organization behind Brown's raid, James Mason had been eager to
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start a thorough-going investigation.

He felt enough evi-

dence existed to warrant belief in
conspiracy and was determined to expose it. Mason knew Brown
"acted from the impression made upon him by abolitionist
tracts," which implied
that all one had to do was put arms in
the reach of slaves to

incite immediate insurrection.

The Virginian wanted an

inquiry made to discover the source of funds
for this "military expedition." By mid-December, 1859, Mason
had

his wish.

He was appointed chairman of a special Senate committee

charged with examining the Harpers Ferry incident.

And he

was empowered to ask questions which bore directly on the

issue of conspiracy.

Mason and his fellow committeemen,

J.

Fitch, Jefferson Davis, J. R. Doolittle, and Jacob

N.

Collamer were asked to find out whether or not Brown worked

with any organization which "intended to subvert the government of any of the states," whether any citizen of the United
States was implicated as an "accessory to [the raid] by con-

tributions of money, arms, munitions or otherwise," and what
the character of such an organization might be if it did
.

.

exist.

16

Mason's intense initial desire to prove conspiracy dis-

mayed Brown's Boston friends.

At first it seemed to them

that their only hope for sympathy lay with the two Republican's on the committee, J.

R.

Doolittle, and Jacob Collamer.

Collamer 's attitude toward the whole investigation was particularly heartening and best exemplified by his statements
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to A. A. Lawrence in late December.

The Vermont Senator was

certain that any "fair investigation" would show that
the
number of Brown's accomplices, beyond those caught at
Harpers
Ferry, was "extremely small."

Collamer seriously doubted

whether anyone who contributed to Brown "knew his purpose to
be of the criminal proportions and insane expedition it

turned out."

Though the Senator was very disturbed by people

furnishing arms "to carry violence into the Slavery States"
and he termed such acts as "criminal," his hints were obvious.
The committee lacked enough evidence to build its case, Erown

was dead, and those called to the witness stand would really
be in charge of the direction of the investigation.

If they

handled themselves properly, the inquiry might prove to be

blessing in disguise.

a

They (Brown's supporters) could prove

that the warrior had not received arms "for the purposes to

which they were eventually put."
ate as well as implicate.

The hearings could exoner-

17

Ironically, in view of the respective positions taken by

Mason and Collamer previous to the actual hearings, one of
Brown's friends, George Luther Stearns, found he had more to
fear from the Vermont sympathizer than the Virginia enemy.

Mason developed misgivings about the investigation's potential impact as a catalyst for northern antislavery sentiment,
and slowly moved away from his commitment to fully expose

conspiracy.

On the other hand, Collamer, by the time he

interrogated Stearns, began to sense that Brown's Boston

supporters might not have been as ignorant
of the warrior's
"criminal" intent as he had originally
supposed. Collamer
would end up pressing witnesses to speak fully
and truthfully
about their attitude toward Brown and his violent
acts.

And

at times, it seemed he was much more concerned
about the

possibility of conspiracy than Mason had originally
been.

Mason pressured witnesses

— but

never too much.

Collamer

defended them— but not entirely. Mason was never a lion nor
Collamer a lamb.
Ill

When subpeonas went out in early January some men
refused to comply.

Gerrit Smith, James Repath, Hugh Forbes,

Frank Sanborn, and John Brown, Jr., would not go to Washington and testify for one reason or another.

The younger Brown

also used the occasion to dissociate himself from certain of
his father's supporters.

John Jr. claimed he would not

appear to testify but also let it be known that his "business" didn't call him to Canada.

If he visited that tempo-

rary home for "American exiles," it would be from "other con-

siderations than personal safety."

Most men subpeoned by

the Mason Committee, however, did consent to make an appear-

ance.

Throughout late January, February, and early March,

they paraded through the hearing room and answered numerous

questions about their knowledge of Brown, his antislavery
activities, and his Harpers Ferry plans.
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When Henry Wilson was asked about his
relationship with
Brown, he answered by describing Hugh
Forbes' revelations,
discussing his exchange of letters with Howe,
speaking of his
own (and the Republican Party's) disdain for
violence and

documenting this position by telling the committee
of his

confrontation with Brown at the Parker House the previous
spring.

John Andrew was asked why he didn't defend Brown

during his trial.

Andrew answered that as a Republican, a

Massachusetts man and abolitionist he would have been on
trial quite as much as his client.

with Virginia jurisprudence.

He was also unfamiliar

Andrew's testimony is also sig-

nificant because it represents the basic defense agreed upon
by Brown's Boston supporters in meetings held previous to

their testimony.

Andrew emphasized what most impressed him

about Brown, as well as what he thought would enhance the

dead warrior's reputation in the eyes of northern people.

At

the same time, he depicted Brown as one who would never have

shared his Harpers Ferry plan with anyone.
Brown?

Who was John

According to this abolitionist lawyer, Brown was

a

controlled enthusiast, one who spoke in tones "perfectly
level without emphasis and exhultation of feeling."

Brown

was a paragon of those virtues that Andrew, and the secret

committee membership saw as

American character.

a

necessary component of the

The warrior represented those mainstream

values which would bring order to the chaos of mid-nineteenth
America.

He personified the values they imagined could bring
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a return to the halcyon days of
eighteenth-century revolu-

tionary America.

In a time when the corporation had
begun to

nudge the rugged individualist off the stage,
Brown was a man
who "scarcely regarded other people," who was
entirely
"self-

possessed and unto himself."

He "appeared to have no emotion

of any sort but to be entirely absorbed in an
idea."

Ironi-

cally, Andrew and the others had romanticized a product
of

the very socio-economic reality that appalled them. 19
As suggested, Andrew's testimony continued the theme of

secrecy originally begun by Brown's Kansas associate, Richard
Realf.

In testimony given on January 21, Realf, who had par-

ticipated in Boston meetings intended to orchestrate the
statements of all those who were summoned, denied knowledge
of where Brown had procured funds for his venture.

He

claimed Brown was cautious and uncommunicative about the particulars of his plan.

Brown didn't trust anyone with any-

thing more than what was "barely sufficient" to "secure coop-

eration and support."

Realf did admit that Brown told him

Gerrit Smith "promised to assist him in his further enterprises against slavery."

But Realf did not know if this

20
meant assistance against the South.

On January 11 Samuel Gridley Howe was summoned to appear

before the committee thirteen days later.

But the doctor

asked to postpone his testimony until the first week of
February claiming he had previously scheduled an exhibition
of blind children before the Canadian Parliament, which was
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considering an appropriation for rehabilitation
institutions
similar to Perkins School. Howe also wanted
to see
how the

investigation was proceeding before he subjected
himself to
questioning.
He had met with Realf, Stearns, Andrew,
and

Wilson and knew what they would say, but he did not want
to
be surprised by the unexpected.

The more testimony given,

the better his chance to avoid surprise.

Howe's postponement

request was approved and he was resummoned for early
February.

^

From the outset of his testimony, Howe moved quickly to
close the door on any effort to link him to Brown.

To

Mason's question about who controlled guns purchased by

Massachusetts for Kansas, he replied that he could not answer
"with precision."

From that moment on, he qualified his

answers by claiming that he could "not recall," or had "no

definite knowledge of" or "could not say for certain."

Asked

how Brown regained possession of weapons supposedly confiscated by the Massachusetts Kansas Committee in May, 1858, the

doctor deftly noted that he had "no means of knowing" that
the arms used at Harpers Ferry were the same donated for

Brown's defense of Kansas.

Unsatisfied with this reply,

Mason asked Howe to produce letters which proved that Brown
was given the guns only for defensive purposes in Kansas.
Howe balked and claimed he could only speak for himself.

Correspondence with Brown was the responsibility of the com-

mittee chairman, George Luther Stearns.

Howe admitted that

he saw Brown in the spring of 1858,
but said that Brown "gave
no definite information" about his plans.
When Collamer

interjected and asked Howe what he meant when
he suggested
that Brown sought arms and funds for the
"defense of Freedom
in Kansas/' the physician answered revealingly.
Howe
asserted that when Brown used such terms he (the doctor)
had
no thought about "anything but the freedom of Kansas,
as
such, without any thought of colored men at all."

Further on

in the questioning, Collamer returned to the issue of Brown's

plans in 1858 and the funds he collected in Boston during
that spring.

Again Howe hedged.

Brown gave him "no definite

statement of any plan or purpose."

The warrior only appealed

to him as an antislavery man. 22

Up until that point in the testimony the committee had
no evidence to dispute Howe's vague denials.

When it came tc

questioning him about his relationship to Brown in 1859, however, the doctor found himself under more pressure.

The com-

mitteemen had enough evidence partially to rebut his denials
and they proceeded to rattle the forgetful physician.

What

is more, Collamer started to suspect that Howe and the other

men who supported Brown had taken no clear stand against the

warrior when he advocated the use of violence.

Collamer

began a series of questions about 1859 by asking Howe to com-

ment on a note found at Chambersburg

.

It read:

"Dear

Friend, Our friend from Concord called with your note.

I
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began the investment with fifty dollars enclosed
and will try
to do more through friends.
Doctor."
Collamer

:

Howe:

I

Collamer
Howe

Will you say to whom it was addressed?

;

Do you remember the fact of time?
I

'•

presume it was addressed to Captain Brown.

do not remember the time. 23

James Mason was disturbed by Howe's failure to answer
the question and so prodded the doctor by asking him if he

recalled sending

a

telegraphic dispatch to John Kagi, a

friend of Brown's in June,

Mason

18 59.

Will you be good enough to inform the committee

:

whether you were acquainted with

a

man named J. H.

Kagi?
Howe

I

:

Mason

never saw him.

Did you have any correspondence with him?

:

Howe:

I

never corresponded with him that

I

recollect.

Mason then exhibited the telegram sent by Howe to Kagi
on June

6,

1859 which read:

"He got the needful and left

three days ago, direction unknown.

Mason

:

S.G.H."

Will you say if you have any recall of this tele-

graphic dispatch?
Howe:

I

have not the slightest idea.

24

Howe was then questioned about a note
John Brown, Jr.,
sent to John Kagi on August 17, 1859
after his Boston visit.
The note read:
"First called on Dr. H- though I had no
letter of introduction he received me cordially.
He gave me a

letter to a friend who does business on Milk
Street.

with him to his house in Medford and took dinner.

word he said to me was,

'Tell friend

(Issac)

the fullest confidence in his endeavor

result'

,

The last

that we have

whatever may be the

.

Mason:

Did he tell you the object of his visit?

Howe

He did not.

:

Mason
Howe

Went

Did he apply to you for money?

:

He did not.

:

Mason

Did you learn it [the object of his visit] from

:

any other source?

Howe

I

:

did not.

25

After Howe admitted that he gave money to Brown in 1857
and 1858 but that he did not know "what disposition" was made
of the funds, Collamer interjected.

Collamer

:

To prevent any misunderstanding about these con-

tributions

I

desire to ask

a

question.

Were not

the contributions received by the committies which

were made by the people of Boston and Massachusetts
for and during the Kansas troubles?

::

:

:

:

.
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Howe

For that definite purpose.

Collamer

Was any money of these contributions
ever sent to
Brown in 1858?

Howe

Not that

Mason

But there were other contributions that were
sent

I

know of.

to him after the fall of 1858

...

to be used at

his discretion.

Howe

I

:

had personal knowledge of several small sums.

Mason:

What were the limits imposed on his discretion?

Howe

No further than the confidence he inspired among
his friends by two opinions entertained by him,
one of which was that he was opposed to promoting

insurrection among slaves, and another that he was

opposed to shedding human blood except in selfdefense

Mason

.

Do you know of any plan he had

.

.

.

for

.

.

.

promoting insurrection?
Howe

I

:

Doolittle

:

know of no definite plan; he was secretive.

In all your conversation or communication with

Brown had you ever

.

.

.

any intimation

...

of

an organized effort, on his part, to produce an

insurrection among slaves?
Howe

Never

26

Most certainly the committee members

— Democratic

and

Republican--were not pleased with Howe's vague and negative
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responses.

Yet they dismissed him after he answered

Doolittle's question because they realized they
did not have
enough evidence to fully contravert his story.
it is also

possible they believed more information could be
obtained
from the one individual in charge of Massachusetts
Kansas

Committee funds, namely, George Luther Stearns.
In mid-January, while the first sessions of the Mason

Committee were being held, Stearns traveled to North Elba to

visit the Brown family.

He wanted to assure them that

Massachusetts abolitionists would continue their financial
assistance.

At the same time he presented the family with

funds already contributed for their support.

Stearns also

inquired as to the possibility of Ann Brown attending

Franklin Sanborn's school at Concord tuition- free

.

While in

North Elba, he mentioned his forthcoming testimony but
claimed not to be worried about it.

Like Samuel Gridley

Howe, the Medford businessman knew that if he was able to

maintain his composure during questioning nothing illegal
could be proved against him.

The evidence in the committee's

possession was scanty and inconclusive.

Only his own admis-

sion of guilt would give investigators enough material to

recommend prosecution.
kind of slip.

And Stearns wasn't about to make that

He carefully prepared an opening statement for

the committee, attended meetings with Howe and others in

order to coordinate his story with theirs, and closely followed the committee proceedings in the newspapers.

When he

"
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returned home from North Elba he found his summons
waiting.
He was to appear on February 24 before Mason,
Collamer, and

the others.

27

Stearns began his testimony by reading the prepared

statement about his relations with John Brown.

In it he

claimed to have known nothing about the Brown's Chatham meetings or the remarks attributed to him by John Brown, Jr.,

after their August meeting.

The younger Brown's visit to his

Medford home was only a pleasure call.
for his father's use.

No money was given

Stearns also reiterated the theme

which echoed through all previous discussions of Brown by
those testifying:

he never knew much of John Brown's plans

because of the warrior's extreme secretiveness

.

Brown

repeatedly told Stearns that "it was the worst possible policy for a man to reveal his plans."

Surprisingly, Stearns

did admit to having had contact with Francis Merriam, but
only after the raid.

The Medford businessman stated that

while he was in Canada during December, Merriam came to his
hotel room and introduced himself as a "Mr. Lockwood."

Merriam tried to discuss Harpers Ferry, but Stearns promptly
cut him off by saying that he was "very busy and could not

attend him.

28

Having finished his statement Stearns began his questioning.

Mason asked him whether or not it was true that he

attempted to claim the weapons taken from Brown during his
capture.

Stearns denied having done so, saying that he
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presumed "in the confusion of Harpers Ferry everything
was
distributed." Stearns did admit that George Sennot came

to

him and asked what was to be done with the recovered
equipment.

At the same time Sennot exhibited

a letter from Brown

authorizing him (Sennot) to take possession of the property
for the benefit of the Brown family. 29

Like Howe, Stearns never gave his questioners much sat-

isfaction.

He could deny knowledge of Brown's plans, deny

knowledge of funds being raised to support insurrection and
he never had to worry about rebuttal.

dence like John Brown, Jr.

's

Circumstantial evi-

letter pointed to Stearns'

assistance of Brown and indicated he knew more than he admitted.

But the committee lacked the will and direct evidence

to establish such a connection convincingly.

Indeed, Stearns

handled himself with relative ease before their barrage of
questions.

He almost began to relax.

But it was the confi-

dence he gained in dealing with Mason, G. N. Fitch, and

Jefferson Davis, that led him to make an unintended admission
to the increasingly suspicious Collamer.

Collamer

:

Did you at any time before the transaction at

Harpers Ferry, in any way directly or indirectly,

understand that there was any purpose on the part
of Brown to make an in road upon the subject of

slavery in any of the states?
Stearns:

No sir

...

ized plan.

I

did not suppose he had any organ-
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My idea is, making any forcible
entry upon

Virginia, or any other state.
No sir.
Had you ever any intimation of that
kind, any idea
of it?

No Sir.

Perhaps

I

do not understand you.

suppose he would go into Virginia

.

.

.

I

did

and

relieve slaves.
In what way?

In any way he could, give them liberty.

Did you understand he contemplated doing it by
force?
Yes sir, by force if necessary,
(testily)

:

Will you explain in what manner by

force you understood he contemplated doing it?
(realizing his mistake and becoming a bit flustered)
I

:

I

cannot explain any manner because

.

.

.

never talked with him on the subject,

(in heated tones)

:

Had you any idea that these

arms were to be used for any such purpose as

making an inroad into any State?
(upset by Collamers display of anger)

:

I

think

do not understand you.
(angrily)

:

John Brown has made an inroad into

Virginia, with force and arms to relieve slaves;

you understand that'

I

Stearns

Yes sir.

Collamer

Now, did you ever before that took
plao

intimation that that was

.

.

.

ave any

intended

by

.

him?
Stearns;

No sir.

I

never supposed that he contemplated

anything like what occurred at Harpers Ferrv.

Collamer:

Then

I

ask you do you disapprove of such a trans-

Stearns

Despite his previous admission that Brown contemplated
the use of force, Stearns' final denial of Brown satisfied

Collamer enough to end his questioning.

Undoubtably, the

Vermont Senator no longer saw the inquiry as a way to exonerate Brown's Massachusetts supporters.

Collamer learned too

much during the hearings to continue holding that view.

Yet

like his committee colleagues Collamer was handicapped by a

lack of substantial factual evidence to support any further

action against certain witnesses.
Boston friends knew it.

They had come to Washington believ-

ing there was very little chance
them.

He knew it and Brown's

And they were right.

a

case could be made against

Stearns, like those who preceded

him, was dismissed from the witness stand only superficially

bruised by the experience.
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As he traveled back to Boston, Stearns
realized that he

was just as nervous and concerned about the way
in which the

Massachusetts public would react to his Mason Committee
performance as he had ever been about going to Washington to
give that performance.

He had denied Brown and claimed to

disapprove of his tactics before the Senate investigators.
Now he returned home to face all the men and women he had

boldly defended Brown to in the months leading up to Harpers
Ferry.

He wondered if they would condemn him as a hypocrite

and desperately hoped they would be satisfied with his testi-

When he arrived in Medford he was a bit surprised to

mony.

find that people were not only satisfied with his testimony

but also praised him heartily for his "bold speech."

This

reaction convinced him that Harpers Ferry had sunk "deep into
the hearts of our people" and would greatly influence forthi
coming elections.

31

Undoubtably, George Luther Stearns was also thankful
he had

had the wit to make certain additions to his Mason

Committee testimony after that testimony had ended.

As has

been suggested, Stearns was fearful of defending Brown once
he

had

inadvertantly admitted that he knew Brown contempla-

ted the use of force.

He answered Collamer's most important

question by asserting that he would not have approved of the
Harpers Ferry scheme if he had known of it in advance.

But

when Stearns completed his testimony and all of the committeemen (except Mason) left the hearing room, the Medford
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businessman asked the committee stenographer
if he would add
another sentence to that answer. Stearns now
claimed that
disapproval of Brown's act had only been his
first reaction
and that since then he had "changed" his opinion.
In his

addenda Stearns claimed that instead of disapproving
of the
raid had he known of it, he now believed John Brown

to be the

"most representative man of this century" and regarded

Harpers Ferry as an event that would free America.

Mason

just smiled as Stearns added the statement and left the room.
Once home, Stearns was relieved to find that all newspaper

accounts of his testimony included the addenda.

He had

expunged his most blatant denial of the warrior and it actually looked as if he had made the firmest commitment to Brown
of all those who testified. 32

Samuel Gridley Howe was also concerned with public reaction to his testimony.

marily to set himself

After all, he went to Washington pri"

in rectus curia

and recapture public "approbation."

,

"

to correct "misteps,"

Howe was particularly

hopeful that his testimony would dissolve the animosity of
Thomas Wentworth Higginson.

And when the doctor came home

from Washington, he continued efforts to rehabilitate himself

with the minister.

Howe wrote Higginson and told him that

when Brown had been in Boston the previous spring the two of
them had argued about the morality of stealing slaveholders'

property during slave rescue efforts.

As a result of this

disagreement, Howe claimed that he and Brown had no
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conversation about his future plans.

Brown's appearance at

Harpers Ferry was "astonishing" to the doctor.

Howe did have

some trouble trying to explain why he sent money to
Brown in

September 185 9 and how he knew where to send it.

Howe said

he sent funds only to show sympathy for the warrior but did
so "without cognizance of his purposes."

Howe did admit to

something he failed to say before the Mason Committee.

He

told Higginson that if he had known that Brown intended to

steal nothing but slaves he would have given "aid and encouragement" to the warrior.

Unquestionably, Higginson wondered

how the doctor managed to avoid discussion of Brown's plan

during his numerous conversations with Sanborn and Stearns

between June and October.

Was it possible Howe sent the

money to Chambersburg without knowing of its proximity to
Harpers Ferry?

Was it possible that Howe didn't know of

Sanborn's and Stearns' all-night meeting with Francis

Merriam?

Higginson hardly thought so.

The minister wondered

if Howe seriously believed he could divorce himself from

Brown's "special purposes."

33

Howe tried to be recondite about the disclaimer card.
He told Higginson it would not have been published if the two

of them had been able to speak to each other before it was

submitted to the newspapers.

Howe claimed that he doubted

the "expediency" of the card all along.

But he had shown it

to "an honorable man" who "knew about Brown's movements and a

great deal more" and that man had approved of it.

So Howe

submitted the card.

At the end of his letter Howe returned

to his introductory theme.

He told Higginson that he had

assisted Brown with his plans because he had "confidence"
in
the old warrior but claimed he never expected "anything
like

what happened or anything more than a stampede." 34
It is doubtful that Higginson'

changed by the letter.

s

attitude toward Howe was

None of the members of the secret

committee expected what had happened at Harpers Ferry.

For

one thing, Brown wasn't supposed to get caught in the arsenal.

The warrior had hoped to obtain additional weapons

there but did not expect to get trapped inside.

All commit-

tee members were stunned by that occurrence, so Howe could

not separate himself from the project by claiming that
Brown's entrapment surprised him.

Nor could Howe get away

from his role in the whole affair by claiming he only

expected "a stampede" and no violence.

They all expected a

stampede but they were also prepared for the shedding of

blood if that was necessary to make the stampede

a

success.

Maybe Howe did argue with Brown about stealing slaveholders'

property but Higginson remembered that at the time of the
Missouri raid

a

year earlier, Howe had accepted the death of

a white slaveholder without comment.

Howe accepted Parker's

estimate of the episode and was more than willing to trade
one white life for that of eleven slaves.

No, Howe could not

remove himself from responsibility for Brown's acts in the
eyes of Thomas Wentworth Higginson.
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IV

When Sameul Gridley Howe and George Luther
Stearns met
after the hearings both agreed that the
investigation
had

been conducted "unskillfully

.

They had not had to make

incriminating revelations because the questions had been
poorly conceived.

Actually, the failure of the committee to

uncover conspiracy had nothing to do with a lack of skill.
It resulted from a combination of half-truthful answers, a

minimum of evidence, Mason's reluctance to fully establish
conspiracy and Collamer's initial wish that the hearings

exonerate all those called to testify.

poorly conceived questions produced

These factors and not

a less- than-probing anal-

ysis of the money and men behind John Brown.

When the com-

mittee's report was issued in June of 1860, these elements

were reflected on virtually every page of the testimony.

3S

Mason's misgivings are particularly noticeable in the

majority report of the investigation.

Mason concluded that

Brown's purpose in Kansas was to keep the public mind

inflamed on the subject of slavery "with

a view to

effecting

such organization as might enable him to bring about servile

insurrection in the slave states."

Mason stressed that tes-

timony before his committee indicated the "utter insecurity
of peace and safety, in some states of the Union, in the

existing condition of the public mind and its purposes in the
non-slaveholding States."

He was convinced that northern
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public opinion was like

a

tinderbox and could easily be set

off by the committee hearings.

majority report.

This view is pervasive in the

Despite obvious flaws in the testimony of

Howe and Stearns, despite Realf's implication of
Smith, and

despite the refusal of certain associates of Brown to testify,

the resport carefully avoided any accusation of direct

complicity with Brown.

Admittedly the committee lacked the

necessary hard evidence to make

a

direct accusation of wrong-

doing but what evidence did exist the chairman handled in a

remarkably subdued fashion. 36
On the whole issue of accessories "not present" who

might have given Brown arms, money or munitions, the majority
report held that it appeared such contributions were not made

with "actual knowledge of use for which they were intended by
Brown."

Money was freely contributed by those who considered

themselves Brown's friends "without inquiry" about how it was
to be used.

Mason accepted the conspirators' own definition

of the way Brown obtained funds.

By doing so, he walled them

that they believed in

away from the very thing he suspected:

the appropriateness of violent means to end slavery.

Mason

described Brown as one who "successfully impressed himself
and his capacity

.

.

.

upon the sickly

bilities of his allies."

.

In the process,

.

.

depraved sensi-

Brown commanded

their confidence "if he did not altogether bill their

suspicions

.

37

"
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Mason's analysis was not an "unskillful" one.

Indeed,

anyone who reads the report can easily recognize it
as
piece of master craftsmanship.

implied

a full

took place.

a

At once, the Virginia Senator

understanding of how and why the conspiracy

Yet he succeeded in doing the same thing to the

general public that the conspirators tried to do to him.

In

the report he successfully obscured the relationships of

Brown and his supporters so as to prevent the public from

becoming fully aware of their tacit recognition of the principles of justified violence.

Mason accepted statements

about Brown's "remarkable retinence" and his

"

secretiveness

not so much because he believed that this was the case, but

because he hoped to turn these claims to his own advantage.
Brown's friends might escape prosecution by pleading that
they were not fully informed of his intentions but Mason then

used the same argument to prove they did not fully condone

Brown's acts at Harpers Ferry.

Mason hoped to conceal pre-

cisely the same thing Brown's conspirators did.

Mason wanted

to demonstrate that men who supported Brown did so out of a

"lack of knowledge" and not because they believed in the

"cause of insurrection."

There was no need to suggest legis-

lation on the matter because the invasion was "simply

the

act of lawless ruffians under the sanction of no public or

political authority."
own game.

38

Mason beat Howe and Stearns at their
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In their minority report, Collamer and
Doolittle were

less interested than Mason in portraying Brown's
act as one
of "lawless ruffians."

Consequently they tended to focus

more attention on Brown's friends.

In the end the minority

report came down much harder on Brown's supporters than the

majority report did.

Both Senators Doolittle and Collamer

accepted the premise that Brown's Boston friends "placed too

much implicit confidence in him."

But while they saw no con-

clusive evidence of conspiracy, they were appalled by the
Bostonians' tacit acquiescence in the use of violence.

They

believed it was "astonishing" that there should "still be
found large bodies of men laboring under the infatuation that
.

.

.

a good

object can be affected by lawlessness and

,
violence „39
.

V

Thomas Wentworth Higginson ended his immediate relationship to the Harpers Ferry episode when he decided not to pro-

ceed with his rescue scheme.

Gerrit Smith severed his

attachment to the affair by being committed to the Utica
Asylum.

When the Mason Report was published in the late

spring of 1860, it officially ended Howe's and Stearns' con-

nection with the Brown effort

— although

they considered Feb-

ruary's testimony as the termination date.

week of April,

i8 60,

In the first

Frank Sanborn came full circle.
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Early in the evening of April

3

a

group of deputies

under the direction of Silas Carlton rode into Concord,

inquired where the young committee secretary lived, deployed
themselves around his home on Sudbury Road, and then quietly

waited until darkness enveloped the town.

At about nine

o'clock, Carlton accompanied by five deputies walked up the

front steps of Sanborn's home and knocked on the door.

When

Sanborn answered, he was informed that Carlton had been dep-

utized by the sergeant-at-arms of the United States Senate,

Dunning

R.

McNair, to arrest him for failure to heed

Committee summons.

Mason

a

Carlton and his men then burst into the

house, grabbed Sanborn and began pulling him toward their

carriage in the road.
the group,

Sanborn struggled violently against

first pinning his long legs against the doorway,

then hooking them on the railing of the front porch.

As he

struggled, he called to his sister Sarah, told her he was

being arrested without warrant, and asked her to warn the
neighbors.

Sarah ran from the house screaming.

She managed

to awaken a friend named Colonel Whiting and then returned to

her front yard where Frank was still struggling against

Carlton and the others.

Sarah ran to the deputy's carriage,

grabbed the whip, cracked it, and sent th
down the street.

horses bolting off

40

The enormous commotion caused by the arrest attempt woke

people in the area.

Colonel Whiting and many others came out

of their homes to see what was happening and soon found
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themselves grappling with the deputies in an effort to

release Sanborn.

John Keyes had the presence of mind to run

to the nearby home of Judge Rockwell Hoar, obtain a writ
of

habeus corpus and then seek out the town constable, John
Moore.

When Moore and Keyes arrived at the scene, they tem-

porarily called a halt to the melee and tried to discuss the

situation with Carlton.

Moore asked Carlton on what author-

ity he was arresting Sanborn.

deputized by McNair.

Carlton told Moore he had been

Moore then showed Carlton the writ and

asked him to give Sanborn up.

When Carlton refused, Moore

deputized the Concord residents who were present and asked
them to take Sanborn into custody.

During the night of pro-

tective custody he spent at George Precott's home, the secretary hastily penned an open letter to the Massachusetts leg-

islature censuring that body for allowing laws to persist,

which encouraged the "kidnapping" of "white men" by federal
authorities

.

Early the next morning, Sanborn traveled to Boston where
a hearing had been called in the chambers of the Chief Jus-

tice of the Massachusetts Court

— Lemuel

Shaw.

Appearing with

lawyers Robert Treat Paine, Samuel Sewall, and John Andrew,

Sanborn patiently endured the legal arguments and then waited
for Shaw's decision.

Shaw did not feel Sanborn should be

taken to Washington.

In his ruling,

he refused to challenge

the constitutionality of the law of 1846 or the inherent

who
right of a congressional committee to arrest witnesses

had disregarded

a summons.

But Shaw based his decision

against the government on the premise that
"the warrant
returned the power to arrest the respondent in

terms limited

to McNair

.

.

.

and could not be executed by a deputy."

in

short, McNair could not legally delegate the authority
to

arrest Sanborn.

The young secretary was free. 42

During the hearing a large crowd gathered outside the

Court House.

George Luther Stearns, fearing an unpleasant

confrontation when his young friend left Shaw's chambers, had
a carriage waiting by a side door of the building.

When the

hearing ended he hustled Sanborn to the carriage and the two
of them then rode out to Concord.

Sanborn was greeted by

a

Upon arriving in Concord,

cheering crowd and saluted by a can-

He also watched people scream insults at Colonel Joseph

non.

Holbrook and Postmaster Charles Davis, the two townsmen who

provided information to Carlton the night before.

Soon

Sanborn learned that a town meeting had been called in his
honor.

That evening he was to share the platform with

Emerson, Thoreau, and Higginson.

In less than twenty- four

hours he had been arrested, tried, found innocent and made

Concord's "hero of the hour."

He was dazed and overwhelmed.

43

At eight o'clock that evening his moment of triumph
began.

He strode briskly to the speakers platform,

thanked

Emerson and Thoreau for their introductory remarks, turned to
the assemblage, and launched into a brief but dramatic tirade

against the Slave Power.

Sanborn started by describing the
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arrest attempt.

He then acknowledged the heroic efforts
of

those who assisted him and spoke of Shaw's decision.

Sanborn

firmly believed the decision "agreed with the
sentiments of

two-thirds of the people of Massachusetts."

out at the men who tried to arrest him.

Then he lashed

They were "ruffians."

Furthermore, he was convinced that, had they been killed during the rescue, the deed would not have been judged unlawful.
In fact,

Sanborn said he believed the deputies "ought to have

been killed."

Finally, in a dramatic gesture, Sanborn held

up the handcuffs used to bind him during the arrest attempt.
He asked the crowd what they symbolized.

resounding cry.

"Tyranny!" came the

Sanborn had learned many lessons during the

course of his relationship with Brown.

Merriam one of them in early October.

He showed Francis

And, now, Concord was

receiving a demonstration of another. 44
.

.

After holding the handcuffs aloft, Sanborn continued to

whip the emotions of the crowd.
like "dealing with demons."
force.
far.

Dealing with southerners was

Slavery had to be opposed by

But, as always, Sanborn was careful not to go too

He did not counsel attacking slavery.

Rather, he sug-

gested that northerners prepare to meet the encroachments of
slavery with force because that was the "only argument some
people can understand."

Sanborn then concluded his remarks

with a Brown- like nod to the Almighty and to practical abolition.

He swore that "so help him God" he would "put in prac-

tice the teachings of the last twenty-four hours."

The
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secret committeeman received

a

tremendous ovation, waved to

the audience, walked off the platform,
and strode out of the
building into the cool night air. He
was much too excited to
listen to the remaining speakers and
undoubtedly he realized
that he might never receive such a powerful
acclamation of

popular favor again.

It was something to be savored in

solitude. 45
The kidnap incident and Sanborn's reaction to it
suggest
a

good deal about his motives for committing himself
to full-

time work in the abolitionist movement and for attaching
him-

self to John Brown.

From the time he first moved to Concord

in the spring of 1855 Sanborn felt alone; estranged from
the

community.

Of course, he had his schoolteaching,

Sarah's

company, and a superficial acquaintance with some of the

famous personages of the town.

But these things did not sus-

tain him; did not create in him a feeling of acceptance.
Indeed, he was somewhat dismayed by the aloofness of both

Emerson and Thoreau.

They liked him but kept their distance.

For all of Sanborn's transcendental ardor, he could not make
the famous men and women of Concord his intimates.

At the

same time, his identification with these men and women closed

him off from the rest of Concord's citizenry.

As he noted

years later, in peaceable times the "Concord majority sided

with itself and did not approve of people like abolitionists
and Transcendentalists who would turn the world upside down."

This Concord majority disliked the "enemies of constituted

authorities" and turned "all the weapons of
exhortation, gossip and Pharisiac aloofness" against
them.
So there
he was,

a schoolteacher and second generation
transcendentalist

spurned by the Concord majority and not yet fully
sustained
or accepted by those he longed to emulate.

Even during the

six months after Harpers Ferry, when he received
repeated

hints that he would be protected by the community, Sanborn

did not fully trust in Concord's citizens.

Then, in little

over a day, he had experienced a dramatic and intoxicating

alternation of his status.

He had been rescued,

feted,

saluted by cannon, and rhapsodized by men whose intimate
friendship he had so long and vainly sought.

The "people"

had "defended" him and "vowed" to protect him. 46
In the next few days the young man had a chance to

reflect on his new found station.
Theodore Parker about it.

He decided to write to

In the letter Sanborn strained to

define the essential meaning of the whole episode.

He man-

aged to do so in two crucial and revealing sentences.

Sanborn told Parker that "everything is going on favorably
for me as it can."

The tyranny of "the other side has put

all good citizens with me of all parties."

The kidnap

attempt and, by indirection, his relationship to abolition
and Brown had won him acceptance.

He was, as he noted years

later, made "popular in quarters where

before."

I

was not known

Frank Sanborn, the bright young son of

Hampshire clerk, who found that

a

a

New

Harvard education did not

automatically provide one with
finally found his place.

47

a niche in

Boston society, had
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